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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA08-1290
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          7 July  2009
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                                              Burke County
                                                                                                No.  03 CRS  002068-69
DANNY EUGENE TOMLINSON
Appeal  by  defendant  from  judgment  entered                                                  11  July                 2008  by
Judge J. Gentry Caudill in Burke County Superior Court.    Heard in
the Court of Appeals  25 March  2009.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General W.
Wallace Finlator, Jr., for the State.
Cheshire, Parker, Schneider, Bryan & Vitale, by John Keeting
Wiles, for defendant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Danny  Eugene  Tomlinson  (defendant)  appeals  from  convictions
for breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, possession
of stolen goods, and safecracking.
Break-ins occurred at two convenience stores in Burke County:
the  Family  Food  Mart  in  Rutherford  College  during  the  night  and
early  morning  of                                                                              2-3  December            2002  and  the  Knob  Superette  in
Connelly  Springs  during  the  night  and  early  morning  of                                  19-20
January 2003.   Defendant’s house is located between the two stores.
At approximately 5:30 a.m. on the morning of 3 December 2002,
Joel  Abee  arrived  at  the  Family  Food  Mart,  which  Abee  owns.    He




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testified  that  the  ATM  located  to  the  left  of  the  front  door  had
been “bashed” in, although not successfully broken into.   Abee then
discovered that the store’s safe had been pulled from its location
beside  the  cash  register  and  then  broken  into.     The  safe  had
contained                                                                      $8,730.13   in   blue   Bank   of   Granite   money   bags.
Additionally,  approximately  sixty  cartons  of  Marlboro  cigarettes
had  been  stolen,  valued  at  approximately                                  $1,692.00.    Entry  had
apparently  been  gained  via  a  hole  chiseled  in  the  back  bathroom.
Three telephone lines going into the store had been cut to prevent
the alarms from dialing for help.
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on the morning of 20 January 2003,
Margie  Clemens  arrived  at  the  Knob  Superette,  where  she  was  the
kitchen manager.   She testified that, upon entering the store, she
noticed  that  the  time  clock  had  been  destroyed  and  that  the  safe
had  been  busted  open.    Additionally,  Tahoe  brand  cigarettes  had
been stolen.   Clemens tried to call the police, but the phone lines
entering the store had been cut.    The method of entry appeared to
be  a  hole  broken  into  the  concrete  at  the  back  of  the  building.
Clemens  testified  that  defendant  was  a  regular  at  her  lunch
counter.
Jason  Tomlinson  (Jason),  defendant’s  nephew,  told  Detective
Becky Brendle that he knew his uncle was involved in breaking and
entering  businesses.    Detective  Brendle  testified  that  Jason  had
told  her  that  when  he  and  defendant  were  employed  laying  tile,
defendant  said,                                                               “I’m  going  to  make  one  good  lick,”  which  Jason
explained is common parlance for a robbery.   Jason also said that,




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after the Family Food Mart break-in, defendant told Jason that “it
was the easiest job I have done.”    Two days after the Family Food
Mart break-in, Jason saw defendant come out of his camper holding
a blue money bag and proclaiming, “See, if you’re smart, all you’ve
got to do is make one good lick.”
Defendant  later  told  Jason  that  he  had  approached  the  Knob
Superette  store  via  the  back  road  behind  the  store  and  that  the
only  evidence  the  police  had  were  boot  tracks,  about  which
defendant remarked,  “I ain’t even going to worry about that.”
Kathleen Gantt testified that defendant had told her that he
and Johnny Wilson had broken into the Family Food Mart and the Knob
Superette  and  that  they  “needed  to  get  rid  of  the  stuff  and  have
somewhere  to  put  the  money  and  the  bags  and  exchange  rolls  of
money.”    Gantt testified that defendant tried to bribe her to say
that Wilson alone had broken into the stores.
David Maynor testified that he had shared a cell at Mountain
View  Correctional  Center  in  Spruce  Pine  with  defendant.    Maynor
testified that defendant had told Maynor how he had disabled alarms
and  broken  into  safes.     Defendant  spoke  specifically  about  a
business in Burke County where he had disabled the telephones and
then broken in.    Defendant mentioned that the business was one at
which he frequently ate and that was “right down the road” from his
house.
Detective  Stacy  Buff  testified  that,  pursuant  to  a  search
warrant issued  17 March  2003, he had recovered an empty blue Bank
of Granite money bag from underneath a seat in a Chevy S10 Blazer




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that  Detective  Buff  had  seen  defendant  driving.    When  Detective
Buff  questioned  defendant  about  the  break-ins,  defendant—while
smoking Tahoe brand cigarettes—denied involvement.
At trial, over defendant’s objection, the State moved to join
the charges relating to the break-ins of the Family Food Mart and
the Knob Superette.   Defendant argued that joining the two offenses
would  be  “piling  on”  and  the  jury  might  “have  a  hard  time  .  .  .
separating the two offenses.”    However, the trial court concluded
that  “the two offenses were in the same general vicinity” and were
perpetrated against  “similar-type business establishments” with a
similar  “method  of  operation.”    Also,  the  trial  court  concluded
that  “the time between the two break-ins was not so great so as to
lessen the similarities between the two break-ins” and that the two
break-ins  “[formed]  a  series  of  two  acts  connected  together  and
constituting  a  single  scheme  or  plan.”    As  such,  the  trial  court
joined the two offenses for trial.
Later,  Abee  said  during  voir  dire  that  Detectives  Buff  and
Brendle  had  shown  him  photos  of  suspects,  including  defendant.
However,  the  record  did  not  include  a  photo  array,  and  it  was
determined  that  the  detectives  had  shown  Abee  only  a  photo  of
defendant.
Defendant moved for a mistrial, but the trial court held that
a mistrial would be inappropriate.    The detectives had shown Abee
the  photo  of  defendant  in  order  to  determine  whether  or  not
defendant had previously been a customer at the Family Food Mart;
the photo had not been shown in order for Abee to indicate whether




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or not he believed that defendant had committed the break-ins.   To
this end, the trial court stated:
[T]he appropriate sanction will be to prohibit
the State from introducing evidence regarding
the identification of defendant as having been
a customer in the store on previous occasions.
Based    on    the    foregoing    findings    and
conclusions,   the   defendant’s   motion   for
mistrial is denied and the State is prohibited
from introducing evidence from this witness or
other  witnesses  connected  with  a  break-in  at
the Family Food Mart on or about December  2nd
-  3rd of  2002.
The jury returned guilty verdicts against defendant for breaking or
entering the Knob Superette and the Family Food Mart with intent to
commit larceny therein, as well as for possession of stolen goods
from both stores, and for four counts of safecracking.    Defendant
was  also  found  guilty  of  being  a  habitual  felon  and  ordered  to
serve consecutive sentences of between 167 and 210 months, totaling
334 to  420 months.   Defendant now appeals.   For the reasons stated
below, we hold that defendant received a trial free from error.
Arguments
I.
First,  defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court  abused  its
discretion  by  allowing  the  State  to  join  the  break-ins  at  the
Family Food Mart and the Knob Superette.    We disagree.
With  respect  to  joinder  of  offenses,  North  Carolina  General
Statutes provide that  “[t]wo or more offenses may be joined in one
pleading or for trial when the offenses . . . are based on the same
act or transaction or on a series of acts or transactions connected




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together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.”    N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  15A-926(a)  (2007).
In  determining  the  transactional  connections  between  two
offenses, the following will be considered:                                   “(1) the nature of the
offenses  charged;                                                            (2)   any  commonality  of  facts  between  the
offenses;  (3) the lapse of time between the offenses; and  (4) the
unique circumstances of each case.”   State v. Perry, 142 N.C. App.
177,                                                                          181,                                              541  S.E.2d     746,                               749      (2001)   (quotations  and  citation
omitted).
On review, the question for joinder is:
whether  the  offenses  are  so  separate  in  time
and place and so distinct in circumstances as
to                                                                            render                                            consolidation                                      unjust   and
prejudicial.                                                                                                                                    Whether   offenses   should   be
joined  is  a  matter  addressed  to  the  sound
discretion  of  the  trial  judge.     His  ruling
will be overturned only upon a showing that he
abused his discretion.
State  v.  Chandler,  324  N.C.  172,  188,  376  S.E.2d  728,  738  (1989)
(citations omitted).
The   facts   of   the   present   case   meet   the   transactional
connections required by Perry and Chandler because both break-ins
involved (1) entry by breaking through the back cinder block wall,
(2)  telephone  wires  being  cut  to  prevent  the  alarm  from  dialing,
(3)  safes  being  cracked,                                                   (4)  cigarettes  being  stolen,                   (5)  a
proximity in location of the two stores to defendant’s residence,
and  (6)  two  stores  that  are  similar  types  of  establishments.    In
particular, cutting the telephone lines and then breaking the safes
are unique circumstances.




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As for the question of the seven-week time lapse between the
offenses,  our  Supreme  Court  has  previously  allowed  joinder  for
crimes  spread  over  sixteen  months,  including  an  interval  of  five
months  between  two  of  the  crimes,  because  the  crimes  featured  a
“similar modus operandi, similar circumstances, . . . [and] similar
location.”    State v. Williams,  355 N.C.  501,  531,  565 S.E.2d  609,
627  (2002).    As  such,  the  passage  of  seven  weeks  between  crimes
does not disqualify joinder.
Chandler also states that for joinder to be erroneous, it must
be “unjust and prejudicial.”   Chandler, 324 N.C. at 188, 376 S.E.2d
at  738  (citations omitted).                                                  “A defendant is prejudiced by errors
. . . when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in
question  not  been  committed,  a  different  result  would  have  been
reached  at  the  trial  out  of  which  the  appeal  arises.”    N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  15A-1443(a)  (2007).
Therefore, given the high level of similarity between the two
offenses  and  the  numerous  witnesses  testifying  about  defendant’s
involvement in both offenses, it was not unjust or prejudicial to
join the offenses because there was no reasonable possibility that
separating  the  offenses  into  separate  trials  would  have  produced
any different outcome than occurred when the charges were joined.
Therefore, the trial court did not commit error in this matter.
II.
Second, defendant argues that the trial court committed plain
error  by  allowing  the  State  to  present  evidence  related  to  the




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break-in at the Family Food Mart after the court had prohibited the
State from introducing evidence  “connected with a break-in at the
Family Food Mart.”    We disagree.
Defendant raised no objection at trial to the introduction of
evidence  relevant  to  the  break-in  at  the  Family  Food  Mart  and
therefore  waived  the  objection.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                      §                       15A-1446(b)
(2007).    However,  “[i]n  criminal  cases,  a  question  which  was  not
preserved by objection noted at trial  .  .  . may be made the basis
of an assignment of error where the judicial action questioned is
specifically  and  distinctly  contended  to  amount  to  plain  error.”
N.C.R. App. P.  10(c)(4)  (2007).
Our Supreme Court has said:
the  plain  error  rule                                                      .  is  always  to  be
applied cautiously and only in the exceptional
case where, after reviewing the entire record,
it   can   be   said   the   claimed   error   is   a
fundamental  error,  something  so  basic,  so
prejudicial,  so  lacking  in  its  elements  that
justice cannot have been done,  .  .  . where it
can  be  fairly  said  the  instructional  mistake
had  a  probable  impact  on  the  jury’s  finding
that the defendant was guilty.
State  v.  Black,                                                            308  N.C.               736,          740,   303  S.E.2d   804,   806   (1983)
(quotations and citations omitted).
However,  defendant’s  argument  is  predicated  on  an  erroneous
construction  of  the  trial  court’s  order,  and,  therefore,  lacks
merit.
The  trial  court  ordered  that  “the  State  is  prohibited  from
introducing evidence from this witness or other witnesses connected
with  a  break-in  at  the  Family  Food  Mart  on  or  about  December
2nd-3rd of 2002.”   The topic of discussion at that time was whether




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or not defendant was a prior customer at the Family Food Mart.   The
trial  court’s  order  resulted  from  confusion  over  whether  the
detectives had shown Abee a photo array or just a single photo of
defendant.   However, defendant’s literal reading of that statement
ignores  the  trial  court’s  immediately  preceding  order  that           “the
appropriate sanction will be to prohibit the State from introducing
evidence regarding the identification of defendant as having been
a  customer  in  the  store  on  previous  occasions.”    Therefore,  the
trial court’s allowance of evidence concerning the Family Food Mart
break-in was not contradictory to its ruling prohibiting evidence
to be submitted that defendant was a prior customer at the Family
Food Mart.    As such, defendant’s argument for plain error fails.
III.
Third, defendant argues that the trial court committed plain
error  by  allowing  Detective  Brendle  to  give  testimony  tending  to
show that defendant had a prior conviction; defendant also argues
that the trial court abused its discretion by also allowing Maynor
to  give  testimony  tending  to  show  that  defendant  had  a  prior
conviction.    We disagree.
Defendant  raised  no  objection  at  trial  to  the  testimony  of
Detective  Brendle.     Therefore,  defendant  waived  the  objection.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(b) (2007).   However, as discussed supra
at  Section  II,  this  court  may  hear  the  argument  since  defendant
specifically  contends  that  the  trial  court  committed  plain  error
with  regards  to  Detective  Brendle’s  testimony.     Defendant  did




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object at trial to the testimony of Maynor and now argues that the
trial  court’s  allowance  of  testimony  by  Maynor  was  an  abuse  of
discretion.
Testimony incidentally showing prior convictions is allowable
if it goes towards the witness’s “opportunity . . . [or] knowledge”
to  have  accurately  learned  the  information.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.         §
8C-1, Rule  404(b)  (2007).    Detective Brendle testified about what
Jason had told her.    While working with defendant at a job laying
tile after defendant had been released from prison, Jason had heard
defendant’s  plans  to  commit  break-ins.    Maynor  testified  that  he
had  not  known  defendant  except  for  when  they  had  shared  a  prison
cell,  where  defendant  had  spoken  specifically  of  a  previous
break-in.    In both instances, the timing and circumstances of the
conversation were necessary in order to provide more understandable
and  credible  testimony  to  the  jury.    Therefore,  the  evidence  was
allowable  under  Rule  404(b),  as  it  went  toward  showing  that  the
witnesses  had  the  opportunity  to  learn  this  knowledge  concerning
defendant’s involvement with the break-ins.   See N.C. Gen. Stat. §
8C-1,  Rule  404(b)  (2007)  (“Evidence  of  other  crimes,  wrongs,  or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show that he acted in conformity therewith.   It may, however, be
admissible   for   other   purposes,   such   as   proof   of   motive,
opportunity,  intent,  preparation,  plan,  knowledge,  identity,  or
absence  of  mistake,  entrapment  or  accident.”).     Therefore,  the
trial court did not err by admitting the questioned testimony.




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Even assuming arguendo that the trial court committed error,
defendant  still  fails  to  show  that  the  jury  probably  would  have
reached a different conclusion had the error not been made.   Given
the   remaining   unchallenged   witness   testimony   and   the   other
evidence, such as the blue money bag recovered from defendant’s car
and  defendant’s  possession  of  Tahoe  cigarettes,  plus  the  unique
modus operandi for the two break-ins, then there is no reasonable
possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been different
absent  the  testimony  tending  to  show  that  defendant  had  a  prior
conviction.
IV.
Defendant  next  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  denying
defendant’s   motion   to   dismiss   the   charges   for   insufficient
evidence.    Again, we disagree.
“The   standard   of   review   on   a   motion   to   dismiss   for
insufficient evidence is whether the State has offered substantial
evidence of each required element of the offense charged.”    State
v.  Goblet,                                                                 173  N.C.  App.   112,   118,   618  S.E.2d   257,   262   (2005).
Evidence is substantial if it is relevant and if it is sufficient
to  persuade  a  rational  juror  to  accept  a  particular  conclusion.”
State v. Frogge, 351 N.C. 576, 584, 528 S.E.2d 893, 899 (2000).   In
ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, this Court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and
every reasonable inference drawn from the evidence must be afforded
to the State.    Id. at  585,  528 S.E.2d at  899.




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The jury was charged with deciding two counts of breaking or
entering with the intent to commit larceny therein, two counts of
possession of stolen property, and four counts of safecracking.
A  person  is  guilty  of  breaking  or  entering  with  intent  to
commit larceny if “he breaks or enters any building with intent to
commit  .  . . larceny therein.”   N.C. Gen. Stat.  § 14-54(A) (2007).
A person is guilty of safecracking if he
unlawfully opens, enters, or attempts to open
or enter a safe or vault:
(1)  By  the  use  of  explosives,  drills,  or
tools; or
(2)  Through  the  use  of  a  stolen  combination,
key, electronic device, or other fraudulently
acquired implement or means; or
(3) Through the use of a master key, duplicate
key   or   device   made   or   obtained   in   an
unauthorized   manner,   stethoscope   or   other
listening  device,  electronic  device  used  for
unauthorized  entry  in  a  safe  or  vault,  or
other surreptitious means; or
(4)  By  the  use  of  any  other  safecracking
implement or means.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-89.1(a)  (2007).
A person is guilty of felonious possession of stolen property
if  he                                                                    “[possesses]  stolen  goods  knowing  or  having  reasonable
grounds to believe them to [have been] stolen” during a breaking or
entering.    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §§  14-72(b)(2),  (c)  (2007).
For  breaking  or  entering  the  Family  Food  Mart  and  the  Knob
Superette  and  then  cracking  the  safes,  the  State  presented  the
following   evidence:                                                     (1)   Detective   Brendle’s   testimony   that
defendant  had  told  Jason  that  he  had  broken  into  the  Knob




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Superette, had shown Jason a blue money bag, and had told him that
“it  was  the  easiest  job  I  have  done”;  (2)  Gantt’s  testimony  that
defendant  had  told  her  that  he  and  Wilson  had  broken  into  both
stores and that defendant tried to bribe Gantt to claim that Wilson
had acted alone; (3) Maynor’s testimony that defendant had told him
about cutting phone lines before breaking into businesses, that he
had  cracked  safes  during  break-ins,  and  that  he  had  once  broken
into a store where he frequently ate and that was near his house;
and (4) Clemens’s and Abee’s testimony outlining the details of the
break-ins, including the cut telephone lines and the cracked safes,
as well as the fact that defendant was a frequent customer at the
Knob Superette.
Given this extensive testimony and evidence, the State met its
burden by offering substantial evidence that it was defendant who
broke  into  the  Family  Food  Mart  and  the  Knob  Superette  with  the
intent  to  commit  larceny  therein  and  then  cracked  both  stores’
safes.
For possession of stolen property from both stores, the State
presented  the  following  evidence:                                          (1)  money  and  cigarettes,
specifically Tahoe brand from the Knob Superette, were stolen from
the  two  stores;  (2)  defendant  was  smoking  Tahoe  brand  cigarettes
when  Detective  Brendle  questioned  him;  (3)  Abee’s  testimony  that
the money at the Family Food Mart was kept in blue bank bags;  (4)
Brendle’s testimony that defendant had shown Jason a blue money bag
and said,  “See, if you’re smart, all you’ve got to do is make one
good  lick”;  (5)  Detective  Brendle’s  recovery  of  a  blue  money  bag




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from defendant’s car; and (6) Gantt’s testimony that defendant had
asked  her  for  a  place  to  put  the  money  and  cigarettes  from  the
break-ins of both stores.
Again,  given  this  substantial  testimony  and  evidence,  the
State  met  its  burden  for  possession  of  stolen  property  from  both
stores.    Defendant’s argument that he was merely in possession of
the  money  bag  and  not  the  money  itself  is  without  merit,  as  the
money bag was part and parcel of the money stolen from the Family
Food Mart.
Therefore, defendant’s fourth assignment of error also fails.
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant received a trial free from
error.
No error.
Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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