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PATRICIA WARD, Plaintiff, v. KRISTEN BEATON, Defendant
No. COA99-1277
(Filed 19 December 2000)
1.                                                                                                      Alienation of Affections--denial of directed verdict--sufficiency of evidence
The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the
claim for alienation of affections, because: (1) plaintiff presented evidence to show there was a
marriage with love and affection and that defendant’s conduct destroyed the marriage; (2)
“luring” by defendant is not required to sustain this claim; (3) defendant need not be the initiator
in such a relationship, but must be only a willing participant, making occasions for a relationship
to develop; and (4) defendant’s actions need not be the sole cause of the alienation as long as her
conduct was a controlling or effective cause of the alienation.
2.                                                                                                      Alienation of Affections--affirmative defense--fraud--failure to specially plead--
waiver
Although defendant contends the trial court erred in an action for alienation of affections
by denying defendant’s N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment based on
an alleged fraud, this issue was not preserved for appeal, because: (1) fraud is an affirmative
defense that must be specially pleaded as required by N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 8(c), and failure to
plead an affirmative defense results in waiver unless the parties try the issue by express or
implied consent, N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 15(b); and (2) defendant neither pled nor tried the case
on this theory, but only made it an issue in her post-trial motion for relief from judgment.
3.                                                                                                      Alienation of Affections--punitive damages--aggravating factors--sexual
                                                                                                        relationship--additional circumstances
The trial court did not err in an alienation of affections case by submitting the issue of
punitive damages to the jury, because: (1) plaintiff complied with the requirement in N.C.G.S. §
1A-1, Rule 9(k) by averring both malice and willful and wanton conduct as the relevant
aggravating factors under N.C.G.S. § 1D-15, and there is no requirement that the complaint state
with particularity the circumstances underlying these factors; (2) evidence of “sexual relations”
will allow a plaintiff to get to the jury on the issue of punitive damages in a claim for alienation
of affections, and plaintiff presented evidence that defendant and plaintiff’s husband had sex at
least two times; and (3) there was evidence of other aggravating circumstances including that
after forming a sexual relationship with plaintiff’s husband, defendant accompanied plaintiff’s
husband when he returned his children to the custody of plaintiff, defendant appeared
unannounced at the front door of the marital home asking plaintiff if they could be friends, and
defendant arrived in the driveway of the marital home while plaintiff’s husband was visiting his
children and defendant blew her car horn for plaintiff’s husband.
4.                                                                                                      Alienation of Affections--jury instruction--punitive damages--consistent with
pattern jury instruction
Although defendant contends the trial court’s jury instruction on punitive damages in an
alienation of affections case was confusing, defendant concedes it was consistent with the North
Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions, a review of the trial court’s instruction reveals it was entirely
consistent with the provisions of Chapter 1D of our general statutes, and any simplified or
shortened instruction would violate the requirement that the judge instruct the jury on the law
with respect to every substantial feature of the case.




5.                                                                                                    Alienation of Affections--punitive damages--evidence of defendant’s assets before
determination of compensatory damages--failure to request bifurcated trial
The trial court did not err in an alienation of affections case by admitting evidence of
defendant’s assets before the trier of fact determined that compensatory damages were warranted
when defendant did not request a bifurcated trial under N.C.G.S. § 1D-30, because: (1) evidence
of a defendant’s net worth may be considered by the jury in determining the amount of a punitive
damages award, N.C.G.S. § 1D-35(i); and (2) defendant’s failure to request a bifurcated trial on
the issue of punitive damages under N.C.G.S. § 1D-30 rendered this evidence admissible at any
time during plaintiff’s case-in-chief.
6.                                                                                                    Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--failure to object
Although defendant contends the trial court’s instruction on future damages in an
alienation of affections case was error, this issue is waived because defendant failed to object to
this instruction at trial as required by N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2).
Judge WALKER dissenting.
Appeal  by  defendant  from  order  entered                                                           14  June                                                                            1999  and
judgment entered 28 June 1999 by Judge John M. Gardner in Mitchell
County Superior Court.   Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 September
2000.
Harrison & Poore, P.A., by Hal G. Harrison, for the plaintiff-
appellee.
Ronald  W.  Howell,  P.A.,   by   Ronald  W.  Howell,  for  the
defendant-appellant.
LEWIS, Judge.
Plaintiff Patricia Ward brought this action against defendant,
Kristen Beaton, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for  (1)
alienation  of  affections,                                                                           (2)  criminal  conversation  and                                                    (3)
intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress.    At  the  close  of
plaintiff's  evidence,  the  court  granted  defendant's  motion  for
directed  verdict  as  to  the  criminal  conversation  and  intentional
infliction  of  emotional  distress  claims.     The  jury  returned  a
verdict in favor of plaintiff on the alienation of affections claim




and awarded plaintiff  $52,000 in compensatory damages and  $43,000
in  punitive  damages.    Defendant  made  several  post-trial  motions,
including  a  motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict
pursuant  to  N.C.R.  Civ.  P.  50(b)  and  (c),  a  motion  for  new  trial
pursuant  to  N.C.R.  Civ.  P.  59(a)(9)  and  a  motion  for  relief  from
the court's judgment pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (2), (3)
and  (6).   The trial court denied each of these motions.   Defendant
appeals from the court's final judgment and from the court's order
denying relief pursuant to Rule  60(b).
[1] Defendant has assigned as error the trial court's denial
of  her  motion  for  directed  verdict  on  the  issue  of  alienation  of
affections.    On  a  defendant's  motion  for  directed  verdict,  the
trial court must determine whether the evidence, when considered in
the  light  most  favorable  to  the  plaintiff,  is  sufficient  to  take
the case to the jury.   N.C.R. Civ. P. 50(a); Hutelmyer v. Cox,  133
N.C. App.  364,  369,  514 S.E.2d  554,  558  (1999), appeal dismissed,
351 N.C.  356,  ___ S.E.2d  ____ (2000).   Where the trial court finds
there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element
of the plaintiff's claim, the motion for directed verdict should be
denied.   Norman Owen Trucking v. Morkoski, 131 N.C. App. 168, 172,
506 S.E.2d  267,  270  (1998).
To  survive  a  motion  for  directed  verdict  on  a  claim  for
alienation  of  affections,  the  plaintiff  must  present  evidence  to
show:                                                                          (1) that there was a marriage with love and affection;  (2)
that  the  love  and  affection  was  alienated  and  destroyed;  and  (3)
that the wrongful and malicious acts of defendant produced the loss
of love and affection.   Hankins v. Hankins, 202 N.C. 358, 361,  162




S.E.                                                                          766,                                                              767    (1932).    The  "malicious  acts"  required  have  been
defined  as  acts  constituting  "'unjustifiable  conduct  causing  the
injury  complained  of.'"    Chappell  v.  Redding,  67  N.C.  App.  397,
400, 313 S.E.2d 239, 241 (quoting Heist v. Heist, 46 N.C. App. 521,
523,  265  S.E.2d  434,  436  (1980)),  disc.  review  denied,  311  N.C.
399,  319 S.E.2d  268  (1984).
Plaintiff testified that prior to 1998, plaintiff thought she
and  her  husband  had  "the  perfect  marriage."                             (Tr.  at                                                          15.)
Plaintiff also testified Mr. Ward was a "good husband" to her and
a  "good  father"  to  his  children.                                         (Tr.  at                                                          19.)   See,  e.g.,
Litchfield  v.  Cox,  266  N.C.  622,  623,  146  S.E.2d  641,  642  (1966)
(holding plaintiff's own testimony that her marriage was a good one
sufficient  to  establish  a  marriage  with  love  and  affection).
Plaintiff's  evidence  also  tended  to  show  that  the  love  and
affection  that  once  existed  between  her  and  her  husband  was
alienated and destroyed by defendant's conduct.   Plaintiff began to
notice a change in her husband's affections in the late spring of
1998, around the time her husband met defendant.   During this time,
plaintiff's  husband  began  to  "draw  away"  from  home  and  started
missing evening meals with his family.                                        (Tr. at  20-21.)   As he was
spending  less  time  with  plaintiff  and  his  children,  he  began  to
spend an increasing amount of time with defendant.
Plaintiff's husband, who at the time was working as a captain
at the Mitchell County Sheriff's Department, first met defendant in
"early                                                                        1998,"  when  he  responded  to  several  reports  of  domestic
disputes  at  her  home.                                                      (Tr.  at  45-46.)    In  June  1998,  defendant
began  inviting  plaintiff's  husband  to  her  home,  and  did  so  on




numerous occasions by contacting him at work.   On one occasion she
arrived  at  the  police  station  asking  to  speak  to  plaintiff's
husband.     The  officers  noticed  she  emanated  a  strong  odor  of
alcohol,  but  she  refused  to  take  an  alkasensor  test  and  insisted
that plaintiff's husband drive her home.   The increasing amount of
time that defendant and plaintiff's husband were spending together
culminated in plaintiff's husband moving into defendant's home on
4  July  1998,  where  he  stayed  for  about  two  weeks.    The  evidence
indicated   that   a   sexual   relationship   developed   between   the
defendant and plaintiff's husband during this time.
We   conclude   this   evidence   was   sufficient   to   overcome
defendant's  motion  for  directed  verdict.    However,  the  defendant
maintains   that   absent   any   evidence   that   defendant   "lured"
plaintiff's husband away, the evidence on the claim of alienation
of affections could not be submitted to the jury.   To the contrary,
"luring"  by  the  defendant  is  not  required  to  sustain  a  claim  for
alienation of affections.    Scott v. Kiker,  59 N.C. App.  458,  464,
297  S.E.2d                                                                   142,   146   (1982).    A  defendant  need  not  even  be  the
initiator  in  such  a  relationship,  but  must  be  only  a  willing
participant,  making  occasions  for  a  relationship  to  develop.
Heist,  46  N.C.  App.  at  525,  265 S.E.2d  at  437.    In addition,  the
defendant  maintains  the  Wards'  marriage  was  strained  before
defendant  entered  the  picture.    Even  so,  the  defendant's  actions
need  not  be  the  sole  cause  of  the  alienation.    As  long  as  her
conduct was a "controlling" or "effective" cause of the alienation,
plaintiff  may  prevail  even  in  the  face  of  other  contributing
factors.   Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592, 596, 96 S.E.2d 870, 873




(1957).                                                                       We  find  the  evidence  sufficient  to  suggest  that  the
defendant was the effective cause of the alienation in this case.
[2]  In  support  of  her  Rule                                               60(b)  motion  for  relief  from
judgment,  the  defendant  submitted  evidence  of  a  consent  order
entering a divorce from bed and board between the plaintiff and her
husband on 5 August 1998, the same day the complaint in this action
was  filed.    This  consent  order  relieved  Mr.  Ward  of  payment  of
alimony,  post-separation  support  and  child  support.     Defendant
asserts   on   appeal   that   the   findings   in   the   consent   order
alleviating   Mr.   Ward   of   these   responsibilities   evidence   a
fraudulent  scheme  on  the  part  of  plaintiff  and  her  husband  in
filing this claim for alienation of affections.   Defendant contends
the fraud indicated by the consent order required the trial court
to direct a verdict in defendant's favor.
Fraud  is  an  affirmative  defense  that  must  be  specially
pleaded.    N.C.R.  Civ.  P.  8(c).    Failure  to  plead  an  affirmative
defense  ordinarily  results  in  waiver  of  the  defense.    Nationwide
Mut. Insur. Co. v. Edwards, 67 N.C. App.  1, 6,  312 S.E.2d 656,  660
(1984).    The parties may, however, still try the issue by express
or implied consent.   N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(b).   Defendant neither pled
nor tried the case on this theory, but only made it an issue in her
post-trial  motion  for  relief  from  judgment.     Accordingly,  she
cannot now present it on appeal.
[3]   Defendant   also   contends   the   trial   court   erred   in
submitting  the  issue  of  punitive  damages  to  the  jury.    Defendant
first  contends  plaintiff's  demand  for  punitive  damages  did  not
comply  with  the  requirements  set  forth  in  Rule  9(k)  of  the  North




Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.   Rule 9(k) states, "A demand for
punitive  damages  shall  be  specifically  stated,  except  for  the
amount,  and  the  aggravating  factor  that  supports  the  award  of
punitive damages shall be averred with particularity."   One of the
following  aggravating  factors  listed  in  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1D-15
must  be  established  to  recover  punitive  damages:                         (1)  fraud,  (2)
malice or  (3) willful or wanton conduct.    In accordance with Rule
9(k),  plaintiff's  complaint  averred  both  malice  and  willful  and
wanton conduct as the relevant aggravating factors under G.S.  1D-
15.    Absent  any  additional  requirement  in  the  statute  that  the
complaint  state  with  particularity  the  circumstances  underlying
these factors, we find the pleadings in compliance with Rule 9(k).
Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the award of punitive damages based on malice or willful or
wanton  conduct.    It  is  well  settled  that  punitive  damages  may  be
awarded in an action for alienation of affections.   Heist, 46 N.C.
App.  at  527,  265  S.E.2d  at  438;  see  also  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1D-1
(1999) ("Punitive damages may be awarded, in an appropriate case .
.  .  , to punish a defendant for egregiously wrongful acts.").    In
order for the question of punitive damages to be submitted to the
jury,   however,   there   must   be   evidence   of   circumstances   of
aggravation  beyond  the  proof  of  malice  necessary  to  satisfy  the
elements of the tort to sustain a recovery of compensatory damages.
Chappell  v.  Redding,  67  N.C.  App.  397,  403,  313  S.E.2d  239,  243
(1984).    Specific  circumstances  of  aggravation  include  "willful,
wanton, aggravated or malicious conduct."    Heist,  46 N.C. App. at
526-27, 265 S.E.2d at 438; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-15 (1999).




Evidence of "sexual relations" will allow a plaintiff to get
to  the  jury  on  the  issue  of  punitive  damages  in  a  claim  for
alienation of affections.                                                     1 Suzanne Reynolds, Lee's North Carolina
Family  Law,  §  5.48(c)  (5th  ed.  1993);  see  also  Hutelmyer  v.  Cox,
133  N.C.  App.  at                                                           371,                                       514  S.E.2d  at   560               (finding  sufficient
aggravating factors where defendant engaged in sexual relationship
with plaintiff's husband, publically displayed the affair, welcomed
him  into  her  home  numerous  times  and  called  plaintiff's  home  to
determine his whereabouts); Jennings v. Jessen, 103 N.C. App. 739,
744,                                                                          407  S.E.2d                                264,              267               (1991)                 (finding  sufficient  aggravating
factors   where   defendant   engaged   in   sexual   intercourse   with
plaintiff's husband, as well as "cohabited for several weeks with
[him]  and  was  audacious  enough  to  call  plaintiff's  home  in  an
attempt to discover [his] whereabouts"); Shaw v. Stringer, 101 N.C.
App.                                                                          513,                                       517,              400  S.E.2d       101,                   103                                 (1991)   (finding  sufficient
aggravating  factors  where  defendant  had  sexual  intercourse  with
plaintiff's  wife,  ignored  plaintiff's  request  not  to  visit  the
marital  home  and  laughed  when  plaintiff's  wife  told  him  that
plaintiff knew of the relationship).   On the other hand, plaintiffs
who  have  failed  to  prove  sexual  relations  have  lost  their  claims
for  punitive  damages.    Cottle  v.  Johnson,  179  N.C.  426,  431,  102
S.E.  769,  771  (1920)  (ordering new trial where plaintiff received
punitive  damages  for  alienation  of  affections  in  case  in  which
plaintiff  did  not  make  out  criminal  conversation);  Chappell,           67
N.C. App. at  403,  313 S.E.2d at  243  (ordering on remand the trial
court  submit  only  to  compensatory  damages;  no  evidence  of  sexual
relations);  Heist,                                                           46  N.C.  App.  at                         527,              265  S.E.2d  at   438




(affirming  trial  court's  refusal  to  enter  judgment  on  punitive
damages;  no  evidence  of  sexual  relations);                              1  Suzanne  Reynolds,
Lee's North Carolina Family Law,  §  5.48(c)  (5th ed.  1993).
We  find  sufficient  evidence  of  additional  circumstances  of
aggravation  justifying  punitive  damages  here.     The  plaintiff
presented evidence that the defendant and plaintiff's husband "had
sex"  at  least  two  times.                                                 (Tr.  at  55.)    In  addition,  there  was
evidence of other aggravating circumstances.    Specifically, after
forming  a  sexual  relationship  with  plaintiff's  husband,  the
defendant  accompanied  him  when  he  returned  his  children  to  the
custody of the plaintiff.   On a later date, the defendant appeared
unannounced at the front door of the marital home, asking plaintiff
if  they  could  be  friends.    Again,  about  a  week  later,  defendant
arrived  in  the  driveway  of  the  marital  home  while  plaintiff's
husband  was  visiting  his  children,  blowing  the  car  horn  for
plaintiff's husband.    The plaintiff walked outside and recognized
the  defendant,  who  subsequently  drove  away  without  Mr.  Ward.    We
find  this  evidence  of  additional  circumstances  of  aggravation
sufficient to warrant submission of the punitive damages issue to
the jury on plaintiff's claim for alienation of affections.
[4]  Defendant  also  contends  the  court's  jury  instruction  on
punitive damages was confusing, but concedes that it was consistent
with the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions.    Specifically,
defendant argues the proper considerations to be made by the jury
are set forth in a disorganized manner, and thus did not meet the
requirement that the judge explain the law.    We have reviewed the
court's instruction on punitive damages and find it to be entirely




consistent  with  the  provisions  of  Chapter                                1D  of  our  general
statutes,  outlining  the  procedure  for  establishing  and  awarding
punitive damages.    Any simplified or shortened instruction would,
in our opinion, violate the requirement that the judge instruct the
jury  on  the  law  with  respect  to  every  substantial  feature  of  the
case.    N.C.R.  Civ.  P.  51(a);  Mosley  &  Mosley  Builders  v.  Landin
Ltd.,  87 N.C. App.  438,  445,  361 S.E.2d  608,  612  (1987).
[5]  Defendant  next  contends  the  court  erred  in  admitting
evidence of defendant's assets before the trier of fact determined
that  compensatory  damages  were  warranted.    Defendant  argues  this
premature  admission  of  evidence  tainted  the  jury's  verdict  for
compensatory damages.   Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that
defendant's failure to request a bifurcated trial on the issue of
punitive  damages  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                   §                      1D-30  rendered  this
evidence admissible at any time during plaintiff's case-in-chief.
We agree.
It  is  clear  that  evidence  of  a  defendant's  net  worth  may  be
considered  by  the  jury  in  determining  the  amount  of  a  punitive
damages   award.                                                              N.C.   Gen.   Stat.    §                                                    1D-35(i)   (listing   as   a
permissible factor to be considered "[t]he defendant's ability to
pay punitive damages, as evidenced by its revenues or net worth")
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                             §                      1D-30  sets  forth  the  procedural  safeguard  of
bifurcation, stating:
Upon the motion of a defendant, the issues of
liability  for  compensatory  damages  and  the
amount of compensatory damages, if any, shall
be   tried   separately   from   the   issues   of
liability for punitive damages and the amount
of   punitive   damages,   if   any.                                          Evidence
relating solely to punitive damages shall not
be  admissible  until  the  trier  of  fact  has




determined  that  the  defendant  is  liable  for
compensatory  damages  and  has  determined  the
amount  of  compensatory  damages.     The  same
trier  of  fact  that  tried  the  issues  relating
to  compensatory  damages  shall  try  the  issues
relating to punitive damages.
(Emphasis added.)   The language of G.S. 1D-30 makes clear that the
defendant is not entitled to bifurcation until the defendant files
such  a  motion.    See  also  N.C.R.  Civ.  P.  42(b)  ("The  court  may  in
furtherance  of  convenience  or  to  avoid  prejudice  and  shall  for
considerations of venue upon timely motion order a separate trial
of any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of
any  separate  issue  or  of  any  number  of  claims,  crossclaims,
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.")  (Emphasis added).
Because  the  defendant  here  failed  to  move  for  a  bifurcated  trial
under  the  provisions  of  G.S.                                                1D-30,  evidence  regarding  her  net
worth was admissible at any time during plaintiff's case-in-chief.
[6] Defendant next contends the trial court's instruction on
future  damages  was  error.     The  defendant  admits  on  appeal  her
failure  to  object  to  this  instruction  at  trial.     Accordingly,
defendant  is  prohibited  from  raising  this  issue  on  appeal  and  we
will not address it.    N.C.R. App. P.  10(b)(2).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining assignment of error and
find it to be without merit.
Affirmed.
Judge HUNTER concurs
Judge WALKER dissents.




NO. COA99-1277
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                       19 December  2000
PATRICIA WARD,
Plaintiff
v.                                                                           Mitchell County
                                                                             No.  98 CVS  209
KRISTEN BEATON,
Defendant
WALKER, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion which affirms
the judgment of the trial court.
In  this  case,  Michael  Ward  was  the                                     “star”  witness  for  the
plaintiff, although he testified he had been subpoened.   He was the
only witness to testify that he and defendant engaged in a sexual
relationship, that defendant showed affection toward him, that he
lived with defendant for about two weeks, that defendant received
alimony  and  that  defendant’s  father  set  up                             “one  or  two  million
dollars”  for  her.     All  of  this  testimony  was  denied  by  the
defendant.
At  the  close  of  plaintiff’s  evidence,  defendant  moved  for  a
directed  verdict  on  the  claims  of  alienation  of  affections  and
criminal  conversation.    The  trial  court  allowed  the  motion  as  to
the  claim  for  criminal  conversation  stating  that  the  plaintiff
failed  to  produce                                                          “legal  and  sufficient  evidence  the  defendant
committed the specific act of sexual intercourse required to show
the existence of that tort.”




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Defendant’s  motion  pursuant  to  Rule                                      60(b)(1)(2)(3)  and                                                 (6)
sets forth the following in part:
(1)    On  23  July  1998,  plaintiff  filed  an  action  against  her
husband, Michael Ward, alleging an adulterous relationship by Mr.
Ward  and  that  he  abandoned  plaintiff  and  the  children                (Ward  v.
Ward,  98 CVD  201).
(2)    On                                                                    6  August                                                           1998,  plaintiff  filed  a  consent  order  in
                                                                             which she waived alimony and post-separation support and Mr. Ward
was ordered to pay child support.
(3)   Immediately thereafter, on 6 August 1998, plaintiff filed
this action  (98 CVS  209).
(4)    Following  the  consent  order,  Michael  Ward  did  not  pay
specified  child  support;  however,  plaintiff  filed  an  affidavit
excusing and explaining Mr. Ward’s failure to pay.
(5)   Following the trial on 10 and 11 March 1999, defendant in
this case discovered in the Ward v. Ward file plaintiff’s statement
releasing  Michael  Ward  from  paying  $900.00  and  a  letter  dated  26
March                                                                        1999  from  plaintiff’s  counsel  stating  that  plaintiff  and
Michael  Ward  had  reconciled  and  plaintiff  requested  that  her
husband’s child support obligation be terminated.
Defendant argues that under Rule 60(b)(6), the judgment should
be set aside because (1) extraordinary circumstances exist, and (2)
justice  demands  that  relief  be  granted.     In  support  of  her
argument, defendant points to the sequence of events beginning with
the filing of the action in Ward v. Ward on 23 July 1998 and ending
with the reconciliation on  26 March  1999, which raises a question




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of  whether  plaintiff  and  Mr.  Ward                                         “connived”  or                           “colluded”  in
pursuing  these  claims  against  defendant.     I  agree  the  highly
unusual events in this case demand that a new trial be ordered on
plaintiff’s claim of alienation of affections and her entitlement,
if any, to compensatory damages.
After careful review, I conclude the evidence does not support
an  issue  of  punitive  damages.    In  a  similar  case,  this  Court  has
held:
It  is  incumbent  on  the  plaintiff  to  show
circumstances  of  aggravation  in  addition  to
the malice implied by law from the conduct of
defendant   in   causing   the   separation   of
plaintiff and her husband which was necessary
to sustain a recovery of compensatory damages.
Cottle v. Johnson,  179 N.C.  426,  102 S.E.  769
(1920).                                                                        In  the  present  case,  the  wrongful
conduct of defendant in permitting plaintiff’s
husband  to  visit  her  at  her  residence  with
knowledge  of  the  marital  discord  which  these
visitations   produced   and   over   plaintiff’s
protests was sufficient to establish the tort.
However, we are of the opinion that plaintiff
has    not    shown    such    circumstances    of
aggravation  in  addition  to  the  above  conduct
of defendant to justify the submission of the
punitive damage issue to the jury.




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Heist v. Heist, 46 N.C. App.  521,  527, 265 S.E.2d 434, 438 (1980).
In  a  later  case,  this  Court  further  stated  that  punitive
damages may be awarded where the defendant’s conduct was willful,
aggravated,  malicious  or  of  a  wanton  character.    See  Chappell  v.
Redding, 67 N.C. App.  397, 403, 313 S.E.2d 239,  243 (1984).   There
must be some circumstances of aggravation in addition to the malice
implied  by  law  from  the  conduct  of  a  defendant  in  alienating  the
affection  between  the  spouses,  which  is  necessary  to  sustain
compensatory damages.   Id.   Here, it is apparent that the jury was
influenced by the prejudicial evidence from the Register of Deeds
and Mr. Ward concerning the wealth of the defendant.
There is no evidence of aggravated conduct on the part of the
defendant.    The  only  aggravated  conduct  in  this  case  was  on  the
part  of  Mr.  Ward  when  he  admitted  to  having  consumed  alcoholic
beverages before and during his visits at defendant’s residence in
July of  1998.
In sum, for the reasons stated, the judgment should be vacated
and a new trial ordered on the plaintiff’s claim of alienation of
affections and her entitlement, if any, to compensatory damages.

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