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RICKY WHITEHEAD, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, v. SPARROW ENTERPRISE, INC., d/b/a
LABOR FINDERS, Defendant
NO. COA04-208
Filed:  7 December  2004
1.                                                                                                   Jurisdiction--North Carolina Wage and Hour Act--no exemption for temporary
employment agency
The trial court did not err by concluding that defendant temporary employment agency is
not exempt from the jurisdiction of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, because plaintiff’s
claims arise from N.C.G.S. §§ 95-25.6 and 95-25.8 which address wage payment and
withholding of wages respectively.
2.                                                                                                   Employer and Employee--wage withholding--transportation deduction--specific
authorization
A de novo review revealed that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment
in favor of defendant temporary employment agency based on defendant withholding class
members’ wages to pay for an optional transportation service to and from job sites, because: (1)
defendant’s house rules comply with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 95-25.8(2)(a) as a specific
authorization even though there is a range given for the dollar amount since it is sufficiently
narrow to provide adequate notice to the class members, the deductions for transportation
expenses are not automatic and are conditioned upon the class members specifically requesting
use of the van pool each morning, and class members receive frequent and sufficient notice of
the cost to use defendant’s van pool; (2) defendant’s house rules satisfy the formatting and
content requirements under N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0305(b) since the authorization form
is written, signed by the class members on or before the payday for the pay period from which
the deduction is made, includes the date signed, and states the reason for the deduction; and (3)
the optional transportation service offered to the class members is not an incident of nor is it
necessary to the employment, and it does not matter that the trip is between defendant’s home
office and the job sites.
3.                                                                                                   Employer and Employee--wage withholding--waiting and traveling to work
A de novo review revealed that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment
in favor of defendant temporary employment agency based on class members not being entitled
to compensation under N.C.G.S. § 95-25.6 for time spent waiting for and traveling on
defendant’s optional transportation service, because: (1) plaintiff testified that defendant never
told him that hours worked included wait time or travel time to and from the job site, and the
employment contract does not provide for the compensation the class members seek; (2) the
class members’ wait or travel time is not a principal activity requiring compensation, but instead
is preliminary and postliminary activity since the class members’ idle time either before or after
the workday is personal; and (3) the receipt of general protective equipment does not make travel
time compensable under 29 C.F.R. § 785.38.
Appeal  by  plaintiff  from  order  entered  21  November  2003  by
Judge Donald W. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court.    Heard in
the Court of Appeals  14 October  2004.




Law  Offices  of  Robert  J.  Willis,  by  Robert  J.  Willis,  for
plaintiff-appellant.
Richardson,  Patrick,  Westbrook  &  Brickman,  LLC,  by  James  L.
Ward,  Jr.,  and  Rogers  Townsend  &  Thomas,  P.C.,  by  Paul  M.
Platte, for defendant-appellee.
TYSON, Judge.
Ricky  Whitehead                                                              (“plaintiff”)  on  behalf  of  those  similarly
situated  (collectively,  “the class members”) appeal from entry of
summary judgment in favor of Sparrow Enterprise, Inc. (“defendant”)
after  the  trial  court  found  no  violations  of  the  North  Carolina
Wage and Hour Act  (“the NCWHA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. §  95-25.1 et seq.
(2003)).    We affirm.
I.    Background
Defendant   is   a   temporary   employment   agency   that   hires
individuals on a daily basis for casual labor.    Defendant markets
and  provides  the  temporary  labor  to  businesses  that  periodically
need additional workers.
Defendant’s hiring policy is structured on a first come first
serve basis.    Individuals seeking work must arrive at defendant’s
office  early  in  order  to  be  considered  available  for  employment.
At their first hiring, the class members are required to sign the
“House  Rules.”     The                                                       “House  Rules”  discloses  defendant’s  hiring
process, the details and rules of employment, hours of operation,
the  hourly  wage,  hours  worked,  and  standard  deductions  which
include  optional  transportation  expenses.    Plaintiff  signed  the
“House Rules” on  2 January  2001.
Upon  arrival  in  the  morning,  the  class  members  write  their
names  on  a  sign-in  sheet  and  wait  for  an  assignment  of  available




jobs.     The                                                                 “House  Rules”  specifically  states  such  time  is  not
compensable, “Hours worked and pay are determined from the time the
worker  starts  working  at  the  customer’s  establishment  And  (sic)
ends when the work is completed at the customer’s establishment.”
While  waiting,  the  class  members  often  eat  breakfast,  read  a
newspaper, watch television, talk, or sleep.
The  class  members  who  are  offered  work  are  called  to  the
assignment desk and provided a description of the job and pay.   If
they  accept  the  position,  they  are  asked  whether  they  have
transportation available.    If they do not, the class members will
ride with either a fellow employee or in defendant’s van.   The cost
to  the  class  members  is                                                   $1.00  each  way.                                           The        “House  Rules”
explains the transportation program and cost to the participant.
After receiving work assignments, defendant provides general
safety  equipment  like  hard  hats,  boots,  and  gloves  to  those
employees who would need them.    The class members either wait for
the  van  pool  or  secure  their  own  transportation  to  the  job  site.
They  are  allowed  to  do  whatever  they  want  during  this  period,  so
long  as  they  arrive  at  the  job  site  on  time.    Those  who  select
defendant’s van pool are not given any instructions about the job
during the ride.   Plaintiffs have the option to be paid at the end
of the workday or at a later time.
On  12  June  2002,  plaintiff,  acting  on  behalf  of  himself  and
the class members, filed a class action complaint under Rule 23 of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure asserting two claims.
First,  plaintiff  argued  the  wage  deductions  for  the  communal
transportation  were  illegal  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                       §                                                           95-25.8.
Second,  plaintiff  argued  employees  who  elect  to  use  the  optional




transportation should be paid for time spent while both waiting for
the van and riding to and from the job sites under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§                                                                             95-25.6.     Plaintiff  sought  redress  solely  under  the  NCWHA.
Defendant answered on  16 January  2003.
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 16 September
2003.    It  asserted:                                                        (1)  plaintiff  agreed  to  both  situations  by
signing  enforceable  contracts;                                              (2)  defendant  is  exempt  from  the
jurisdiction  of  the  NCWHA;  and  (3)  plaintiff  is  not  an  adequate
class representative to allow the class action to proceed.
On 21 November 2003, the trial court found the “material facts
regarding these claims are not in significant dispute  [and]  [t]he
issue                                                                         .  is  whether  or  not  the  undisputed  material  facts  of
record establish a violation of the Wage and Hour Act.”   The trial
court  held  plaintiff  made  no  showing  of  a  violation  of  the  NCWHA
and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on both claims.
Plaintiff appeals.
II.    Issues
The  issues  on  appeal  are  whether:                                        (1)  defendant  is  exempt
from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  NCWHA;  (2)  the  trial  court  properly
granted  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  defendant  on  the  class
members’  transportation  deduction  claim;  and  (3)  the  trial  court
erred  in  granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  defendant  on  the
class members’ time spent both waiting and traveling claim.
III.    Federal Statutes, Regulations, and Cases as Guidance
We  note  at  the  outset  that  the  issues  before  us  arise  from
employment and labor law, a substantive area monopolized by federal
statutes, regulations, and case law.   Plaintiff’s claims are based
on  the  NCWHA,  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §                                         95-25.1  et.  seq.    The  NCWHA  is




modeled after the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“the FLSA”), 29
U.S.C.                                                                       §           201  et  seq.    Laborers'  Int'l  Union  of  North  America,
AFL-CIO  v.  Case  Farms,  Inc.,  127  N.C.  App.  312,  314,  488  S.E.2d
632,                                                                         634         (1997).    The  North  Carolina  Administrative  Code           (“the
Code”) states that “judicial and administrative interpretations and
rulings established under [] federal law” may serve as a guide for
interpreting North Carolina laws when our Legislature has adopted
provisions of the FLSA.   N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r. 12.0103 (June
2004).
We are not bound by decisions of Federal circuit courts other
than  those  of  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Fourth
Circuit arising from North Carolina law.   Haynes v. State, 16 N.C.
App. 407, 409-10, 192 S.E.2d 95, 97 (1972) (citing State v. Barber,
278 N.C.  268,  179 S.E.2d  404  [(1971)]).
IV.    Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s entry of summary judgment de novo.
                                                                                         Shroyer  v.  County  of  Mecklenburg,                                    154  N.C.  App.                               163,   167,   571
S.E.2d                                                                       849,        851                                                             (2002)   (citing  Falk  Integrated  Tech.,  Inc.  v.
Stack,  132 N.C. App.  807,  809,  513 S.E.2d  572, 574  (1999)).   Under
de novo review, a reviewing court considers the matter anew, and it
may substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court.   Mann
Media,  Inc.  v.  Randolph  Cty.  Planning  Bd.,                             356  N.C.   1,                                                              13,      565
S.E.2d  9,  17  (2002)  (citation omitted).
A  grant  of  summary  judgment  is  proper  when:                           “(1)  the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on  file,  together  with  the  affidavits,  show  that  there  is  no
genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”   Von Viczay v. Thoms, 140




N.C. App. 737, 738, 538 S.E.2d 629, 630 (2000) (quotation omitted),
aff'd per curiam,  353 N.C. 445, 545 S.E.2d 210 (2001).   The moving
party  has  the  burden  of  showing  there  is  no  genuine  issue  of
material  fact  and  that  it  is  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of
law.    Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors, Inc.,  350 N.C.  567,  572,
515  S.E.2d  438,  441  (1999).    Both  this  Court  and  the  trial  court
must  view  the  evidence  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the
non-moving  party  and  all  inferences  from  that  evidence  must  be
drawn  against  the  moving  party  and  in  favor  of  the  non-moving
party.    Id.
After  a  review  of  the  record  and  hearing  the  parties’  oral
arguments,  we  conclude  no  genuine  issues  of  material  fact  exist.
We review the trial court’s conclusions of law.
V.    Exemption from the NCWHA
[1] Defendant asserts, as an enterprise engaged in interstate
commerce, its relationships with the class members are covered by
the  FLSA  and  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  NCWHA.     We
disagree.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  95-25.14(a)  (2003)  provides  exemptions  to
employers from the NCWHA in limited circumstances, which states:
The provisions of G.S. 95-25.3 (Minimum Wage),
G.S.                                                                           95-25.4   (Overtime),  and  G.S.   95-25.5
(Youth Employment), and the provisions of G.S.
95-25.15(b) (Record Keeping) as they relate to
these exemptions, do not apply to:
(1)   Any  person  employed  in  an  enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production
of  goods  for  commerce  as  defined  in  the
Fair Labor Standards Act  .  .  .
Plaintiff’s claims arise from N.C. Gen. Stat.  §§  95-25.6 and
95-25.8  which  address  Wage  Payment  and  Withholding  of  Wages




respectively.   The statute defendant relies upon for exemption does
not  cover  either  section  of  the  NCWHA.    Defendant’s  argument  is
overruled.
VI.    Transportation Deduction Claim
[2]  Plaintiff  asserts  defendant  failed  to  comply  with  the
North  Carolina  statutes  and  the  Code,  which  provide  when  and  how
employers may deduct wages from employees’ paychecks.   We disagree.
A.    Specific Authorization of Wage Withholding
                                                                                                                                  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  95-25.1  et  seq.  comprise  the  NCWHA.    N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                  §                                          95-25.8                                                                            (2003)  addresses  wage  withholding,  which
states:
An employer may withhold or divert any portion
of an employee’s wages when:
(1)                                                                          The employer is required or empowered to
do so by State or federal law, or
(2)                                                                          The employer has a written authorization
from  the  employee  which  is  signed  on  or
before the payday for the pay period from
which   the   deduction   is   to   be   made
indicating the reason for the deduction.
Two types of authorization are permitted:
(a)   When  the  amount  or  rate  of  the
proposed   deduction   is   known   and
agreed    upon    in    advance,    the
authorization   shall   specify   the
dollar amount or percentage of wages
which shall be deducted from one or
more paychecks, provided that if the
deduction is for the convenience of
the employee, the employee shall be
given  a  reasonable  opportunity  to
withdraw the authorization;
(b)   When  the  amount  of  the  proposed
deduction  is  not  known  and  agreed
upon  in  advance,  the  authorization
need  not  specify  a  dollar  amount
which  can  be  deducted  from  one  or
more  paychecks,  provided  that  the
employee receives advance notice of
the specific amount of any proposed




deduction and is given a reasonable
opportunity                                                                   to                                               withdraw   the
authorization  before  the  deduction
is made.
The statute offers employers two options of written authorization
to deduct wages.   First, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(a) addresses
deductions  of  a  “known”  sum  of  money,  a  specific  authorization.
N.C.  Admin.  Code  tit.  13,  r.  12.0305  (June  2004).    Employees  who
agree to specific authorizations must receive from their employers
an opportunity to withdraw the authorization before the deduction
is made,  “if the deduction is for the convenience of the employee
.”   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(2)(a).   Second, N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 95-25.8(2)(b) refers to a blanket authorization, one made for an
unknown  amount  of  money.    N.C.  Admin.  Code  tit.  13,  r.  12.0305.
Before a deduction may be completed under a blanket authorization,
the  employee  must  receive  notice  of  the  specific  amount  and  a
reasonable  opportunity  to  withdraw  the  authorization.    N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  95-25.8(2)(b).
The Code further requires valid wage deduction authorizations
by employees to be:                                                           (1) written;  (2) signed by the employee on or
before  the  payday  for  the  pay  period  for  which  the  deduction  is
made;  (3) show the date of signing by the employee; and  (4) state
the  reason  for  the  deduction.     N.C.  Admin.  Code  tit.                13,  r.
12.0305(b).   If the authorization is specific, the dollar amount or
percentage  of  wages  withheld  must  be  provided.    Id.    Before  an
employer  may  deduct  wages  under  a  blanket  authorization,  it  must
first  provide  the  employee:                                                (1)advance  notice  of  the  specific
amount of the proposed deduction;  (2) a reasonable opportunity of
at  least  three  calendar  days  from  the  employer’s  notice  of  the




amount to withdraw the authorization.   N.C. Admin. Code tit. 13, r.
12.0305(d).
Each   employee   hired   by   defendant   must   read   and   sign
defendant’s  form,  the  “House  Rules.”    It  includes  the  following
language:
Anyone choosing to accept transportation from
Labor  Finders,  to  one  of  our  job  sites,  will
be  charged  no  less  than  .50  to  and  .50  from
and  no  more  than  $1.00  to  and  $1.00  from  the
job site.    Worker understands that this offer
of transportation is for the worker’s benefit
and                                                                          if                                                        worker                                             chooses   to   accept
transportation,    worker    authorizes    Labor
Finders    to    deduct    the    cost    of    that
transportation   in   both   overtime   and   non-
overtime weeks.
This  provision  qualifies  as  a  specific  authorization  under
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                            §                                                         95-25.8(2)(a).     The  optional  transportation
service offered by defendant and its associated cost is explained.
Although  a  range  is  given  for  the  dollar  amount,  we  hold  it  is
sufficiently  narrow  to  provide  adequate  notice  to  the  class
members.                                                                     We  further  note  the  deductions  for  transportation
expenses  are  not  automatic.    They  are  conditioned  upon  the  class
members specifically requesting use of the van pool each morning.
Only then are wages withheld.    The class members receive frequent
and sufficient notice of the cost to use defendant’s van pool.   We
hold the “House Rules” complies with the requirements of N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  95-25.8(2)(a) as a specific authorization.
Finally, the “House Rules” satisfies the Code’s formatting and
content requirements.   The authorization form is written, signed by
the class members on or before the payday for the pay period from
which the deduction is made, includes the date signed, and states
the  reason  for  the  deduction.     N.C.  Admin.  Code  tit.               13,  r.




12.0305                                                                     (b).    We hold that defendant’s  “House Rules” form and wage
deduction  procedure  complies  with  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  95-25.8  and
N.C. Admin. Code tit.  13, r.  12.0305.
This portion of plaintiff’s assignment of error is overruled.
B.    Incident of and Necessary to Employment
Plaintiff   contends   the   optional   transportation   services
offered  by  defendant  to  its  employees  benefit  defendant  and  are
considered neither wages nor deductible.    We disagree.
Employers  may                                                              “count  as  wages  the  reasonable  cost                        ‘of
furnishing [an] employee with board, lodging, or other facilities,
if  such  board,  lodging,  or  other  facilities  are  customarily
furnished by such employer to his employees.’”   Arriaga v. Florida
Pacific  Farms,  L.L.C.,                                                    305  F.3d                                                       1228,   1236   (2002)   (quoting   29
U.S.C. § 203(m)).   The employer may deduct the reasonable cost from
the  employee’s  paycheck,  even  if  the  net  amount  falls  below  the
minimum wage.                                                               29 C.F.R.  §  531.27  (2004).
The United States Department of Labor (“USDOL”) defines “other
facilities” as:
Meals  furnished  at  company  restaurants  or
cafeterias   or   by   hospitals,   hotels,   or
restaurants    to    their    employees;    meals,
dormitory  rooms,  and  tuition  furnished  by  a
college  to  its  student  employees;  housing
furnished   for   dwelling   purposes;   general
merchandise  furnished  at  company  stores  and
commissaries                                                                (including   articles   of   food,
clothing,    and    household    effects);    fuel
(including   coal,   kerosene,   firewood,   and
lumber  slabs),  electricity,  water,  and  gas
furnished  for  the  noncommercial  personal  use
of   the   employee;   transportation   furnished
employees  between  their  homes  and  work  where
the  travel  time  does  not  constitute  hours
worked  compensable  under  the  Act  and  the
transportation  is  not  an  incident  of  and
necessary to the employment.




29   C.F.R.                                                                   §                          531.32(a)                                        (2004)                                                                     (emphasis  supplied).                                       If   the
                                                                                                                                                          “facilities”  are  primarily  for  the  benefit  of  the  employer,  the
                                                                                                                                                          cost may not be included in computing wages and the employer must
                                                                                                                                                          “reimburse  the  expense  up  to  the  point  the  FLSA  minimum  wage
                                                                                                         provisions  have  been  met.”     Arriaga,  at                                                                              1241-42;                                       29  C.F.R.   §
531.3(d)(1)                                                                   (2004).                                                                                                                                                The  issue  here  is  whether  the  optional
transportation service offered to the class members is “an incident
of and necessary to the employment” and primarily for the benefit
of defendant.                                                                 29 C.F.R.  §  531.32(a).
Plaintiff  cites  Arriaga  as  persuasive  authority  to  show  the
optional transportation service was  “an incident of and necessary
to” defendant’s business and primarily for defendant’s own benefit.
305  F.3d  at  1228.    There,  domestic  agricultural  employers  hired
nonimmigrant  aliens  from  Mexico  as  farm  laborers  to  work  on  a
seasonal  basis.    Id.  at  1232.    Laborers  who  passed  the  interview
process  paid  for  their  own  passage  to  the  United  States,  visa
costs, and various recruiting fees.   Id. at 1234.   After deducting
these  expenses  from  wages  earned,  the  net  income  fell  below  the
statutory minimum wage.    Id. at  1231-32.
The  Eleventh  Circuit  held  the  transportation  costs  were  “an
incident of and necessary to the employment” and the employers must
reimburse  the  laborers  for  expenses  paid  in  coming  to  the
employment.    Id. at  1242.    The court noted the determining factor
was  the  transportation  costs  were  “an  inevitable  and  inescapable
consequence of having foreign . . . workers employed in the United
States.”    Id.    The  court  carefully  distinguished  that  situation
from one where an employer “hires from its locale.”   Id.   Further,
the court distinguished between costs “arising from the employment




itself and those that would arise in the course of ordinary life”
by interpreting  “other facilities” as meaning  “employment-related
costs  .  .  . that would arise as a normal living expense.”    Id. at
1242-43.
We find Arriaga persuasive, but not as plaintiff argues.   The
paramount distinction between the facts here and therein Arriaga is
exactly  what  the  Court  discussed.     In  Arriaga,  transportation
expenses were both inevitable under the program employers used to
recruit  and  hire  foreign  workers,  and  is  substantially  different
from  normal  commuting  costs.     Here,  defendant’s  transportation
service is one of several options available to the class members to
travel  to  and  from  job  sites.    They  are  free  to  use  their  own
vehicles, ride public transportation, walk, ride with a co-worker,
or  defendant’s  van.    The  choice  facing  the  class  members  is  the
same  encountered  by  every  worker  every  day  and  is  not  unique  to
defendant’s  business.    It  matters  not  that  the  trip  is  between
defendant’s home office and the job sites.   Vega v. Gaspar, 36 F.3d
417,  425  (5th Cir.  1994).
We  find  the  optional  transportation  service  offered  by
defendant falls within the category of  “other facilities” and may
be   counted   towards   wages.                                              Defendant   properly   deducts   the
associated transportation cost from the class members’ paychecks in
compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8 and N.C. Admin. Code tit.
13, r.  12.0305.
Plaintiff  has  failed  to  show  and  we  find  no  evidence  in  the
record  that  a  genuine  issue  of  material  fact  exists  or  defendant
improperly  withheld  wages  from  the  class  members.     Defendant’s
authorization form, the  “House Rules,” satisfies the requirements




of both N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  95-25.8 and N.C. Admin. Code tit.  13, r.
12.0305.     The  class  members  received  sufficient  notice  of  the
transportation option, its cost, and the process of electing to use
the van pool and the subsequent wage withholding.   This assignment
of error is overruled.
VII.    Time Spent Waiting and Traveling to and from Work
[3] Plaintiff contends that time spent waiting and traveling
between defendant’s office and the job sites is compensable under
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  95-25.6  (2003),  which  states,  [e]very  employer
shall  pay  every  employee  all  wages  and  tips  accruing  to  the
employee on the regular payday.   Pay periods may be daily, weekly,
bi-weekly,  semi-monthly,  or  monthly.    Wages  based  upon  bonuses,
commissions,  or  other  forms  of  calculation  may  be  paid  as
infrequently as annually if prescribed in advance.    We disagree.
A.    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  95-25.6
Plaintiff  argues  defendant  is  breaching  “an  express  oral  if
not  written  contract”  between  the  parties  requiring  defendant  to
pay the class members in accordance with the FLSA, which triggers
the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6.   Plaintiff concedes
the “House Rules” specifically addresses this issue in defendant’s
favor.     However,  he  requests  this  Court  to                          “look[]  beyond  the
language  contained  in  the                                                [House  Rules]”  to  federal  statutes,
regulations,  and  case  law,  to  find  waiting  and  traveling  time
compensable under these circumstances.
The applicable provision of defendant’s employment contract,
the  “House Rules,” states:
We  open  between  5:30  &  6:30  AM.    To  improve
your  chance  of  employment,  you  may  choose  to
“show up” at the earliest possible time and no




less  than  one  hour  before  a  repeat  ticket’s
delivery time.    This is entirely voluntary on
the worker’s part.   During the waiting time in
our lobby, the worker is waiting to be engaged
rather  than  engaged  to  Wait                                               (sic).     Hours
worked  and  pay  are  determined  from  the  time
the  worker  starts  working  at  a  customer’s
establishment And  (sic) ends when the work is
completed at the customer’s establishment  .  .
.  .    The worker understands that waiting time
for  assignments  at  Labor  Finders,  and  travel
time  from  Labor  Finders  to  the  customer’s
establishment and back, as well as waiting to
be  picked  up  from  the  job  site,  is  not
compensable work time.
The contract defines  “hours worked” as beginning when  “the worker
starts  working  at  a  customer’s  establishment  And  (sic)  ends  when
the work is completed at the customer’s establishment.”
The record on appeal indicates the class members will only be
compensated for time spent working at the job sites.    It includes
a copy of the “House Rules” detailing the compensation process with
plaintiff’s  signature.    Plaintiff  also  testified  that  defendant
never told him “hours worked” included wait time or travel time to
and from the job site.
The employment contract does not provide for the compensation
the  class  members  seek.    Plaintiff  admitted  he  understood  this
policy and a copy of the agreement bears his signature.   We find no
violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  95-25.6.    We  now  consider  whether
federal law requires defendant to compensate the class members for
time spent waiting and traveling.
B.    The Portal to Portal Act
The  Portal  to  Portal  Act,  29  U.S.C.  §  254,  does  not  require
employers to pay employees for the following activities:
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from
the   actual   place   of   performance   of   the




principal  activity  or  activities  which  such
employee is employed to perform, and
(2)  activities  which  are  preliminary  to  or
postliminary  to  said  principal  activity  or
activities,  which  occur  either  prior  to  the
time  on  any  particular  workday  at  which  such
employee  commences  or  subsequent  to  the  time
on any particular workday at which he ceases,
such principal activity or activities.
29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2003) (emphasis supplied).   The issue before us
is  whether  the  class  members’  wait  and  travel  time  are  principal
activities and thus compensable.    We hold that they are not.
Employers must compensate employees for time spent waiting and
traveling when “it is part of a principal activity of the employee,
but not if it is a preliminary or postliminary activity.”   Vega, 36
F.3d  at                                                                      424,      425                                             (citing  The  Portal  to  Portal  Act,                           29  U.S.C.                               §
254).                                                                                                                                   Principal   activities   are   those   duties   integral   and
                                                                                        indispensable  to  the  employer’s  business.                                                                    Karr  v.  City  of
Beaumont,  Tex.,  950  F.  Supp.  1317,  1322  (E.D.Tex.  1997)  (citing
Truslow v. Spotsylvania County Sheriff, 783 F. Supp. 274, 277 (E.D.
Va. 1992) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2), (b)), aff'd, 993 F.2d 1539
(4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)).   They include duties “‘performed as
part of the regular work of the employees in the ordinary course of
business[,] work  [that] is necessary to the business  .  .  .                .  [and
also] primarily for the benefit of the employer.’”    Vega,  36 F.3d
at  424  (quoting  Dunlop  v.  City  Electric,  Inc.,  527  F.2d  394,  401
(5th Cir.  1976)).
Preliminary  activities  are  those  “engaged  in  by  an  employee
before the commencement of his ‘principal’ activity or activities.”
29  C.F.R.                                                                    §         790.7                                           (2004).                                                          “‘[P]ostliminary  activity’  means  an
activity  engaged  in  by  an  employee  after  the  completion  of  his




‘principal’ activity or activities  .  .  .                                   .”    Id.    Preliminary and
postliminary activities are spent primarily for the employees’ own
interests,  completed  at  the  employees’  convenience,  and  not
necessary  to  the  employer’s  business.    Jerzak  v.  City  of  South
Bend,  996 F. Supp.  840,  848  (N.D.Ind.  1998).
1.    Waiting Time
Plaintiff   asserts   he   and   the   class   members   should   be
compensated for waiting time both between receiving job assignments
and  physically  commencing  work  at  the  job  sites  and  between
stopping work and returning to defendant’s office.   We consider two
factors  in  determining  whether  plaintiff’s  waiting  time  is  a
principal activity and compensable under The Portal to Portal Act.
The  first  issue  is  whether  the  time  spent  is  predominantly  to
benefit  the  employer  and  integral  to  the  job.    Preston  v.  Settle
Down Enterprises, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1278-79 (N.D.Ga. 2000)
(citations omitted); Vega,  36 F.3d at  425  (citing Mireles v. Frio
Foods,  Inc.,                                                                 899  F.2d                      1407,   1411   (5th  Cir.   1990)).    The  second
issue is whether the employee is able to use the time for their own
personal  activities.    Vega,  36  F.3d  at  426  (citing  Mireles,  899
F.2d at  1413).
Defendant is in the business of providing temporary labor to
its customers on an as-needed basis.   Customers request defendant’s
services when extra help is needed on any variety of construction
projects.     Defendant  hires  enough  workers  on  a  daily  basis  to
satisfy that demand.    Workers receive assignments because work is
available  on  that  particular  day.     Defendant  does  not  retain
individuals to wait for customers to request labor services.




After receiving a work assignment, the class members elect how
they will travel from defendant’s office to the job site.   They can
use their own vehicle, ride public transportation, walk, car pool
with   another   driver,   or   sign   up   for   defendant’s   optional
transportation service.   Defendant does not restrict the mode, the
class  members’  activities  while  they  wait  for  the  ride,  or  their
activities  in  transit.    The  class  members  are  free  to  do  as  they
please.    At the end of the day, defendant gives the class members
the option whether to return to the office to get their paycheck at
that time or at a later date.
Based on this evidence, we hold the class members’ time spent
waiting   is   a   preliminary   and   postliminary   activity   and
noncompensable.   The class members’ principal activity, that which
defendant  hired  them  for,  is  to  work  for  customers  on  a  daily
basis.                                                                         Temporary  labor  is  the  entire  scope  of  defendant’s
business.     Customers  pay  for  that  service,  which  begins  upon
arrival at the job site and stops at the end of the work day.   The
class  members’  idle  time  either  before  or  after  the  workday  is
personal.   Many spend waiting time reading the newspaper, sleeping,
drinking coffee, eating meals, watching television, or socializing
with other waiting workers.
The class members’ time spent waiting directly correlates to
their choice of transportation.    They are free to spend that time
as  they  wish.     It  is  neither  beneficial  nor  indispensable  to
defendant’s  business.     We  decline  to  extend                             “hours  worked”  to
include the class members’ waiting time prior to arrival at the job
site and at the end of the day.
2.    Travel Time




Travel time is only compensable under The Portal to Portal Act
                                                                              if  it  is  a  principal  activity  of  the  employee.                                                                                                                                                           29  U.S.C.  §  254.
                                                                                                                                         Normal commuting from home to work and back is considered ordinary
                                                                                                                                         travel  and  not  a  “principal  activity”  absent  a  contract  stating
otherwise.                                                                                                                                                                                                          29 U.S.C. § 254; 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.34 and 785.35 (2004).
                                                                              Travel   from   an   employer’s   campus   to   the                                                                                                                                                              “actual   place   of
performance”  is  noncompensable.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             29  C.F.R.   §   790.7(e)               (2004).
However, travel between job sites after work has begun for the day
is compensable.    Wirtz v. Sherman Enterprises, Inc.,  229 F. Supp.
746,  753  (1964)  (emphasis supplied);  29 C.F.R.  §  785.38  (2004).
Plaintiff relies heavily on Preston,  90 F. Supp.  2d  1267, in
arguing that travel time to and from the job sites is compensable
as  a  principal  activity.    There,  the  court  addressed  this  same
issue.     Similar  to  the  present  case,  the  defendant  provided
temporary  labor  to  customers  on  a  daily  basis.     Id.  at             1272.
Laborers hired were furnished transportation from the defendant’s
office  to  the  job  sites.    Id.  at  1273.    The  court  analyzed  the
issue by reviewing  29 C.F.R.  §  785.38, which states, in part:
Time spent by an employee in travel as part of
his  principal  activity,  such  as  travel  from
job site to job site during the workday, must
be counted as hours worked.   Where an employee
is  required  to  report  at  a  meeting  place  to
receive instructions or to perform other work
there,  or  to  pick  up  and  to  carry  tools,  the
travel  from  the  designated  place  to  the  work
place  is  part  of  the  day’s  work,  and  must  be
counted   as   hours   worked   regardless   of
contract, custom, or practice.
Based on this regulation, the court considered three important
factors:                                                                      (1)  whether  workers  were  required  to  meet  at  the
defendant’s  office  before  going  to  the  job  site;                       (2)  whether
workers  performed  labor  before  going  to  the  job  site;  and            (3)




whether  workers  picked  up  and  carried  tools  to  the  job  site.
Preston,  90 F. Supp.  2d at  1280-81.   Factors two and three did not
apply in Preston.   Id. at 1280.   However, the court ruled on factor
one  that  “arriving  at  a  business  on  one’s  own  initiative  seeking
employment” is not the same as an employer requiring an employee to
report at a meeting place.    Id. at  1280-81.    Thus,  “hours worked”
did not accrue until after arrival at the job site.
Applying the same analysis here, we find identical answers to
factors one and two.    First, defendant does not require employees
to report at its office at a certain time.   Rather, it established
the  policy  for  laborers  to  follow  if  they  were  interested  in
seeking  employment  from  defendant  on  a  daily  basis.    Second,  the
class members do not perform any work either at defendant’s office,
or in transit to the job sites.   Third, unlike Preston, the record
indicates that the class members are provided personal protective
equipment after receiving an assignment and before reporting to the
job site.   We address factor three, the picking up and carrying of
tools to the job site.
In  Crenshaw  v.  Quarles  Drilling  Corp.,  798  F.2d  1345  (10th
Cir.  1986)  and  D  A  &  S  Oil  Well  Servicing,  Inc.  v.  Mitchell,  262
F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1958), the courts found travel time compensable
as  an  indispensable  part  of  the  employees’  jobs.     Employer-
defendants  in  both  cases  required  their  employees  to  transport
specialized  equipment  necessary  to  service  oil  wells.    Crenshaw,
798  F.2d  at  1346;  D  A  &  S  Oil  Well  Servicing,  Inc.,  262  F.2d  at
553-54.    In  an  unpublished  opinion,  the  District  Court  for  the
Eastern  District  of  Kentucky  held  that  in  situations  where
employees are transporting specialized equipment to the job site,




“it  can  be  concluded  that  the  transportation  of  specialized
equipment,  provided  by  the  employer,  is  work  in  and  of  itself.”
Spencer v. Auditor of Public Accounts, No.  88-54,  1990 U.S. Dist.
Lexis  1076  (E.D.Ky. Jan.  30,  1990).
The USDOL addressed this issue in  29 C.F.R.  §  790.7, its own
expansive   interpretation   of                                               “preliminary”   and                          “postliminary”
activities.     The  regulation  distinguished  between  an  employee
transporting heavy equipment and ordinary hand tools.                         29 C.F.R. §
790.7(d)  (2004).    In  considering  heavy  equipment,  the  regulation
states   the   employee’s   travel                                            “is   not   segreable   from   the
simultaneous performance of his assigned work (the carrying of the
equipment,   etc.)                                                            .”   and   does   not   fall   under   the
noncompensable travel outlined by The Portal to Portal Act.    Id.
We agree with this distinction between the transportation of
specialized  and  heavy  equipment  and  the  non-unique  protective
equipment  issued  the  class  members  by  defendant.     The  record
indicates the class members receive hard hats, boots, and gloves.
These implements are not specialized and are used in a breadth of
manual  labor  jobs.    It  is  a  different  situation  from  an  employee
transporting  specialized  vehicles,  tools,  or  heavy  equipment
necessary  to  perform  highly  sophisticated  work.    The  receipt  of
nonspecialized  protective  equipment  does  not  make  travel  time
compensable under 29 C.F.R. § 785.38.   If its issuance constituted
the  beginning  of  “hours  worked,”  employers  could  just  wait  until
employees  were  at  the  job  site  before  passing  them  out  to  save
money.
We note further that the Fifth Circuit encountered the issue
of compensable travel time in Vega,  36 F.3d 417.   The defendant, a




farm    laborer    contractor,    provided    its    employee-laborers
transportation, for a fee, to and from the farm sites.   Id. at 423.
The court held the traveling time was preliminary and postliminary
activity and not compensable.    Id. at  425.    It based its decision
on  factors  present  in  the  case  at  bar.     First,  the  laborers
performed no work prior to getting on the bus in the morning.   Id.
Second,  the  defendant  offered  the  transportation  as  an  option  to
the workers and did not require its usage.   Id.   Third, not all of
the  laborers  elected  to  use  the  transportation.    Id.    The  court
concluded the travel from the defendant’s office to the farm sites
was  “an extended home-to-work-and-back commute.”    Id.
These factors, together with our analysis of Preston, compels
us  to  hold  that  class  members’  travel  time  is  a  preliminary  and
postliminary  activity  and  is  noncompensable.    This  assignment  of
error is overruled.
VIII.    Conclusion
Defendant  complies  with  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  95-25.8  and  N.C.
Admin. Code tit.  13, r.  12.0305 in withholding the class members’
wages to pay for an optional transportation service to and from job
sites.    The class members are not due compensation for time spent
waiting  for  and  traveling  on  defendant’s  optional  transportation
service under N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  95-25.6.    The trial court’s grant
of summary judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and LEVINSON concur.

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