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A                                                                                               p                     p   e   l   l   a   t   e   P   r   o   c   e   d   u   r   e
NO. COA11-72
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  6 December  2011
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                                              Mecklenburg County
                                                                                                No.  06 CRS  244166
                                                                                                No.  08 CRS  46152
JOHN ARTHUR STROUD
Appeal  by  defendant  from  judgment  entered  23  September  2009
by  Judge  Timothy  S.  Kincaid  in  Mecklenburg  County  Superior
Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  17 August  2011.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Richard H. Bradford, for the State.
Gilda C. Rodriguez for defendant-appellant.
BRYANT, Judge.
Where  the  trial  court’s  ruling  implicates  a  violation  of
defendant’s  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  counsel  and  where  the  State
fails  to  show  this  violation  was  harmless  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt, we must grant defendant a new trial.
Facts and Procedural History




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On  18  September  2006,  officers  in  the  Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Police  Department  arrested  John  Arthur  Stroud                            (“Defendant”)  for
possession  of  cocaine.     Defendant  was  subsequently  indicted  on
14 July  2008 for being an habitual felon.
This  case  was  called  for  trial  for  at  least  the  fourth  time
on  21  September  2009.    In  a  pre-trial  motion,  defendant  moved  to
withdraw  his  court-appointed  counsel.     After  hearing  from  both
parties,  the  trial  court  found  that  there  were  “legal  grounds  to
require  counsel  to  withdraw  or  remove  counsel  of  record.”    The
trial  court  then  gave  defendant  two  choices:                            “[y]ou  may  either
keep  Mr.  Sanders  as  your  attorney  and  try  this  thing  or  you
waive  counsel  and  try  it  without  one.”     Defendant  elected  to
keep his counsel rather than represent himself.
Also  pre-trial,  the  State  moved  to  “proffer  the  lab  analyst
[Agent  Jennifer  Leiser]  as  an  expert  in  forensic  chemistry  and
her  opinion  that  the  fact  that  the  evidence  in  this  case  was
tested  positively  to  be  cocaine.”     Defense  counsel  confirmed
that                                                                          “he  is  not  going  to  object”  when  the  State  introduces  the
lab  report  and  tenders  the  Agent  Leiser                                 “as  an  expert  witness”
and  only  requested                                                          “the  opportunity  to  cross-examine  her  at
trial.”
The  jury  returned  a  verdict  of  guilty  of  possession  of
cocaine  on  23  September  2009,  and  defendant  also  pled  guilty  to
being  an  habitual  felon.    The  trial  court  sentenced  defendant  to




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a   minimum   of                                                            120   months   and   a   maximum   of                           153   months
imprisonment.    Defendant appeals.
On  appeal,  defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by
(I)  denying  defendant’s  request  for  a  new  attorney,  and             (II)
admitting   a   laboratory   report   of   a   non-testifying   forensic
analyst and the testimony of a substitute analyst.
I.
Defendant   argues   the   trial   court   erred   by   denying
defendant’s  request  for  new  counsel  after  ruling  that  there
existed  legal  grounds  to  dismiss  current  counsel.  Defendant
contends  that  this  error  by  the  trial  court  essentially  denies
him  any  relief  or  effective  representation  under  the  Sixth
Amendment.    We are constrained to agree.
This   Court   reviews   an   appeal   alleging   a   violation   of
defendant’s  constitutional  rights  de  novo.    State  v.  Graham,  200
N.C.  App.  204,  214,  683  S.E.2d  437,  444  (2009).                     “A  violation  of
the  defendant's  rights  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United
States  is  prejudicial  unless  the  appellate  court  finds  that  it
was  harmless  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.”    N.C.G.S.  §  15A-1443(b)
(2009).                                                                     If  an  error  is  found,  the  State  bears  the  burden  of
proving  that  the  error  was  harmless  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.
Id.




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When   a   defendant   seeks   to   obtain   substitute   counsel,
defendant  must  show  “good  cause,  such  as  a  conflict  of  interest,
a   complete   breakdown   in   communication   or   an   irreconcilable
conflict  which  leads  to  an  apparently  unjust  verdict.”    State  v.
Covington,                                                                     __  N.C.  App.                                            __,    __,    696  S.E.2d   183,   185   (2010)
(quoting  State  v.  Sweezy,  291  N.C.  366,  372,  230  S.E.2d  524,  529
(1976)).                                                                       In  evaluating  the  effectiveness  of  counsel,          “the
obligation  of  the  court  [is]  to  inquire  into  defendant's  reasons
for  wanting  to  discharge  his  attorneys  and  to  determine  whether
those  reasons                                                                 [are]  legally  sufficient  to  require  the  discharge
of  counsel.”     State  v.  Hutchins                                          303  N.C.                                                 321,   335,   279  S.E.2d
788,  797  (1981).    A  defendant  does  not  “have  the  right  to  insist
that  new  counsel  be  appointed  merely  because  he  has  become
dissatisfied  with  the  attorney's  services.”                                                                                                 Id.    (citations
omitted).                                                                      “Similarly,   the   effectiveness   of   representation
cannot  be  gauged  by  the  amount  of  time  counsel  spends  with  the
accused;  such  a  factor  is  but  one  consideration  to  be  weighed  in
the  balance.”    Id.  (citations  omitted).                                   “In  the  absence  of  any
substantial  reason  for  the  appointment  of  replacement  counsel,
an  indigent  defendant  must  accept  counsel  appointed  by  the
court,  unless  he  wishes  to  present  his  own  defense.”                   Id.
(citation omitted).
“[A]  trial  court  is  constitutionally  required  to  appoint
substitute  counsel  whenever  representation  by  counsel  originally




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appointed   would   amount   to   denial   of   defendant's   right   to
effective  assistance  of  counsel,  that  is,  when  the  initial
appointment  has  not  afforded  defendant  his  constitutional  right
                                                                                                                                             to  counsel.”     State  v.  Thacker,                                         301  N.C.                                            348,          352,                        271  S.E.2d
252,                                                                          255                                                            (1980)                                                                        (citations  omitted).     Our  Supreme  Court  has
stated  that  “a  motion  to  withdraw  is  ordinarily  a  matter  left  to
the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  judge                                 .”     State  v.
Thomas,  310  N.C.  369,  375,  312  S.E.2d  458,  461  (1984)  (citation
omitted).
When  a  trial  court  exercises  its  own  judgment  in  rendering
a   decision,   the   abuse   of   discretion   standard   is   applied.
Appliance  Sales  &  Service  v.  Command  Electronics  Corp.,  115  N.C.
                                                                              App.  14,  21,  443  S.E.2d  784,  789  (1994).                                                                                                                                                                 “A  ruling  committed  to
                                                                                                                                             a  trial  court's  discretion  is  to  be  accorded  great  deference  and
                                                                                                                                             will  be  upset  only  upon  a  showing  that  it  was  so  arbitrary  that
                                                                                                                                             it  could  not  have  been  the  result  of  a  reasoned  decision.”
White  v.  White,                                                             312  N.C.                                                      770,                                                                          777,                                                 324  S.E.2d   829,                        833           (1985)
(citing  Clark  v.  Clark,                                                                                                                   301  N.C.                                                                     123,                                                 271  S.E.2d   58                          (1980)).
Further,                                                                      “[b]ecause  of  the  potential  these  challenges  have  for
disrupting  the  efficient  dispensing  of  justice,  appellate  courts
ought  to  be  reluctant  to  overturn  the  action  of  the  trial  judge”
absent  a  showing  of  a  Sixth  Amendment  violation  by  the  court.
State  v.  Hutchins,                                                          303  N.C.                                                      321,                                                                          337,                                                 279  S.E.2d   788,                        798




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                                                                     (1981);  see  also  State  v.  Covington,   __  N.C.  App.   __,         __,     696
S.E.2d  183,  185  (2010).
Here,   defendant   requested   new   counsel   and   specifically
complained to the trial court that:
I  called  this  man  every  day.  I  got  the
number  in  my  phone.  I  called  him  every  day.
I  never  got  no  response  whatsoever,  and  I'm
here  today  to  go  to  trial.  I  got  a  list  of
witnesses  right  here  that  would  have  been
here.  They  were  ready.  They  came  down  here
two  times  before                                                   --  ran  down  here  before,
but  he  said  he  was  going  to  subpoena  them.  I
called  him  every  day  to  see  if  he  subpoenaed
them.  I  haven't  heard  from  him  myself.  He
still has not talked to me about my case.
In reply, defense counsel informed the court that:
Mr.  Stroud  and  I  did  have  quite  a  bit  of
phone  tag  back  and  forth.  I  did                                [have]  a
lengthy  meeting  with  him  on  the  8th  of  June
where  we  discussed  this  case  in  some  detail.
I  did  ask  Mr.  Stroud  to  provide  a  list  --  if
he  had  any  witnesses  that  he  wanted  me  to
subpoena  or  wanted  me  to  contact,  I  asked
him   to   provide   a   list   of   witnesses   and
contact  information  at  that  time.  I  still
have  not  received  any  witnesses  or  any  way
to contact those witnesses.
Your  Honor,  Mr.  Stroud  did  call  me  probably
at  least  five  times  last  week,  and  I  did
return                                                               every                                       one              of          those   calls.
                                                                     Unfortunately,  I  recall                                    -  I  now           --  today
when  I  called  the  wrong  number;  I  had  one
digit  wrong.  His                                                   --  I  thought  I  was  calling
the  right  number,  but  I  want  the  Court  to
know  I  did  call  him  back  probably  five  or
six  times.  Unfortunately,  I  had  the  wrong
number.
But  just  so  the  Court  will  know,  I  have
discussed  the  case  with  Mr.  Stroud,  and  I'm




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prepared  to  go  to  trial  if  he  wants  to  have
me  as  his  counsel.  If  he  doesn't  want  me  to
have  as  his  counsel,  that's  certainly  his
prerogative.  I'm  ready  to  go  if  needed,  Your
Honor.
Both  defendant  and  counsel  acknowledged  that  the  case  was  over
three  years  old.    After  review,  the  trial  court  concluded  that
there  were                                                                   “legal  grounds  to  require  counsel  to  withdraw  or
remove  defense  counsel.”     The  trial  court  then  gave  defendant
two  choices:  either  keep  existing  defense  counsel  or  waive
counsel and try the case without an attorney.
We  are  confronted  in  this  case  with  the  trial  judge’s
determination  that  there  were  “legal  grounds  to  require  counsel
to   withdraw   or   remove   defense   counsel”;   yet,   instead   of
appointing  substitute  counsel,  the  trial  judge  gave  defendant
the  option  of  keeping  the  same  defense  counsel  or  waiving
counsel  and  proceeding  pro  se.    The  record  does  not  indicate  any
findings  of  fact  or  conclusions  of  law  set  forth  by  the  trial
court  that  would  provide  guidance  to  this  Court  in  evaluating
the  trial  court’s  actions.     All  we  have  is  the  trial  court’s
declaration  “that  there  were  legal  grounds  to  withdraw  or  remove
defense   counsel,”   a   declaration   which   effectively   granted
defendant’s  motion  to  remove  counsel.    This  ruling  of  the  trial
court  that  legal  grounds  exist  to  discharge  counsel,  absent
further   explication,   appears   to   implicate   a   violation   of




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defendant’s  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  counsel.1    As  such,  this  is
a  constitutional  error  and  such  errors  are  presumed  prejudicial
unless  the  State  shows  that  the  error  is  harmless  beyond  a
reasonable doubt.    N.C.G.S.  §  15A-1443(b)  (2009).
In  rebuttal,  the  State  argues  that  defendant  forfeited  his
constitutional  right  to  counsel  by  his  behavior  pursuant  to
State  v.  Montgomery,                                                         138  N.C.  App.         521,   530  S.E.2d   66   (2000).
We  find  this  argument  unpersuasive,  since  in  Montgomery  the
defendant  was  actually  verbally  disruptive  in  the  courtroom  on
two  occasions,  leading  to  trial  delays,  as  well  as  physically
disruptive  when  he  assaulted  his  attorney.     Id.  at                    525,                    530
S.E.2d  at  69;  see  also  United  States  v.  McLeod,  53  F.3d  322,  325
(11th  Cir.  1995)  (finding  that  defendant  forfeited  his  right  to
counsel when he threatened his attorney with harm).
After  careful  review,  we  find  nothing  in  the  record  to
indicate   that   defendant’s   actions   constitute   forfeiture   of
counsel.    Montgomery,  138  N.C.  App  at  524,  530  S.E.2d  at  69  (“A
forfeiture  results  when  the  state's  interest  in  maintaining  an
orderly    trial    schedule    and    the    defendant's    negligence,
indifference,  or  possibly  purposeful  delaying  tactic,  combine  to
1  Even  assuming  it  could  be  determined  that  the  trial  court’s
ruling  did  not  implicate  defendant’s  constitutional  right  to
counsel  because  the  trial  court  did  not  specifically  find  that
counsel’s    assistance    was    ineffective,    the    trial    court
nevertheless  abused  its  discretion  in  not  allowing  substitute
counsel   after   determining   there   were                                   “legally   sufficient
grounds” to discharge original counsel.




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justify  a  forfeiture  of  defendant's  right  to  counsel.                .”
(citation and quotations omitted)).
However,  notwithstanding  its  forfeiture  argument,  the  State
fails  to  demonstrate  that  the  error  by  the  trial  court  was
harmless   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt,   thereby   overcoming   the
presumption  of  prejudice.    Consequently,  we  must  grant  defendant
a new trial.
II.
Defendant  also  alleges  the  trial  court  erred  by  admitting  a
laboratory  report  of  a  non-testifying  forensic  analyst  and  the
testimony   of   a   substitute   analyst.   However,   we   decline   to
address this issue as we have granted defendant a new trial.
Reverse and remand for a new trial.
Judges GEER and BEASLEY concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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