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VAUGHAN S. WINBORNE, JR., Plaintiff v. MICHAEL F. EASLEY,
Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, COLON
WILLOUGHBY, in his official capacity as District Attorney for the
10th Prosecutorial District, and NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF
ELECTIONS, Defendants
No. COA98-1523
(Filed 21 December 1999)
1.                                                                                                      Elections--limitation on fund-raising during legislative sessions
The trial court did not err in addressing the issue of whether part of N.C.G.S. § 163-
278.13B (a)(2), the definition of “limited contributee” in a statute addressing limitations on fund-
raising during legislative sessions, was unconstitutional even though plaintiff raised the
constitutionality of the statute as it applied to challengers and to political committees desiring to
contribute to challengers, because that issue was also properly before the court since plaintiff
was seeking a means to obtain contributions from lobbyists and their political committees during
the legislative session.
2.                                                                                                      Elections--limitation on fund-raising during legislative sessions--compelling
                                                                                                        governmental interest--not narrowly tailored
The trial court did not err in finding N.C.G.S. § 163-278.13B (a)(2), the definition of
“limited contributee” in a statute addressing limitations on fund-raising during legislative
sessions, to be unconstitutional as applied to independent political committees accepting
contributions on behalf of candidates because although the statute was enacted for the
compelling governmental interest of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption
among both incumbents and challengers while the General Assembly is in session, the statute
was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
3.                                                                                                      Elections--limitation on fund-raising during legislative sessions--compelling
                                                                                                        governmental interest--narrowly tailored
The trial court did not err in finding that N.C.G.S. § 163-278.13B, a limitation on fund-
raising during legislative sessions, was constitutional as applied to plaintiff candidate for the
General Assembly as a challenger because: (1) a compelling governmental interest was
addressed in amending the statute to include challengers; (2) the statute is narrowly tailored in its
application to challengers, as well as incumbents; and (3) plaintiff has made no showing that the
statute invidiously discriminates against him as a challenger.
Appeal by defendants from an order entered  7 October  1998 by
Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court.   Heard
in the Court of Appeals  23 September  1999.
White  &  Associates,  by  J.  David  Stradley,  for  plaintiff-
appellee.
Attorney   General   Michael   F.   Easley,   by   Special   Deputy
Attorneys  General  Susan  K.  Nichols,  Alexander  McC.  Peters,
and James Peeler Smith, for defendants-appellants.




Deborah K. Ross and Mebane Rash Whitman for amicus curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal
Foundation, Inc.
WALKER, Judge.
On                                                                          2  October           1998,  plaintiff  filed  this  action  seeking  to
enjoin defendants from enforcing N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  163-278.13B on
the ground that the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon his
freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.   Specifically, plaintiff asserted that
the  statute  was  unconstitutional  as  applied  to  him  as  a  non-
incumbent  candidate  for  the  General  Assembly  and  as  to  political
action   committees   desiring   to   contribute   to   non-incumbent
candidates.
Plaintiff’s  motion  for  preliminary  injunction,  along  with
defendants’ motion to dismiss, was heard on 5 October 1998.   Since
supporting  affidavits  and  witness  testimony  were  offered  by  the
parties  during  this  hearing,  the  trial  court  converted,  at
defendants’  request,  the  defendants’  motion  to  dismiss  into  a
motion  for  summary  judgment  pursuant  to  Rule                          56  of  the  North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.   On 7 October 1998, after making
findings and conclusions, the trial court held that while N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  163-278.13B furthered a compelling governmental interest,
it   was   not   narrowly   tailored   to   that   interest   and   was
unconstitutional.     The  trial  court  then  entered  a  declaratory
judgment granting partial summary judgment to each party.
Plaintiff’s   allegations   in   his   complaint   included   the
following:




9.    Plaintiff  Winborne  was  unopposed  of  the
Democratic nomination for N.C. House District
92  seat,  and  on  May                                6,           1998,  Mr.  Winborne
became the Democratic nominee for said seat.
11.    Since  January,  1998,  Plaintiff  Winborne
has  actively  campaigned  for  the  District          92
N.C. House seat.
12.    The  general  election  will  take  place  on
November  3,  1998.
14.    Section  163-278.13B  prohibits  political
action committees from making contributions to
members  of,  or  candidates  for,  the  General
Assembly or Council of State while the General
Assembly  is  in  session.     Additionally,  the
section  prohibits  members  of,  or  candidates
for,  the  General  Assembly  from  receiving  or
soliciting contributions from political action
committees  while  the  General  Assembly  is  in
session.
15.    The General Assembly convened on May  11,
1998 and continues in session.
16.    According  to  widely  publicized  reports,
leaders  of  the  General  Assembly  have  stated
that the Assembly may not adjourn until after
the general election.
17.   Currently,   the   general   election   is
approximately  5 weeks away.
23.    On  account  of  the  threat  of  enforcement
of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                  §            163-278.13B,  Plaintiff
Winborne   has   been,   and   continues   to   be,
deprived of contributions to his campaign.
24.    On  account  of  the  threat  of  N.C.  Gen.
Stat. § 163-278.13B, Plaintiff SEANC has been,
and   continues   to   be,   deprived   of   the
opportunity  to  contribute  to  campaigns  of
candidates for the General Assembly.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                      §            163-278.13B(b)  and                        (c),  which  became
effective  on                                          1  January   1998,  limits  fund-raising  during  the




legislative session, and provides:
(b)   Prohibited   Solicitations.--While   the
General  Assembly  is  in  regular  session,  no
limited contributee  ... shall:                                          (1) Solicit a
contribution from a limited contributor to be
made to that limited contributee or to be made
to   any   other   candidate,   officeholder,   or
political committee;  ...
(c)                                                                                                                                                                                  Prohibited   Contributions.--While   the
                                                                                                                                     General  Assembly  is  in  regular  session:                                                                                             (1)
                                                                                                                                     No limited contributor shall make or offer to
make                                                                     a                                                           contribution                                                                               to                              a   limited
contributee...                                                                                                                                                                                                                  (4)  No  limited  contributee
shall  accept  a  contribution  from  a  limited
contributor.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                        §                                                           163-278.13B(b)  and                             (c)(Cum.  Supp.                            1998).
“Limited contributor” is defined as:
a  lobbyist  registered  pursuant  to  Article  9A
of  Chapter  120  of  the  General  Statutes,  that
lobbyist’s  agent,  or  a  political  committee
that  employs  or  contracts  with  or  who  parent
entity  employs  or  contracts  with  a  lobbyist
registered  pursuant  to  Article  9A  of  Chapter
120 of the General Statutes.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                        §                                                           163-278.13B(a)(1)(Cum.  Supp.                   1998).                                     “Limited
Contributee” is defined as:
a  member  of  or  candidate  for  the  Council  of
State,  a  member  of  or  candidate  for  the
General Assembly, or a political committee the
purpose  of  which  is  to  assist  a  member  or
members of or candidate or candidates for the
Council of State or General Assembly.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  163-278.13B(a)(2)(Cum. Supp.  1998).
In its order, the trial court’s findings can be summarized as
follows:                                                                 (1)   The statute was passed to prevent corruption or the
appearance  of  corruption  among  both  incumbent  and  non-incumbent
legislative candidates.                                                  (2)   The General Assembly, in adopting the
statute, recognized that one of its legislators could be wrongfully
influenced by money given directly to him or her during the session




or  by  a  lobbyist’s  threat  to  give  money  to  a  challenger  if  the
incumbent fails to support a program sought by the lobbyist.                 (3)
The  prevention  of  corruption  or  the  appearance  of  corruption  is
sufficient to justify some limitation on campaign contributions and
thus  the  free  speech  protected  thereunder  by  the  First  and
Fourteenth  Amendments.    The  underlying  justification  for  the  “in
session” prohibition is that lobbyists and their related political
committees   should   not   affect   or   appear   to   affect   ongoing
legislation by directly contributing to or receiving solicitations
from  lawmakers  or  by  threatening  contributions  to  non-incumbent
candidates.                                                                  (4)   The statute is overly broad since it is only the
“direct”   solicitation,   contribution,   pledge,   or   threat   to
contribute  that  results  in  the  appearance  of  corruption.     The
prohibitions  relating  to  the  political  committees  for  individual
candidates or groups of candidates, which are registered with and
regulated   by   the   State   Board   of   Elections,   constituted   an
impermissible  restriction  on  political  free  speech.                     (5)    That
portion of the  “limited contributee” definition which pertains to
a  political  committee  established  to  assist  an  incumbent  or
challenger  for  the  General  Assembly  is  overly  broad  and  invalid
since it imposes a too rigid restriction on political free speech
in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States  Constitution.     This  does  not,  however,  invalidate  the
remainder of the statute in question since the offending language
can be severed.   With the removal of political committees from the
definition of  “limited contributee,” the remainder of the statute
would meet constitutional muster.




After making these findings, the trial court concluded:
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  163-278.13B  was  enacted  by
the General Assembly in furtherance of a valid
and  compelling  governmental  interest--  the
prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption  and  impropriety  while  the  General
Assembly  is  engaged  in  the  business  of  the
people   of   the   State   of   North   Carolina.
However, the prohibition imposed by N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  163-278.13B,  which  bans  solicitation
and   contributions   by   lobbyists   and   their
related  political  committees  to  independent
committees  to  elect  candidates,  incumbent  or
challenger,  is  overly  broad  and  invalid  in
that  it  imposes  a  too  rigid  restraint  and
restriction on political free speech under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States  Constitution.     With  this  particular
part removed, the remainder of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§  163-278.13B is valid, lawful and remains in
effect.
Finally, the trial court entered a declaratory judgment which
holds:
a.    That N.C.G.S.  163-278.13B was enacted for
a compelling governmental purpose to wit:    to
protect  the  State  and  the  Legislative  Branch
of  Government  from  actual  corruption  or  the
appearance of corruption or impropriety while
the General Assembly is in session.
b.   That   the   portion   of   N.C.G.S.                       163-
278.13B(a)(2)                                                   “Limited   Contributee”   which
provides  that  a  Limited  Contributee  means  “a
political committee the purpose of which is to
assist a member or members of or candidate or
candidates for the Council of State or General
Assembly” is overly broad and invalid in that
it   imposes   a   too   rigid   restriction   on
political  free  speech  in  violation  of  the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
c.     That  the  remaining  portion  of  N.C.G.S.
163-278.13B(a)(2)  is  a  valid  and  appropriate
restriction  on  political  contributions  and
enacted  to  achieve  a  compelling  governmental
interest,  ...  and  does  not  violate  political
free   speech   secured   under   the   First   and
Fourteenth  Amendments  to  the  United  States




Constitution.
d.    That  N.C.G.S.  163-278,  of  which  N.C.G.S.
163-278.13B is a part, contains a severability
clause....    Accordingly,  this  Court  has  the
authority  to  and  orders  the  severance  of  the
invalid  language  as  set  forth  above  from
N.C.G.S.  163-278.13B(a)(2).
e.    That  having  severed  the  invalid  language
from N.C.G.S.  163-278.13B(a)(2), that section
                                                                             of  the  statute  now  reads:     N.C.G.S.   163-
278.13B(a)(2).                                                               (2)                                          “Limited   contributee”
means a member of or candidate for the Council
of  State,  a  member  of  or  candidate  for  the
General Assembly.
[f.]     That  N.C.G.S.                                                      163-278.13B,  as  it  now
reads,   is   valid   and   enforceable   in   its
entirety and a lawful and valid limitation on
political free speech, not in conflict with or
violation   of   the   First   and   Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Defendants set forth two assignments of error:                               (1) the trial
court  erred  in  declaring  a  part  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                  §                                            163-
278.13B(a)(2) unconstitutional when the issue was not raised by the
parties, and (2) the trial court erred in granting partial summary
judgment   to   plaintiff   on   the   ground   that   the   statute   was
unconstitutional as applied to independent political committees of
candidates.    Plaintiff  cross  assigns  as  error  the  trial  court’s
award  of  partial  summary  judgment  to  defendants  since  defendants
have  failed  to  demonstrate  that  this  statute  serves  a  compelling
governmental interest as applied to the plaintiff.
[1]  We  first  address  defendants’  contention  that  the  trial
court  erred  in  concluding  that  part  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.              §                                            163-
278.13B(a)(2)  was  unconstitutional  when  the  issue  had  not  been
raised in the trial court.   Defendants argue that plaintiff, at the




hearing,  only  raised  the  constitutionality  of  the  statute  as  it
applied  to  challengers  and  to  political  committees  desiring  to
contribute  to  challengers.    Thus,  the  trial  court  addressed  an
issue not before it.
Plaintiff  counters  by  pointing  out  that  he  alleged  in  his
complaint that the statute was unconstitutional because it was “not
narrowly tailored to serve any substantial state interest” and was
“impermissibly  over  broad.”     He  further  contended  that  he  was
“deprived of contributions to his campaign” because of the threat
of enforcement of this statute and therefore requested relief from
its  provisions.    Since  plaintiff,  in  this  action,  was  seeking  a
means  to  obtain  contributions  from  lobbyists  and  their  political
committees  during  the  legislative  session,  we  conclude  the  issue
was  properly  before  the  trial  court  and  it  did  not  err  in
addressing the scope of the definition of “limited contributee” as
it pertains to plaintiff as a challenger.
[2] We next address defendants’ argument that the trial court
erred  in  finding  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                       §   163-278.13B(a)(2)  to  be
unconstitutional  as  applied  to  independent  political  committees
accepting  contributions  on  behalf  of  candidates.     Defendants
contend  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  compare  an  independent
political  committee  for  a  legislative  candidate  with  that  of  a
committee established for a judicial candidate, as the trial court
did.   Further, defendants argue that a legislative candidate would
be  closely  allied  with  his  or  her  political  committee,  thus
preventing it from being independent.
Restrictions  on  campaign  finance  which  burden  expressive




activity  under  the  First  Amendment  must  be  narrowly  tailored  to
serve  a  compelling  governmental  interest.     Austin  v.  Michigan
Chamber  of  Commerce,                                                          494  U.S.                                                  652,  657,                                     108  L.  Ed.   2d            652,   662
(1990),  citing  Buckley  v.  Valeo,                                                                                                       424  U.S.                                      1,             46  L.  Ed.   2d     659
(1976).    The  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  Austin  applied  the
strict  scrutiny  analysis  and  recognized  that  the  prevention  of
corruption  and  the  appearance  of  corruption  were  “legitimate  and
compelling”   governmental   interests   for   restricting   campaign
finance.   Austin,  494 U.S. at  658, 108 L. Ed.  2d at  664.   However,
because political free speech under the First Amendment has such a
high  status,                                                                   “it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  the  constitutional
guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to
the conduct of campaigns for political office.”    Buckley,  424 U.S
at  15,  46  L.  Ed.  2d  at  685.    Thus,  when  the  government  restricts
political  contributions  and  expenditures,  it  must  employ  means
narrowly drawn to serve its compelling governmental interest.   Id.
at  25,  46 L. Ed.  2d at  691.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                               §                                                          163-278.13B  prohibits,  while  the  General
Assembly  is  in  session,  incumbents  from  soliciting  or  accepting
contributions  from  lobbyists  and  prohibits  lobbyists  from  making
contributions to incumbents.   The statute also prohibits lobbyists
or their related political committees from indirectly threatening
incumbents,  while  the  General  Assembly  is  in  session,  with
contributions  to  challengers.     Thus,  the  trial  court  properly
concluded  that  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                              §                                                          163-278.13B  was  enacted  for  a
compelling governmental interest, i.e. the prevention of corruption
or   the   appearance   of   corruption   among   both   incumbents   and




challengers while the General Assembly is in session.
However,  the  trial  court  found  that  the  remedy  set  forth  in
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.13B was not narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.    The statute prohibits  “limited
contributees”  from  soliciting  or  accepting  contributions  from
“limited contributors.”   The definition of “limited contributee” in
the statute includes “a political committee the purpose of which is
to assist a member or members of or candidate or candidates for the
...  General  Assembly.”     Thus,  the  statute  prohibits  political
committees  for  the  candidates,  in  addition  to  the  candidates
themselves,   from   soliciting   or   accepting   contributions   from
lobbyists.    The  trial  court  was  correct  in  concluding  that  this
prohibition  on  political  committees,  however,  was  not  narrowly
drawn to serve the compelling governmental interest of preventing
corruption  or  the  appearance  of  corruption  while  the  General
Assembly is in session and therefore constituted an impermissible
restriction  on  political  free  speech.    Thus,  the  trial  court  did
not  err  in  severing  “political  committee”  from  the  definition  of
“limited contributee.”
[3] Plaintiff cross-assigns as error the trial court’s finding
that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.13B was constitutional as applied to
him  as  a  challenger.    Plaintiff  contends  that  the  statute  is  not
narrowly tailored because it prohibits contributions to challengers
who have no influence to peddle.
The trial court observed that the rationale for changing the
law  to  include  challengers  was  to  prevent  lobbyists  and  their
political committees from using the  “threat” of contribution to a




challenger  as  pressure  to  cause  an  incumbent  to  vote  on  an  issue
which  the  lobbyist  or  the  related  political  committee  opposed  or
championed  and  to  eliminate  that  outside  influence  from  being
asserted  against  the  incumbent.    The  trial  court  did  not  err  in
concluding that a compelling governmental interest was addressed in
amending  the  statute  to  include  challengers.     Therefore,  the
statute is narrowly tailored in its application to challengers, as
well as incumbents.
Further,  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  held  that                     “absent
record evidence of invidious discrimination against challengers as
a  class,  a  court  should  generally  be  hesitant  to  invalidate
legislation  which  imposes  evenhanded  restrictions  on  its  face.”
Buckley,  424 U.S. at  31,  46 L. Ed.  2d at  695.    Plaintiff has made
no   showing   in   this   record   that   the   statute   invidiously
discriminates  against  him  as  a  challenger;  therefore,  his  cross
assignment of error is overruled.
Affirmed.
Judges LEWIS and WYNN concur.

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