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Triad Women's Ctr., P.A. v. Rogers
State: South Carolina
Court: Court of Appeals
Docket No: 09-1272
Case Date: 10/25/2010
Plaintiff: Triad Women's Ctr., P.A.
Defendant: Rogers
Preview:NO. COA09-1272 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 5 October 2010 TRIAD WOMEN'S CENTER, P.A., Plaintiff, v. TOSHA L. ROGERS, Defendant. Appeal by defendant from order entered 11 June 2009 by Judge Catherine C. Eagles in Guilford County Superior Court. the Court of Appeals 23 March 2010. Robert E. Boydoh, Jr. and Angela Bullard Fox for plaintiffappellee. Penry Riemann PLLC, by Rolly L. Chambers, for defendantappellant. GEER, Judge. Defendant Tosha L. Rogers appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment to plaintiff Triad Women's Center, P.A. The order also stated that it was awarding plaintiff attorneys' fees, but reserved for further hearing the issue of the amount of fees to be awarded. Defendant appealed prior to the trial court's On Heard in Guilford County No. 08 CVS 11285

entering any order finalizing the award of attorneys' fees.

appeal, defendant challenges only the decision to award fees and not the trial court's determination that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment. Since there has been no final decision on the

attorneys' fees issue, this appeal, limited to the propriety of an award of fees, is interlocutory. Despite the interlocutory nature

-2of the appeal, defendant makes no argument as to the existence of a substantial right that will be lost absent immediate review. We, therefore, dismiss defendant's appeal. Facts On 19 May 2007, plaintiff and defendant entered into an employment agreement in which defendant agreed to work for

plaintiff as a physician in its obstetrics and gynecology medical practice. Section 3.1(e) of the agreement provided that plaintiff

could at any time terminate defendant's employment for cause, including, but not limited to, acts considered "materially adverse to the best financial interests" of plaintiff. If defendant's employment was terminated, section 1.6 of the agreement required her to purchase, at defendant's own expense, continuing coverage for any liability directly or indirectly

resulting from acts or omissions occurring during the term of the agreement. This coverage ("tail insurance coverage") was required

to be obtained through an extended reporting endorsement to the existing insurance policy maintained by plaintiff and to name plaintiff as an additional certificate holder. The endorsement

would extend the period of time that the insurance company would cover claims arising out of services rendered by defendant while employed by plaintiff but not yet reported to the insurance company at the time of the termination of defendant's employment. The agreement further specified that if defendant did not provide plaintiff with a certificate confirming she had purchased this coverage, plaintiff could purchase the coverage using any

-3money due defendant. If no money was due defendant, plaintiff was

entitled to seek reimbursement from defendant. Defendant began work on 1 August 2007. By letter dated 6 May

2008, defendant gave plaintiff 60-days notice, pursuant to the agreement, that she would be resigning from the medical practice. Defendant stated that her resignation was "due to differences in practice style and philosophy" that were "too vast for the patients to receive an adequate standard of care." Defendant wrote: "I

feel as though the patient should be the most important aspect of patient care. The good of the patient should supersede the good of This letter was copied to

the staff or the good of the practice."

David Moore, M.D., Chief of Staff at High Point Regional Hospital. On 23 May 2008, Dr. Elaine Greene, plaintiff's President, called defendant to inform her that her employment was being immediately terminated for cause due to the statements defendant made to High Point Regional Hospital in the 6 May 2008 letter. Dr.

Greene explained that those statements were "materially adverse to the interest of the company" and that, pursuant to the agreement, defendant was required to purchase tail insurance coverage. That

same day, Dr. Greene mailed to defendant's home address written notice of the termination of defendant's employment and a reminder of her obligation to obtain tail insurance coverage. By letter dated 12 June 2008, plaintiff's legal counsel also notified defendant of her obligation to obtain tail insurance coverage and advised her that if she did not obtain the coverage by 30 June 2008, plaintiff would purchase it on her behalf. On 19

-4June 2008, defendant sent plaintiff a "Certificate of Liability Insurance" that had been issued by her new employer's insurance company. That "Certificate of Liability Insurance" was determined

to be inadequate verification of insurance coverage for plaintiff because plaintiff "was not named in the Certificate as an insured or an additional insured." On 30 June 2008, plaintiff's legal counsel sent another letter to defendant notifying her that because she had not provided evidence that she had purchased tail insurance coverage, plaintiff had purchased it on her behalf. The letter stated that plaintiff

was giving defendant five days to reimburse plaintiff in full for the insurance premium, or plaintiff would institute a lawsuit to recover the premium, interest, court costs, and attorneys' fees. On 17 September 2008, plaintiff filed suit against defendant in Guilford County Superior Court, seeking $6,904.00 in

reimbursement for the cost of the tail insurance coverage plus interest and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
Download 091272-1.pdf

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