Preview:

An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA07-1366
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  1 July  2008
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                                              Granville County
                                                                                                Nos.  06 CRS  52872-73
RONNIE DALE SUGGS
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 31 May 2007 by Judge
Robert H. Hobgood in Granville County Superior Court.   Heard in the
Court of Appeals  16 June  2008.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Jill A. Bryan, for the State.
Irving Joyner for defendant-appellant.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Ronnie  Dale  Suggs                                                                             (“defendant”)  appeals  from  the  judgment
entered upon his convictions for second degree sexual offense and
crime  against  nature.    For  the  reasons  stated  below,  we  find  no
error.
On  30 October  2006, the Granville County grand jury indicted
defendant on charges of first degree sexual offense, crime against
nature,  and  first  degree  kidnapping.    In  a  “notice  of  intent  to
introduce  evidence  of  defendant’s  prior  bad  acts”  pursuant  to
N.C.G.S.                                                                                        §                                             8C-1,  Rule   404(b)  filed  on   16  May   2007,  the  State




-2-
informed defendant of its intention to introduce facts supporting
earlier charges against him of first degree rape and second degree
kidnapping.
At  trial,  the  State  introduced  evidence  tending  to  show  the
following  occurrences,  which  gave  rise  to  the  charges  on  which
defendant  was  being  tried.     At  approximately                             5:30  p.m.  on   2
September 2006, Starneisha Minor (“Ms. Minor”) was walking home in
Durham  when  she  saw  defendant  lift  the  hood  of  his  truck.    She
noticed  a  pack  of  cigarettes  and  asked  defendant  for  one.    When
defendant agreed to her request, Ms. Minor walked over to the truck
which  was  on  the  side  of  the  street.    After  lowering  the  hood,
defendant  gave  her  a  cigarette  and  asked  if  she  needed  a  light.
Defendant  then  opened  the  truck  door  and  pulled  out  a  rusty  gun.
He told Ms. Minor to get into the truck through the driver’s side
door, and he proceeded to drive away with her.
Defendant drove around for approximately an hour with the gun
in  his  lap  before  stopping  in  a  wooded  area.    He  then  opened  the
passenger door, pointed the gun at Ms. Minor, and told her to take
off  her  clothes.    After  she  did  so,  she  said  defendant  “made  me
perform  oral  sex  on  him  there.”     Ms.  Minor  estimated  it  took
approximately  fifteen  minutes  to  complete  the  act,  and  defendant
apologized to her afterwards and told her that he was going to take
her home.   She got dressed, and they drove back toward Durham.   Ms.
Minor indicated she had repeatedly asked defendant to let her out
since  she  had  gotten  into  the  truck,  but  defendant  responded  by
shaking his head and continuing to drive.




-3-
Defendant stopped at a store at one point, but he did not get
out of the truck.   Ms. Minor saw a lady coming out of the store and
banged on the window.   The lady simply looked and then left in her
car.   Defendant drove away without getting anything from the store
and  stopped  about  thirty  minutes  later  at  what  appeared  to  be  a
recycling facility.   He parked behind the dumpsters, and Ms. Minor
saw  the  gun  again  when  he  opened  the  passenger  door.    Defendant
performed oral sex upon her for ten minutes, and the gun was within
his reach.    He next wanted her to perform oral sex upon him.    She
did so for about five minutes, then defendant wanted anal sex.   Ms.
Minor  said  she  “just  broke  down”  and  “just  started  crying  really
bad”  at  that  time.    Defendant  told  her  to  “[j]ust  get  out  .  .  .
[g]o in the woods and turn around.”    The gun was in his pocket at
that  time.    As  Ms.  Minor  got  out  and  pulled  up  her  clothes,  she
noticed defendant was looking around and inching the gun out of his
pocket.   She acted as if she were going into the woods and then ran
about  half  a  mile  to  a  building.    No  one  came when  she  banged  on
the door.   She hid behind some bushes and saw defendant’s truck go
around twice, at which time she ran to a church.
Officers responded to a  911 call from someone at the church.
Officer Bryan Kilgore took the initial report from Ms. Minor.   She
described  the  perpetrator  as  a  white  male  with  tattoos  and  blue
eyes and as wearing a Ford hat, a blue work shirt, and blue jeans.
She  said  the  gun  was  rusty  and  that  the  truck  was  blue  with  red
carpet and a stick shift.   She noticed a broken pair of sunglasses
on the dashboard and a screwdriver with a blue handle.    Ms. Minor




-4-
and three officers were unable to find the first location where she
was  assaulted,  but  they  did  find  the  second  location.    Detective
James Rose observed where it appeared a vehicle had been stopped in
the grass and also two spots about mid-way of the vehicle where it
appeared people had been.
Detective  Rose  and  Detective  Derek  Alston  later  conducted  a
formal interview with Ms. Minor at the police station.    Detective
Alston  then  drove  Ms.  Minor  to  Duke  Hospital,  where  a  sexual
assault kit was performed, and he took her to her home afterwards.
No  identifying  fluids  were  found  on  the  items  tested.    Detective
Alston  testified  that  he  recognized  the  perpetrator  from  the
description which Ms. Minor had given the officers earlier.    When
asked on what basis he recognized the individual, the trial court
excused the jury and conducted a voir dire hearing into the matter.
During the voir dire, Detective Alston recalled investigating
a sexual assault which had allegedly occurred at defendant’s home
approximately  a  year  earlier.    A  woman  who  was  supposed  to  dance
for  defendant  accused  him  of  putting  a  rusty  gun  to  her  head  and
sexually assaulting her.    Defendant described the woman as a call
girl, and he admitted having oral sex with the woman.   Police were
unable to locate the gun.   After hearing argument from counsel, the
trial court made the following ruling:
The  witness  may  testify  under  Rule  404(b)  as
to  statements  made  by  this  defendant  to  him
incident   to   a   matter   which   occurred                                  3
September                                                                      2005,  but  his  testimony  will  be
limited to what the defendant said to him.
He  may  not  refer  to  anything  additional
that  a  white  female  dancer  may  have  said  to




-5-
this witness, and the Court will instruct the
jury  that  this  evidence  is  admitted  for  the
limited  purpose  of  showing  identity,  motive,
intent, or plan but for no other purpose.
[G]oing  back  to  Rule                                                      404,  the  incident
was  contemporaneous  in  time,  being  within  a
year of the alleged crime in this case, and it
was similar in nature.
[U]nder  Rule                                                                403,  the  Court  rules  the
evidence is relevant, it is probative and the
probative  value  is  not  outweighed  by  the
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant in
that  a  limiting  instruction  will  be  given  to
the jury.
Detective Alston subsequently testified that he was involved
in  an  investigation  involving  defendant  for  an  offense  which
occurred on  3 September  2005.    Defendant admitted having oral sex
with  the  victim,  but  he  denied  having  intercourse  with  her.    He
said  that  the  victim  was  a  call  girl.    The  State  concluded  its
questioning  of  Detective  Alston  after  a  second  voir  dire  was
conducted,  and  the  trial  court  instructed  the  jury  that              “the
evidence  was  submitted  for                                                [the]  limited  purpose  of  showing
identity, motive, intent, or plan, if you so find.”
Detective Rose testified that he began interviewing defendant
at                                                                           11:45  p.m.  on  the  date  in  question.     During  questioning,
defendant stated:                                                            “Now, why would I be stupid going - - going down
to Durham, or Chapel Hill, or whatever, and then bring a woman up
here  and  all  that  stuff  and  get  in  trouble  up  here,  right?”
Detective Rose indicated that he had not “mentioned anything about
a  woman  being  brought  up  from  Durham,  Chapel  Hill,  or  whatever
else[.]”    To  his  knowledge,  no  other  officer  had  mentioned  that
information to defendant either.   Later in the interview, defendant




-6-
admitted picking up a prostitute in Durham and bringing her back to
Butner to perform oral sex for twenty-five dollars.   When asked how
he knew the woman was a prostitute, defendant told Detective Rose
that the woman had approached his truck in Durham and asked, “What
you  doing?”    Defendant  told  her  that  he  was  “looking  for  a  real
good  time,  that’s  it.”     Detective  Rose  suggested  at  one  point
during  the  interview  that  defendant  was  lying,  and  defendant
responded  that  he  “didn’t  hurt  the  girl  or  nothing.”    When  asked
what he did to her, defendant said,  “I just got one blow job.”
Detective Rose searched defendant’s truck later that night or
early the next day.   He observed a broken pair of sunglasses on the
dashboard  and  a  tool  which  could  have  been  a  screwdriver,  and  he
was involved in the seizure of a Ford hat and a work shirt with a
name insignia on it from defendant’s residence.
At  the  close  of  the  State’s  evidence,  defendant  moved  to
dismiss  the  charges.     The  trial  court  denied  the  motion,  and
defendant did not present any evidence.   After receiving the trial
court’s instructions, the jury deliberated and found defendant to
be  guilty  of  second  degree  sexual  offense,  crime  against  nature,
and second degree kidnapping.   The trial court arrested judgment on
the second degree kidnapping offense, and it then consolidated the
two remaining offenses for judgment and imposed a sentence of  110
to                                                                            141  months  imprisonment.     From  the  trial  court’s  judgment,
defendant appeals.
Defendant first contends the trial court erred by allowing the
State to introduce evidence of statements he allegedly made during




-7-
an  interview  by  a  police  officer  in  a  prior  unrelated  charge  in
violation of N.C.G.S.  §  8C-1, Rules  403 and 404(b).   He argues the
State could not introduce evidence of his bad character because he
did not testify or otherwise present any character evidence.
Evidence  of  a  defendant’s  other  crimes,  wrongs,  or  acts  is
admissible under Rule 404(b) for purposes “such as proof of motive,
opportunity,  intent,  preparation,  plan,  knowledge,  identity,  or
absence  of  mistake,  entrapment,  or  accident.”    N.C.G.S.  §  8C-1,
Rule  404(b)  (2007).                                                        “The courts of this State have been markedly
liberal  in  admitting  evidence  of  prior  sexual  misconduct  of  a
defendant for the purposes cited in Rule 404(b).”   State v. Smith,
152 N.C. App.  514,  527,  568 S.E.2d  289,  297, disc. review denied,
356 N.C. 623, 575 S.E.2d 757 (2002).   The use of evidence permitted
under  Rule                                                                  404(b)  is  guided  by  two  constraints:  similarity  and
temporal proximity.    State v. Brothers,  151 N.C. App.  71,  76,  564
S.E.2d                                                                       603,                                                         607       (2002),  disc.  review  denied,   356  N.C.   681,                   577
S.E.2d                                                                       895                                                          (2003).   This   Court   reviews                        “a   trial   court’s
determination to admit evidence under  [Rules]  404(b) and  403, for
an abuse of discretion.”   State v. Summers, 177 N.C. App. 691, 697,
629 S.E.2d 902, 907, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 653, 637 S.E.2d
192  (2006).
In  the  present  case,  the  State  offered  testimony  from
Detective  Alston  about  an  earlier  incident  involving  defendant.
When questioned by Detective Alston, defendant described the woman
as a call girl.   Defendant admitted having oral sex with the woman,
but  he  denied  having  intercourse  with  her.    The  earlier  incident




-8-
occurred  approximately  a  year  before  the  offenses  at  issue  here.
We  note  the  trial  court  instructed  the  jury  to  consider  the
evidence only for the purpose of identity, motive, intent, or plan.
Considering  the  temporal  proximity  of  the  two  incidents  and
defendant’s proclivity for a specific sexual act to the exclusion
of another with women he considered to be prostitutes, we conclude
the  previous  incident  was  sufficiently  similar  to  be  admissible
pursuant to Rule  404(b).
Even  assuming,  arguendo,  that  the  evidence  should  not  have
been admitted, we conclude that defendant was not unduly prejudiced
by  its  admission.                                                           “The  party  who  asserts  that  evidence  was
improperly  admitted  usually  has  the  burden  to  show  the  error  and
that  he  was  prejudiced  by  its  admission.”    State  v.  Anthony,  133
N.C.  App.  573,  579,  516  S.E.2d  195,  199  (1999),  aff’d,  351  N.C.
611,                                                                          528  S.E.2d                                      321   (2000).   “Evidentiary  errors  are  harmless
unless a defendant proves that absent the error a different result
would  have  been  reached  at  trial.”    State  v.  Ferguson,  145  N.C.
App.  302,  307,  549 S.E.2d  889,  893, disc. review denied,  354 N.C.
223, 554 S.E.2d 650 (2001).   Here, there was overwhelming evidence
of defendant’s guilt.    Ms. Minor spent approximately two and one-
half  hours  during  daylight  hours  in  close  proximity  to  the
perpetrator, who did not attempt to obscure his appearance, and she
positively identified defendant in open court.   Defendant admitted
to picking up a  “prostitute” in Durham and bringing her to Butner
to  perform  oral  sex.    A  search  of  defendant’s  truck  revealed  a
broken pair of sunglasses on the dashboard and a tool which could




-9-
have been a screwdriver that Ms. Minor had observed.    A search of
his residence revealed a Ford hat and a work shirt that Ms. Minor
had  described  the  perpetrator  as  wearing.     Even  if  Detective
Alston’s  testimony  regarding  the  prior  incident  had  not  been
admitted,  it  is  unlikely  that  a  different  result  would  have
occurred at trial.    This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next contends the trial court erred by refusing to
dismiss   the   second   degree   sexual   offense   charge   due   to
insufficiency of the evidence.   He argues Ms. Minor did not testify
that she was in fear of him or that she had engaged in the sexual
acts  without  her  consent  or  as  a  result  of  any  force  which  he
directed toward her.    We disagree.
In  addressing  a  motion  to  dismiss,  the  trial  court  must
determine  whether  there  is  both  substantial  evidence  of  each
element  of  the  offense  charged  and  substantial  evidence  that  the
defendant is the perpetrator.   State v. Stroud, 345 N.C. 106, 111,
478 S.E.2d  476, 479  (1996), cert. denied,  522 U.S.  826,  139 L. Ed.
2d                                                                          43                                                                     (1997).   Substantial  evidence  is  defined  as   “relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.”   State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564,  411 S.E.2d  592,
595                                                                         (1992).    The  evidence  must  be  considered  in  the  light  most
favorable  to  the  State,  drawing  all  reasonable  inferences  in  the
State’s  favor  whether  the  evidence  is  direct,  circumstantial,  or
both.    State  v.  Israel,                                                 353  N.C.                                                              211,      216,  539  S.E.2d                        633,        637
(2000).




-10-
The elements of second degree sexual offense are: (1) a person
engages in a sexual act;  (2) with another person; and  (3) the act
is by force and against the person’s will.    See N.C. Gen. Stat.  §
14-27.5(a) (2007).   Defendant only challenges the third element of
the  offense.                                                                 “The  requisite  force  may  be  established  either  by
actual,  physical  force  or  by  constructive  force  in  the  form  of
fear, fright, or coercion.”    State v. Etheridge,  319 N.C.  34,  45,
352  S.E.2d  673,  680  (1987).    Constructive  force  may  be  proven  by
the  State  with  evidence  of  the  defendant’s  threats  of  serious
bodily  injury  or  other  actions,  which  under  the  totality  of  the
circumstances, permit an inference that the victim was compelled to
submit to the sexual acts.    Id.
During Ms. Minor’s entire ordeal, defendant kept the handgun
in  his  lap,  in  his  pocket,  in  his  hand,  or  within  reach  while
directing her to submit to the sexual acts or while confining her
in the truck prior to each of the sexual acts.   When viewed in the
light most favorable to the State, there was substantial evidence
permitting a reasonable inference that Ms. Minor was compelled to
submit  to  the  sexual  acts  by  fear  or  coercion.    The  trial  court
properly denied the motion to dismiss the charge of second degree
sexual offense, and this argument is overruled.
No error.
Judges CALABRIA and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

Download 07-1366-5.pdf

South Carolina Law