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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No.  267PA99
FILED:  7 APRIL  2000
ALEX H. THOMPSON, and wife, SHEILA THOMPSON
v.
MICHAEL S. WATERS, d/b/a WATERHOUSE REALTY & CONSTRUCTION and
LEE COUNTY
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S.  §  7A-31 of an
unpublished, unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,  133 N.C.
App.  194,  520 S.E.2d  611  (1999), affirming an amended order
signed by Stanback, J., on  6 August  1998 in Superior Court, Lee
County.    A conditional petition for discretionary review as to
additional issues was allowed by the Supreme Court on  22 July
1999.    Heard in the Supreme Court  17 November  1999.
Cunningham, Dedmond, Petersen & Smith, L.L.P., by Bruce T.
Cunningham, Jr., for plaintiff-appellants.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Coleman M.
Cowan, for defendant-appellee Lee County.
Stella A. Boswell on behalf of North Carolina Academy of
Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae.
FRYE, Chief Justice.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Superior Court, Lee County,
alleging negligent inspection by defendant Lee County and
negligent construction by defendant Michael Waters.    Defendant
Lee County contends that the public duty doctrine bars
plaintiffs’ claim.    We conclude that the public duty doctrine
does not bar plaintiffs’ claim against Lee County for negligent
inspection.




This appeal is before us based on defendant Lee County’s
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, N.C. R. Civ. P.  12(b)(6); thus, we treat
plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true.    See Cage v. Colonial
Bldg. Co.,  337 N.C.  682,  683,  448 S.E.2d  115,  116  (1994).    The
question then becomes whether the allegations of the complaint,
if treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted under some legal theory.    See Lynn v.
Overlook Dev.,  328 N.C.  689,  692,  403 S.E.2d  469,  471  (1991).
Plaintiffs alleged the following in their complaint:    In
September of  1994, plaintiffs entered into a contract with
defendant Waters to construct a private residence.    The building
inspectors for Lee County made periodic inspections of the home
and were grossly negligent in that they approved construction
that was in violation of the North Carolina State Building Code
and good building practice.    Within two weeks of the completion
of the home, plaintiffs began experiencing substantial structural
defects including stress fractures, cracks, settling of
foundations, and shifting of walls.    On  14 November  1996,
plaintiffs received a report from the Lee County Department of
Inspection outlining the numerous defects and building code
violations in the residence.
Defendant Lee County filed a motion to dismiss the action
against Lee County on the basis of the public duty doctrine.    In
response, plaintiffs alleged that the case was not within the
bounds of the public duty doctrine or, in the alternative, that
there existed a special relationship between plaintiffs and Lee
County.




The Superior Court allowed defendant Lee County’s motion to
dismiss.    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s
ruling in a unanimous, unpublished decision.    Thompson v. Waters,
133 N.C. App.  194,  520 S.E.2d  611  (1999).    This Court allowed
plaintiffs’ petition for discretionary review on  22 July  1999.
Defendant Waters is not a party to this appeal.
Plaintiffs contend that the public duty doctrine does not
insulate building inspectors from responsibility for their
negligent acts or, in the alternative, that a special
relationship or special duty existed between plaintiffs and the
County.    Defendant Lee County counters that plaintiffs’ claim is
barred by the public duty doctrine.
In Braswell v. Braswell,  330 N.C.  363,  410 S.E.2d  897
(1991), this Court applied the public duty doctrine to local law
enforcement and held that a municipality and its agents could not
be held liable for failure to furnish police protection to
specific individuals.    The Court also adopted two generally
recognized exceptions to the public duty doctrine in Braswell:
first, where there is a special relationship between the injured
party and the governmental entity, and second, where the
governmental entity creates a special duty by  “‘promising
protection to an individual, the protection is not forthcoming,
and the individual’s reliance on the promise of protection is
causally related to the injury suffered.’”    Id. at  371,  410
S.E.2d at  902  (quoting Coleman v. Cooper,  89 N.C. App.  188,  194,
366 S.E.2d  2,  6, disc. rev. denied,  322 N.C.  834,  371 S.E.2d  275
(1988)).
Notwithstanding our application of the public duty doctrine
in Braswell, this Court, for reasons stated therein, declined to




apply the public duty doctrine in Isenhour v. Hutto,  350 N.C.
601,  517 S.E.2d  121  (1999).    In Isenhour, the plaintiff brought
an action against a school crossing guard and the City of
Charlotte for the injuries and wrongful death that resulted when
a child was struck by an automobile while crossing the street.
Id. at  602,  517 S.E.2d at  123.    The Court concluded that the
public duty doctrine did not shield the City or the crossing
guard, in her official capacity, from liability.    Id. at  608,  517
S.E.2d at  126.    In Stone v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor,  347 N.C.  473,
495 S.E.2d  711, cert. denied,  ___ U.S.  ___,  142 L. Ed.  2d  449
(1998), and Hunt v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor,  348 N.C.  192,  499 S.E.2d
747  (1998), a majority of this Court extended the application of
the public duty doctrine so as to bar plaintiffs’ claims against
a state agency, the Department of Labor.    We are now asked to
extend the public duty doctrine as adopted in Braswell in this
case against a county for the alleged negligence of its building
inspector.    We decline to do so.
The public duty doctrine has caused confusion in other
jurisdictions.    Several courts have expressed difficulty applying
or interpreting the doctrine and its exceptions.    See Jean W. v.
Commonwealth,  414 Mass.  496,  499,  610 N.E.2d  305,  307  (1993);
Doucette v. Town of Bristol,  138 N.H.  205,  209,  635 A.2d  1387,
1390  (1993); Schear v. Board of County Comm’rs,  101 N.M.  671,
674,  687 P.2d  728,  731  (1984).    In some states where sovereign
immunity has been either legislatively or judicially abrogated,
courts have abandoned the public duty doctrine as another form of
sovereign immunity.    See, e.g., Adams v. State,  555 P.2d  235,
241-42  (Alaska  1976); Schear,  101 N.M. at  677,  687 P.2d at  734;
Coffey v. City of Milwaukee,  74 Wis.  2d  526,  536,  247 N.W.2d  132,




137  (1976).    Some courts have criticized the doctrine as
speculative and the cause of  “legal confusion, tortured analyses,
and inequitable results in practice.”    Doucette,  138 N.H. at  209,
635 A.2d at  1390; see also Jean W.,  414 Mass. at  509,  610 N.E.2d
at  313.    Moreover, courts in at least three states have renounced
the public duty doctrine when considering claims for negligent
building inspections.    See Adams,  555 P.2d at  241-42; Wilson v.
Nepstad,  282 N.W.2d  664  (Iowa  1979); Coffey,  74 Wis.  2d at  540,
247 N.W.2d at  139.
This Court has not heretofore applied the public duty
doctrine to a claim against a municipality or county in a
situation involving any group or individual other than law
enforcement.    After careful review of appellate decisions on the
public duty doctrine in this state and other jurisdictions, we
conclude that the public duty doctrine does not bar this claim
against Lee County for negligent inspection of plaintiffs’
private residence.    Because we hold that the public duty doctrine
does not apply, we need not address plaintiffs’ contentions that
the special duty or special relationship exceptions to the
doctrine apply.
The trial court granted defendant’s Rule  12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ claim against the County on the basis of the
public duty doctrine.    The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same
basis.    For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court, Lee County, for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.




Justice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.

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