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NO. COA12-1160
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  18 June  2013
MARGARET TRANTHAM and MARGERET
TRANTHAM executor of the estate
of Grady Trantham,
Plaintiffs,
v.                                                                            Henderson County
No.  09 CVS  2021
MICHAEL L. MARTIN, INC. n/k/a
EQUITY MANAGEMENT, INC.;
MICHAEL L. MARTIN,
Individually; and ROANOKE LAND
COMPANY, INC.;
Defendants.
Appeal  by  defendants  from  judgment  entered  27  February  2012
and  amended  judgment  entered                                               10  May            2012  by  Judge  Bradley  B.
Letts  in  Henderson  County  Superior  Court.    Heard  in  the  Court  of
Appeals  11 February  2013.
Van  Winkle,  Buck,  Wall,  Starnes  and  Davis,  PA,  by  W.  James
Johnson, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Hogan  &  Brewer,  PLLC,  by  James  W.  Lee  III,  for  defendants-
appellants.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Michael  L.  Martin  in  his  individual  capacity,  Michael  L.
Martin,  Inc.  n/k/a  Equity  Management,  Inc.,  and  Roanoke  Land
Company,  Inc.  (“defendants”)  appeal  from  a  judgment  entered  upon




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a  jury‖s  verdict  finding  all  defendants  liable  for  breach  of
contract  and  defendant  Michael  L.  Martin,  individually,  liable
for  constructive  fraud,  unfair  and  deceptive  trade  practices,
and negligent misrepresentation.
The  evidence  at  trial  tended  to  show  that  Margaret  and
Grady  Trantham  owned  approximately  one  hundred  acres  of  farmland
in  Pickens  County,  South  Carolina.    The  Tranthams  purchased  the
farmland  in                                                                  1972  following  Grady  Trantham‖s  retirement  after
thirty-one  years  as  a  machine  operator  at  the  Champion  Paper
Mill  in  Canton,  North  Carolina.    The  Tranthams  farmed  the  land,
raising  crops  and  livestock,  until                                        1997   or                                                           1998   when  they
decided  they  were  too  old  to  continue.    The  Tranthams  placed  the
farm  for  sale  and  met  defendant  Michael  Martin  when  he  came  to
view the property.
Martin  was  a  real  estate  broker  with  some  considerable
experience,  having  held  a  North  Carolina  real  estate  broker‖s
license  for  over  thirty  years  and  having  been                          “involved  with
approximately                                                                 100   seller-financing   transactions   during   that
time.”    In  contrast,  Grady  Trantham  attended  school  through  the
seventh  grade,  while  Margaret  Trantham  completed  the  ninth  grade
and  never  worked  outside  the  home.     Martin  and  the  Tranthams
agreed  to  an  owner-financed  sale  of  the  Pickens  County  property
for                                                                           $388,000.00.     Martin  structured  the  transaction  through  a




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series  of  notes  and  purchase  money  mortgages  taken  by  multiple
entities  that  Martin  solely  owned  and  controlled.    As  a  licensed
real  estate  broker,  Martin  also  received  a  commission  on  the
sale of the property.
Martin   subdivided   and   developed   the   property,   selling
tracts  to  individuals.    Defendants,  however,  soon  fell  behind  on
the   monthly   payments   on   the   various   notes.                           Martin   made
assurances  to  the  Tranthams  that  he  would  eventually  make  the
payments  and  bring  current  the  arrearages.     Throughout  their
dealings,   Martin   fostered   a   personal   relationship   with   the
Tranthams,  visiting  with  them  at  their  home.    Martin  summarized
his  relationship  with  the  Tranthams  in  a  2008  letter  he  wrote  to
them,  saying,  “I  continue  to  appreciate  very  much  the  confidence
that  you  have  always  placed  in  me.”    Martin  also  handled  all  the
accounting   on   the   loans,   providing   periodic   reconciliation
statements  to  the  Tranthams  and  documentation  to  their  income
tax  preparer.     Margaret  Trantham  testified  that  she  and  her
husband  Grady                                                                   “trusted  Mike   [Martin].    We  got  to  know  him  real
well,  and  he  was  more  like  a  friend.    And  we  liked  him.    And  we
just trusted him.”
In  2004,  while  still  behind  on  payments  to  the  Tranthams  in
excess  of  $60,000,  Martin  proposed  in  writing  that  the  Tranthams
release  their  remaining  liens  on  the  property,  enabling  him  to




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sell  the  remaining  lots.     In  exchange,  Martin  was  to  use  the
proceeds  of  the  sale  to                                                    “bring  all  arrearages  and  current  sums
due  to                                                                        [the  Tranthams]  current”  and  the  Tranthams  were  to
receive  substitute  collateral  in  the  form  of  a  second  lien
position   on   a   warehouse   in   Hendersonville,   North   Carolina.
Martin  represented  that  the  value  of  the  warehouse  was                 “in  the
range  of                                                                      $450,000”  and  the  first  lien  was  in  the  amount  of
$175,000,  leaving                                                             $275,000  in  equity.     The  Tranthams  accepted
the   substitution   of   collateral   agreement.                              Martin   did   not
explain  to  the  Tranthams  the  significance  of  the  second  lien
position.
Martin  also  failed  to  disclose  that  he  was  in  arrears  on
the  warehouse‖s  first  mortgage  at  the  time  of  the  collateral
substitution.    In  a  2007  email  to  an  attorney  for  the  first  lien
holder,  Martin  acknowledged  the  history  of  financial  troubles
with  the  property:                                                           “I  have  been  in  a  catch                                 22  from  the
beginning  with  this  property.    It  has  been  in  rough  shape,  which
impacts the rentability.”
Following  the  substitution  of  collateral  agreement,  Martin
made   gross   sales   of   all   the   remaining   property   totaling
$362,297.00.                                                                   However,  Martin  did  not   make  payment  to  the
Tranthams  to  bring  the  arrearages  current,  as  contemplated  in
the agreement.




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In  February                                                                2007,  the  holder  of  the  first  note  on  the
warehouse  property  in  Hendersonville  called  the  note  because  of
the  continued  arrearages  on  that  property.                             Martin,  acting
through  Roanoke  Land  Company,  Inc.,  then  took  an  assignment  of
the  six  original  notes  due  to  the  Tranthams,  purportedly  to
“defend  them”  and  collect  against  the  warehouse.    The  warehouse
was  ultimately  foreclosed  upon  by  the  first  lien  holder  and  no
additional monies were ever remitted to the Tranthams.
Grady  Trantham  died  on                                                   18  March                                           2011  and  his  estate  was
represented  in  this  action  through  Margaret  Trantham,  who  was
ninety-one years old at the time of trial.
The  jury‖s  verdict  awarded  identical  sums  of  $426,927.41  to
plaintiffs  for:                                                            1)  breach  of  the  substitution  of  collateral
agreement  by  Martin,  individually;                                       2)  breach  of  the  promissory
notes  by  Michael  L.  Martin,  Inc.;                                      3)  breach  of  the  promissory
notes  by  Roanoke  Land  Company,  Inc.;                                   4)  constructive  fraud  by
Martin,  individually;  5)  unfair  and  deceptive  trade  practices  by
Martin,   individually;   and                                               6)   negligent   misrepresentation   by
Martin,  individually.     Defendants  made  a  post-trial  motion  to,
inter  alia,  alter  or  amend  the  judgment  and  attached  a  proposed
judgment  reducing  the  amounts  owed  by  Michael  L.  Martin,  Inc.
and  Roanoke  Land  Company,  Inc.  to                                      $92,963.34  and                                     $333,964.07,
respectively,    and    assessing    no    liability    to    Martin,




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individually.     In  a                                                       10  May                                                                  2012  amended  judgment,  the  trial
                                                                              court  entered  judgment  against  Michael  L.  Martin,  Inc.  in  the
amount  of                                                                    $92,963.34,  and  Roanoke  Land  Company,  Inc.  in  the
amount  of                                                                    $333,964.07.     The  trial  court  also  entered  judgment
                                                                              against  Martin,  individually,  in  the  amount  of                                                                                                 $426,927.41,
which  was  trebled  pursuant  to  N.C.G.S.                                                                                                            §                                                                           75-1.1.     Defendants
appeal.
Defendants   first   argue   that   the   trial   court   erred   by
denying  defendants‖  motion  for  a  directed  verdict  with  respect
to  each  of  plaintiffs‖  causes  of  action.                                “The  standard  of
review  of  directed  verdict  is  whether  the  evidence,  taken  in  the
light  most  favorable  to  the  non-moving  party,  is  sufficient  as  a
matter  of  law  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury.”     Davis  v.  Dennis
Lilly  Co.,  330  N.C.  314,  322,  411  S.E.2d  133,  138  (1991)  (citing
Kelly  v.  Int’l  Harvester  Co.,  278  N.C.  153,  158,  179  S.E.2d  396,
398  (1971)).                                                                                                                                                                                                                      “In  determining  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to
                                                                                                                                                       withstand  a  motion  for  a  directed  verdict,  all  of  the  evidence
                                                                                                                                                       which  supports  the  non-movant‖s  claim  must  be  taken  as  true  and
                                                                                                                                                       considered  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  non-movant.”
Turner  v.  Duke  Univ.,                                                      325  N.C.                                                                152,                                                                        158,                                                        381  S.E.2d                   706,         710
(1989).                                                                       The   non-movant   is   given                                                                                                                                                                                    “the   benefit   of   every
                                                                              reasonable  inference  which  may  legitimately  be  drawn                                                                                                                                                                                     [from  the




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evidence,]                                                                                                                     resolving                                                                                                                            contradictions,                                                                                        conflicts,         and
                                                                                                                               inconsistencies  in  the  non-movant‖s  favor.”    Id.                                                                                                                                                                                      “―A  motion  for
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    directed  verdict  should  be  denied  if  more  than  a  scintilla  of
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    evidence   supports   each   element   of   the   non-moving   party‖s
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    claim.‖”    J.T.  Russell  &  Sons,  Inc.  v.  Silver  Birch  Pond  L.L.C.,
__  N.C.  App.                                                               __,                                               __,                                                      721  S.E.2d                                                                 699,                                                                          703    (2011)            (quoting  Weeks
                                                                             v.  Select  Homes,  Inc.,                                                                                                                                                              193  N.C.  App.                                                               725,   730,              668  S.E.2d        638,
641  (2008)).
Defendants   argue   the   trial   court   erred   by   denying   a
directed  verdict  of  plaintiffs‖  claim  of  breach  of  contract
against  Michael  L.  Martin,  individually,  because  the  contract
was  unenforceable  for  lack  of  consideration.    However,  at  trial
defendants  argued  the  contract  claim  should  be  dismissed  because
“no  evidence                                                                [has  been]  presented  that                      [Martin]  in  any  way
signed  in  his  individual  capacity  for  those  notes  under  the
first  cause  of  action.”     No  argument  was  advanced  nor  mention
made  of  consideration.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            “―[A]n  appellate  court  will  not  consider
                                                                                                                                                                                        grounds  other  than  those  stated  to  the  trial  court  in  reviewing
                                                                             the  trial  court‖s  ruling  on  the  motion.‖”                                                                                                                                                                                                                             Leatherwood  v.
Ehlinger,                                                                    151  N.C.  App.                                   15,                                                      18,                                                                         564  S.E.2d                                                                   883,   886               (2002)
                                                                             (quoting  Stacy  v.  Jedco  Constr.,  Inc.,                                                                                                                                            119  N.C.  App.                                                                      115,              123,
457  S.E.2d  875,  881,  (1995)),  disc.  review  denied,  357  N.C.  164,
580 S.E.2d  368  (2003).    Therefore, this argument is overruled.




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Defendants  next  argue  the  trial  court  erred  by  denying
their   motion   for   a   directed   verdict   as   to   the   claim   of
constructive  fraud.     Specifically,  defendants  argue  there  was
insufficient  evidence  to  support  the  contention  that  there  was  a
relationship  of  trust  and  confidence  between  the  parties  or  that
Michael  L.  Martin,  individually,  received  a  benefit  from  the
substitution of collateral.
The  elements  of  a  claim  of  constructive  fraud  require:
“(1)  a  relationship  of  trust  and  confidence,                           (2)   that  the
defendant  took  advantage  of  that  position  of  trust  in  order  to
benefit  himself,  and                                                       (3)   that  plaintiff  was,  as  a  result,
                                                                                                                                  injured.”    White  v.  Consol.  Planning,  Inc.,                                                                                                                                                                         166  N.C.  App.           283,
294,                                                                         603  S.E.2d                                   147,   156                                                 (2004)                                                                                                                                  (citing  Sterner  v.  Penn,                             159
N.C.  App.                                                                   626,                                          631,   583  S.E.2d                                         670,                                                                          674                                                                                     (2003)),  disc.  review
denied,                                                                      359  N.C.                                     286,   610  S.E.2d                                         717                                                                           (2005).                                                                                 “―[A]n  essential
                                                                                                                                                                                      element  of  constructive  fraud  is  that  defendants  sought  to
                                                                                                                                                                                      benefit  themselves  in  the  transaction.‖”    Sterner,  159  N.C.  App.
                                                                                                                                                                                      at  631,  583  S.E.2d  at  674  (quoting  State  ex  rel.  Long  v.  Petree
Stockton,  L.L.P.,                                                                                                                129  N.C.  App.                                     432,                                                                          445,                                                      499  S.E.2d                   790,                      798
(1998)).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            Whether   a   confidential   relationship   exists   is
typically  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.     Carcano  v.  JBSS,
LLC,  200 N.C. App.  162,  178,  684 S.E.2d  41,  53  (2009).
In  this  case,  plaintiffs  presented  evidence  that  Martin  was




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a  savvy  and  practiced  real  estate  broker  with  over  thirty  years‖
experience,  having  been  “involved  with  approximately  100  seller-
financing  transactions  during  that  time.”     The  evidence  showed
that  Grady  Trantham  only  completed  the  seventh  grade,  while
Margaret  Trantham  completed  the  ninth  grade  and  never  worked
outside  the  home.    Evidence  was  presented  that  Martin  fostered  a
personal  relationship  with  the  Tranthams,  visiting  with  them  on
occasion  at  their  home.     Plaintiffs  presented  evidence  that
Martin   handled   all   the   accounting   on   the   loans,   providing
periodic  reconciliation  statements  to  them  and  documentation  to
their  income  tax  preparer.    Margaret  Trantham  testified  that  she
and  her  husband  Grady                                                       “trusted  Mike   [Martin].    We  got  to  know
him real well, and  he was more like a friend.    And we liked him.
And  we  just  trusted  him.”    Plaintiffs  also  introduced  a  letter
from  Martin  which  referenced  their  relationship  by  saying,              “I
continue  to  appreciate  very  much  the  confidence  that  you  have
always  placed  in  me.”    When  viewed  in  the  light  most  favorable
to  plaintiffs,  we  are  satisfied  that  this  evidence  provided
“more  than  a  scintilla”  of  support  for  the  existence  of  a
confidential  relationship,  such  that  it  was  proper  to  submit  the
issue  to  the  jury.    See  J.T.  Russell  &  Sons,  Inc.,  __  N.C.  App.
at  __,  721  S.E.2d  at  703;  Davis,  330  N.C.  at  322,  411  S.E.2d  at
138.




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We   are   also   satisfied   that   more   than   a   scintilla   of
evidence  was  presented  to  support  the  contention  that  Michael  L.
Martin,  individually,  received  a  benefit  from  the  substitution
of  collateral.    Martin  testified  that  he  was  “the  only  one  that
made  any  money  from  [Michael  L.  Martin,  Inc.],”  that  he  was  the
sole  owner,  and  that  the  company  had  no  employees  aside  from
him.     He  also  testified  the  same  was  true  for  Roanoke  Land
Company.     The  evidence  introduced  showed  the  substitution  of
collateral  agreement  allowed  defendants  to  make  additional  gross
sales  of                                                                      $362,297.00,   while  not  making  any  payment  to  the
Tranthams  to  bring  the  arrearages  current,  as  contemplated  in
the  agreement.     This  evidence,  when  both  viewed  in  the  light
most  favorable  to  the  plaintiffs  and  given  “the  benefit  of  every
reasonable   inference   which   may   legitimately   be   drawn,”   was
sufficient  to  submit  the  issue  to  the  jury.    See  Davis,  330  N.C.
at  322,  411  S.E.2d  at  138;  Turner,  325  N.C.  at  158,  381  S.E.2d
at  710.    Therefore, this argument is without merit.
Defendants  next  argue  the  trial  court  erred  by  denying
their  motion  for  a  directed  verdict  on  the  issue  of  negligent
misrepresentation.                                                             Specifically,   they   argue   insufficient
evidence  was  presented  that  Michael  L.  Martin,  individually,  had
a  financial  interest  in  the  subject  transaction  or  that  the
information allegedly supplied by Martin was false.




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“The  tort  of  negligent  misrepresentation  occurs  when  a
party   justifiably   relies   to   his   detriment   on   information
prepared  without  reasonable  care  by  one  who  owed  the  relying
party  a  duty  of  care.”     Raritan  River  Steel  Co.  v.  Cherry,
Bekaert  &  Holland,                                                          322  N.C.                                  200,   206,               367  S.E.2d   609,   612
(1988).
As  addressed  above,  there  was  sufficient  evidence  that
Martin  received  a  financial  benefit  from  the  substitution  of
collateral  agreement.                                                        Therefore,  there  was  also  sufficient
evidence  to  show  Martin  had  a  financial  interest  in  the  subject
transaction.    The  evidence  was  likewise  sufficient  to  show  that
Martin   prepared   information   without   reasonable   care.                In
writing,  Martin  represented  that  the  property  was  worth  $450,000
and  that  a  first  lien  existed  in  the  amount  of  $175,000,  leaving
an  equity  value  of  $275,000.    Martin  also  indicated  he  “thought
the  warehouse  was  a  better  deal  for  the  Tranthams”  and  a            “win-
win  for                                                                      [him]  and  the  Tranthams                 .”     However,  Martin
testified  at  trial  that  the  rental  income  on  the  property  was
insufficient  to  sustain  even  the  debt  owed  to  the  first  lien
holder.     Evidence  was  introduced  that  if  all  arrearages  were
brought   current   and   the   premises   were   fully   occupied,   the
property  would  still  produce  a                                            $1,200  negative  monthly  cash
flow.    Taking  this  evidence  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the




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plaintiffs   and   giving   it                                              “the   benefit   of   every   reasonable
inference  which  may  legitimately  be  drawn,”  we  believe  it  was
sufficient  to  submit  the  issue  of  negligent  misrepresentation  to
                                                                            the  jury.     See  Davis,                               330  N.C.  at                                                                322,              411  S.E.2d  at                           138;
Turner,                                                                     325  N.C.  at                                     158,   381  S.E.2d  at                                                              710.              Therefore,  this
argument is without merit.
Defendants  next  argue  the  trial  court  erred  by  denying
their  motion  for  a  directed  verdict  on  the  issue  of  unfair  and
deceptive  trade  practices.     Specifically,  defendants  argue  the
alleged   acts   do   not   constitute   unfair   or   deceptive   trade
practices   and   the   alleged   acts   were   not                         “in   or   affecting
commerce.”
“To  prevail  on  a  claim  for  unfair  and  deceptive  trade
practices,  one  must  show:                                                                                                                                                                                                        (1)  an  unfair  or  deceptive  act  or
                                                                            practice,  or  unfair  method  of  competition,                                                                                                                                                   (2)  in  or  affecting
                                                                                                                                     commerce,  and  (3)  which  proximately  caused  actual  injury  to  the
                                                                                                                                     plaintiff  or  his  business.”    Miller  v.  Nationwide  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,
112  N.C.  App.                                                             295,                                              301,   435  S.E.2d                                                                  537,              542                                       (1993)                   (citing
Spartan  Leasing  v.  Pollard,                                                                                                                                                                                    101  N.C.  App.   450,                                      460-61,                  400
                                                                                                                                     S.E.2d  476,  482  (1991)),  disc.  review  denied,  335  N.C.  770,  442
S.E.2d  519  (1994).
                                                                                                                                     Defendants  assert  Martin‖s  alleged  acts  do  not  constitute
                                                                            unfair  or  deceptive  trade  practices.                                                                                                                We  disagree.                                                      “North




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Carolina  case  law  has  held  that  conduct  which  constitutes  a
breach  of  fiduciary  duty  and  constructive  fraud  is  sufficient  to
support  a  UDTP  claim.”    Compton  v.  Kirby,  157  N.C.  App.  1,  20,
577   S.E.2d                                                                 905,                                        917              (2003)                                                                  (citing   Spence   v.   Spaulding   &
Perkins,  Ltd.,                                                                                                          82  N.C.  App.   665,          668,                                                      347  S.E.2d                             864,     866
(1986)).                                                                                                                                                Because  we  have  already  concluded  the  jury  could
properly  consider  a  constructive  fraud  claim,  this  argument  is
without  merit.    See  id.  (“Because  we  have  already  held  that  the
issue  of  constructive  fraud  was  properly  submitted  to  the  jury,
defendant‖s   argument   that   the   UDTP   claim   is   improper   must
fail.”).
Defendants  also  assert  that  the  alleged  acts  were  not                “in
or  affecting  commerce.”    N.C.G.S.  §  75-1.1(b)  defines  “commerce”
for   UDTP   claims:                                                         “―[C]ommerce‖   includes   all   business
activities,    however    denominated,    but    does    not    include
professional   services   rendered   by   a   member   of   a   learned
profession.”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  75-1.1(b)  (2011).                     “The  business
of  buying,  developing  and  selling  real  estate  is  an  activity  ―in
or  affecting  commerce‖  for  the  purposes  of  [N.C.]G.S.  §  75-1.1.”
Governor’s  Club,  Inc.  v.  Governor’s  Club  Ltd.  P’ship,                 152 N.C.
App.                                                                         240,                                        250,             567  S.E.2d   781,                                                      788                                     (2002)   (citing  Wilder  v.
Squires,  68  N.C.  App.  310,  314-15,  315  S.E.2d  63,  65-66  (1984)),
aff’d per curium,  357 N.C.  46,  577 S.E.2d  620  (2003).




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In  this  case,  considerable  evidence  was  presented  that
defendants  were  engaged  in  the  buying,  developing,  and  selling
of  real  estate.     At  plaintiffs‖  request,  the  trial  court  took
judicial  notice  of  a  finding  of  fact  from  the  order  allowing
foreclosure  of  the  deed  of  trust  on  the  warehouse  property  that
“Michael  Martin  held  a  real  estate  license  for  approximately  30
years  and  is  currently  in  the  business  of  real  estate  financing,
and  has  been  involved  with  approximately                                100  seller-financing
transactions  during  that  time.”    The  underlying  transactions  in
this  case  involve  the  buying,  developing,  and  selling  of  real
estate.     The  substitution  of  collateral  agreement  states  that
its  purpose  was  to                                                        “complete  pending  and  proposed  sales  of  all
or  part  of                                                                 [the  remaining  unsold  land.]”                    Based  upon  the
testimony  received  and  exhibits  presented,  we  are  satisfied  that
more  than  a  scintilla  of  evidence  supports  the  “in  or  affecting
commerce”  element  of  the  plaintiffs‖  claim,  such  that  it  was
proper  to  submit  the  issue  to  the  jury.     See  J.T.  Russell  &
Sons,  Inc.,  __  N.C.  App.  at  __,  721  S.E.2d  at  703.    Therefore,
this argument is without merit.
Defendants  next  contend  the  trial  court  erred  by  denying
their  motions  for  a  directed  verdict  on  plaintiffs‖  causes  of
action  for  breach  of  contract,  negligent  misrepresentation,  and
unfair  and  deceptive  trade  practices  based  upon  the  applicable




-15-
statutes of limitations.
“When  a  defendant  pleads  the  statute  of  limitations  in  bar
of  a  plaintiff‖s  claim,  the  burden  is  upon  the  plaintiff  to  show
that  its  suit  was  commenced  within  the  appropriate  time  from  the
accrual  of  the  cause  of  action.”     Chase  Dev.  Grp.  v.  Fisher,
                                                                                          Clinard  &  Cornwell,  PLLC,          211  N.C.  App.                                                           295,   304,       710  S.E.2d
218,                                                                          224         (2011)                                                  (citing  Pembee  Mfg.  Corp.  v.  Cape  Fear  Constr.
Co.,                                                                          313  N.C.   488,                           491,   329  S.E.2d       350,                                                    353    (1985)).   The
statute  of  limitations  for  breach  of  contract  and  negligent
misrepresentation  is  three  years.     See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.               §           1-52
(2011).    The  statute  of  limitations  for  an  unfair  and  deceptive
trade  practices  claim  is  four  years.    See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  75-
16.2                                                                          (2011).
Certain  events  may  delay  or  extend  the  accrual  of  a  cause
of  action.    For  example,  in  contract  actions,  a  new  promise  to
pay  an  existing  debt  may  extend  the  time  to  collect  the  debt  up
to  three  years  from  the  time  of  the  new  promise,  provided
however,  the  new  promise  must  be  in  writing.    Andrus  v.  IQMax,
Inc.,  190 N.C.  App.  426,  428,  660  S.E.2d  107,  109  (2008).            “[A]
claim  for  negligent  misrepresentation  does  not  accrue  until  two
events  occur:    first,  the  claimant  suffers  harm  because  of  the
misrepresentation,   and   second,   the   claimant   discovers   the
misrepresentation.”    Guyton  v.  FM  Lending  Servs.,  Inc.,  199 N.C.




-16-
App.                                                                          30,                                                            35,                 681   S.E.2d        465,   470-71   (2009)   (alteration  in
original)                                                                     (internal  quotations  marks  omitted).     When  an  action
for  unfair  and  deceptive  trade  practices  is                             “based  on  fraud,
[the  action  accrues]  at  the  time  the  fraud  is  discovered  or
should  have  been  discovered  with  the  exercise  of  reasonable
diligence.”    Nash  v.  Motorola  Commc’ns  &  Elecs.,  Inc.,                96  N.C.
App.  329,  331,  385  S.E.2d  537,  538  (1989),  aff’d  per  curium,  328
N.C.  627,  400 S.E.2d  36  (1991).
In  this  case,  the  substitution  of  collateral  agreement  was
signed  4  November  2004  and  the  complaint  was  filed  on  9  October
2009——more  than  four  years  and  eleven  months  later.     However,
evidence  was  introduced  at  trial  that  tended  to  show  Martin  made
written  promises  to  bring  the  notes  current  on                         9  March                                                       2007,               4
February  2008,  and  28  March  2008.    These  actions  by  Martin  were
sufficient  to  extend  the  time  for  filing  a  breach  of  contract
cause  of  action  such  that  the  filing  was  timely  in  October  2009.
See   Andrus,                                                                 190 N.C.   App.   at                                           428,                660   S.E.2d   at   109.
Additionally,  the  evidence  tended  to  show  that  Martin  failed  to
disclose   that   he   was   in   arrears   on   the   warehouse‖s   first
mortgage   at   the   time   of   the                                         4   November                                                   2004   collateral
substitution,  and  instead  the  Tranthams  learned  of  the  issue  in
2007,  once  the  foreclosure  process  was  imminent.     This  later
discovery  was  sufficient  to  delay  the  accrual  of  the  action




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until  2007,  which  was  within  three  years  (and  four  years)  of  the
date  the  complaint  was  filed  in  October                                  2009.                                                        See  Guyton,
199 N.C.  App.  at  35,  681  S.E.2d  at  470-71;  Nash,  96  N.C.  App.  at
331,  385  S.E.2d at  538.    Thus, the  claims  were  not  barred  by  the
statutes of limitations.
Defendants  next  argue  the  trial  court  erred  by  not  ruling
on  their  objection  to  the  jury  instructions  and  issue  sheet
until  after  trial  and  also  erred  by  denying  in  part  their  motion
to  alter  or  amend  the  judgment.     Defendants  contend  the  jury
instructions,  issue  sheet,  and  amended  judgment  allowed  for  a
double recovery and windfall to plaintiffs.
“[T]he  trial  court  has  wide  discretion  in  presenting  the
issues  to  the  jury  and  no  abuse  of  discretion  will  be  found
where  the  issues  are  ―sufficiently  comprehensive  to  resolve  all
factual  controversies  and  to  enable  the  court  to  render  judgment
fully  determining  the  cause.‖”    Murrow  v.  Daniels,  321  N.C.  494,
499-500,  364  S.E.2d  392,  396  (1988)  (quoting  Chalmers  v.  Womack,
                                                                               269  N.C.  433,  435-36,  152  S.E.2d  505,  507  (1967)).                                 “Motions  to
amend   judgments   pursuant   to   N.C.G.S.                                                                                                §              1A-1,   Rule                  59   are
addressed  to  the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  court,  and  will
not  be  disturbed  on  appeal  absent  an  abuse  of  that  discretion.”
Spivey  &  Self,  Inc.  v.  Highview  Farms,  Inc.,  110  N.C.  App.  719,
728,  431  S.E.2d  535,  540,  disc.  review  denied,  334  N.C.  623,  435




-18-
S.E.2d  342  (1993).
In  general,  plaintiffs  are  only  entitled  to  one  recovery
for   the   same   alleged   wrongful   conduct.                                                                                             Decker   v.   Homes,
Inc./Constr.  Mgmt.  &  Fin.  Grp.,                                        187  N.C.  App.                                      658,         666,                           654
S.E.2d  495,  501  (2007).
Where  the  same  course  of  conduct  gives  rise
to   a   traditionally   recognized   cause   of
action,   as,   for   example,   an   action   for
breach  of  contract,  and  as  well  gives  rise
to   a   cause   of   action   for   violation   of
[N.C.]G.S.                                                                 [§]                                                               75-1.1,   damages   may   be
                                                                           recovered  either  for  the  breach  of  contract,
or  for  violation  of                                                                                                          [N.C.]G.S.   [§]                            75-1.1,
but not for both.
Marshall  v.  Miller,                                                      47  N.C.  App.                                       530,         542,                           268  S.E.2d   97,           103
(1980),  aff’d  as  modified  by                                                                                                302  N.C.    539,                                         276  S.E.2d   397
(1981).
We  first  note  the  trial  court  did  not  delay  ruling  upon
defendants‖  objection  until  after  the  trial.    Rather,  the  trial
court  indicated  during  the  charge  conference  that,  “I  will  note
the  objection.                                                            I  think  that‖s  something  I  would  consider
postjudgment  if  the  jury  does  rule                                    --,”  and  then  specifically
overruled  the  renewed  objection  after  the  instructions  were
given  to  the  jury.     Additionally,  it  appears  from  the  record
before  us  the  trial  court  properly  reduced  the  judgment  as  to
the   two   corporate   defendants   from                                  $426,927.41   each,   to
$92,963.34   against   Michael   L.   Martin,   Inc.   and                 $333,964.07




-19-
against  Roanoke  Land  Company,  Inc.,  avoiding  a  double  recovery
on  the  breach  of  the  various  promissory  notes.    The  trial  court
also  reduced  the  award  against  Martin,  individually,  from  a
combined  $1,707,709.64  on  four  causes  of  action  to  $426,927.41.
These  causes  of  action  were  for  breach  of  the  substitution  of
collateral                                                                     agreement,                                       constructive   fraud,   negligent
misrepresentation,  and  unfair  and  deceptive  trade  practices,
which  are  separate  from  the  breach  of  promissory  notes  by  the
corporate  defendants.                                                         However,  they  arise  out  of  the  same
series  of  transactions  or  course  of  conduct.     Thus,  all  the
causes  of  action  seek  to  make  the  plaintiffs  whole  for  the
interrelated  wrongs  of  both  losing  the  farm  and  not  being  paid
on  the  notes.    Yet,  plaintiffs  are  entitled  to  but  one  recovery.
See  Murray  v.  Nationwide  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  123  N.C.  App.  1,  20,  472
S.E.2d  358,  368  (1996)  (“[P]laintiff  has  set  forth  a  panoply  of
causes  of  action  arising  from  the  same  injury.     We  emphasize
that  plaintiff  may  recover  for  an  injury  but  once.”),  disc.
review denied,  345 N.C.  344,  483 S.E.2d  172-73  (1997).
Therefore,  we  remand  this  matter  to  the  trial  court  and
instruct  the  court  to  modify  its  judgment  to  reflect  that  any
amount  the  corporate  defendants  pay  on  the  combined  $426,927.41
judgment  against  them  be  credited  toward  plaintiffs‖  properly
trebled  judgment  of                                                          $1,280,782.23  against  Martin,  individually.




-20-
                                                                                                                                              See  Barbee  v.  Atl.  Marine  Sales  &  Serv.,  Inc.,          115  N.C.  App.
641,                                                                      650,                                                  446  S.E.2d   117,                                                     123    (ordering  the  trial  court  to
modify  its  judgment  to  avoid  a  double  recovery  by  crediting
amounts   paid   by   one   defendant   toward   another   defendant‖s
judgment),  disc.  review  denied,                                        337  N.C.                                             689,          448  S.E.2d                                              516
(1994).
Finally,  defendants  purport  to  argue  the  trial  court  erred
in   several   additional   ways.                                         However,   defendants   cite   no
authority  for  these  positions  and  do  not  sufficiently  develop
these  arguments.                                                         “Issues  not  presented  in  a  party‖s  brief,  or
in  support  of  which  no  reason  or  argument  is  stated,  will  be
taken  as  abandoned.”    N.C.R.  App.  P.                                28(b)(6).    Nor  is  it  the
duty  of  this  Court  to  construct  arguments  for  the  parties  on
appeal.     See  Jeffreys  v.  Raleigh  Oaks  Joint  Venture,             115  N.C.
App.                                                                      377,                                                  380,          444  S.E.2d                                              252,   254                                (1994).   Therefore,  these
remaining arguments are overruled.
No error in part, remanded in part with instructions.
Judges McGEE and CALBRIA concur.

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