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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA05-376
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          3 January  2006
EARL M. YANDLE,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              Mecklenburg County
No.  04 CVS  12633
BOYD P. FALLS &  “AUSTIN,
FALLS & CHANDLER”, a
partnership,
Defendants.
Appeal by Defendants from judgment entered 5 November 2004 by
Judge Albert Diaz in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.   Heard in
the Court of Appeals  29 November  2005.
Howard M. Labiner, for plaintiff-appellee.
Joe  T.  Millsaps  and  Erwin  and  Eleazer,  P.A.,  by  L.  Holmes
Eleazer, Jr., for defendant-appellants.
WYNN, Judge.
An arbitration award is subject to attack if the arbitrator,
through  mistake  of  law,  exceeded  his  authority  to  arbitrate.
Calvine  Cotton  Mills,  Inc.  v.  Textile  Workers  Union  of  Am.,  238
N.C. 719, 722, 79 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1953).   In this case, Defendants
argue  that  the  arbitrator  exceeded  his  authority  in  granting
Plaintiff an interest in the equity of the partnership because the
agreement  did  not  address  equity.                                                           Because  the  arbitration
agreement   allowed   arbitration   of   any   claim   related   to   the




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partnership  agreement                                                        (which  would  include  an  equity  interest
claim), we hold that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority.
The facts of this matter are fully set forth in this Court’s
opinion  following  a  prior  appeal  of  this  case.    Yandle  v.  Falls,
142  N.C.  App.                                                               707,                                                  545  S.E.2d    495     (2001)   (unpublished  opinion
COA00-110).    Summarily,  we  note  that  on  5  April  1986,  Plaintiff
Earl  M.  Yandle  entered  into  a  written  partnership  agreement  with
the  public  accounting  partnership  of  Austin,  Falls,  Wallace  &
Hamel.   Defendant Boyd P. Falls signed on behalf of the partnership
whose name was later changed to Austin, Falls & Yandle.   Mr. Yandle
withdrew  from  the  partnership  in  December  1998  and  the  firm  name
was later changed to Austin, Falls & Chandler.
In  June                                                                      1999,  Mr.  Yandle  brought  an  action,              99  CVS        9879,
against Mr. Falls seeking money owed and a receiver to operate and
liqudate  Austin,  Falls  &  Yandle.    Mr.  Falls  counterclaimed  for
breach  of  a  restrictive  covenant.    Thereafter,  the  trial  court
denied  Mr.  Yandle’s  motion  to  compel  arbitration  under  the
partnership  agreement  but  this  Court,  on  appeal,  reversed  and
remanded for entry of an order compelling arbitration.    Id.
In June  2002, Mr. Yandle and Mr. Falls voluntarily dismissed
their  respective  claims  and  counterclaims  in                             99  CVS                                               9879.    The
parties  agreed  upon  Judge  Robert  Kirby  as  the  arbitrator.    Judge
Kirby  entered  his  arbitration  decision  on  14  June  2004,  awarding
Mr. Yandle  (1)                                                               $43,004.00, the total of his capital account on  31
December 1998; (2)                                                            $7,081.00 for income earned in 1998 but not paid




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due to a mathematical error; and (3)                                           $70,000.00, Mr. Yandle’s share
of the value of the firm as of  31 December  1998.
On 21 July 2004, Mr. Yandle filed a new complaint, designated
04  CVS                                                                        12633,  against  Mr.  Falls  and  Austin,  Falls  &  Chandler,
seeking  an  order  confirming  the  arbitration  award.     Defendants
filed an application to vacate the arbitration award or to modify
or  correct  the  award.    The  trial  court  confirmed  the  arbitration
award by order entered 5 November 2004.   From this order Defendants
appeal.
On  appeal,  Defendants  contend  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
confirming  the  arbitration  award  and  in  denying  their  motion  to
vacate,  correct,  or  modify  the  award,  because  (1)  the  arbitrator
exceeded   his   authority   and                                               (2)   the   application   for   court
enforcement of the award was not timely.
First,  Defendants  argue  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
confirming  the  arbitration  award  and  in  denying  their  motion  to
vacate,  correct,  or  modify  the  award,  because  the  arbitrator
exceeded  his  authority.     Defendants  only  contest  the  award  of
$70,000.00,  Mr.  Yandle’s  share  of  the  value  of  the  firm  as  of  31
December 1998.   They acknowledge that the arbitrator was within his
authority to award $43,004.00, the total of his capital account on
31 December  1998, and  $7,081.00 for income earned in  1998 but not
paid due to a mathematical error.
Since  this  appeal  arises  from  a  decision  on  a  motion  to
confirm an arbitration award, we first note  “that a strong policy




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supports upholding arbitration awards.”   Cyclone Roofing Co., Inc.
v.  David  M.  LaFave  Co.,  Inc.,  312  N.C.  224,  234,  321  S.E.2d  872,
879  (1984).    Further,  “judicial review of an arbitration award is
confined  to  determination  of  whether  there  exists  one  of  the
specific  grounds  for  vacation  of  an  award  under  the                    [Uniform]
Arbitration [Act].”   Carolina Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v.
Gunter,  41  N.C.  App.  407,  411,  255  S.E.2d  414,  418  (1979).           “An
award  is  conclusive  on  matters  of  law  and  fact  if  decided  in
accordance with the legal construction of the contract in which the
arbitrators derive their authority.”   J. M. Owen Bldg. Contractors,
Inc. v. Coll. Walk, Ltd.,  101 N.C. App.  483,  488,  400 S.E.2d  468,
471 (1991).   However, the arbitration award is subject to attack if
the  arbitrator,  through  mistake  of  law,  exceeded  his  authority
provided  to  him  in  the  agreement  to  arbitrate.    Calvine  Cotton
Mills, Inc.,  238 N.C. at  722,  79 S.E.2d at  183.
Defendants argue that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in
awarding  the  $70,000.00,  Mr.  Yandle’s  share  of  the  value  of  the
firm  as  of                                                                   31  December   1998,  because  the  agreement  contains  no
“provision or term granting or acknowledging to Yandle a share in
partnership assets[,]” and therefore the arbitration order should
be vacated.    See id.    The  1986 agreement sets forth what could be
arbitrated  as  follows:  “Any  claim  or  controversy  between  parties
hereto  arising  out  of  or  relating  to  this  agreement  or  breach
thereof, or in any way related to the terms and conditions of the
employment of Employee by Austin, Falls, Wallace & Hamel, shall be
settled by arbitration under North Carolina law.” (emphasis added).




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The                                                                            1986  agreement  creates  a  partnership  contract  between  Mr.
Yandle  and  Austin,  Falls,  Wallace  &  Hamel.    It  specifically  sets
forth  the  percentage  of  profit  Mr.  Yandle  was  to  be  paid,  but  is
silent as to whether Mr. Yandle obtained an interest in the equity
of the partnership.   Whether Mr. Yandle obtained an equity interest
in the partnership when he was made a partner of the firm relates
to  the                                                                        1986  agreement.    Therefore,  pursuant  to  the  arbitration
provision of the 1986 agreement, the arbitrator did not exceed his
authority in determining interest in the equity of the partnership.
Second,  Defendants  contend  that  Rule  41(a)(1)  of  the  North
Carolina  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  bars  Mr.  Yandle’s  second
complaint to enforce the arbitration award because he voluntarily
dismissed  99  CVS  9879  on  7  June  2002,  and  did  not  recommence  the
action within one year.
Rule  41(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
provides  in  pertinent  part:                                                 “If  an  action  commenced  within  the
time  prescribed  therefor,  or  any  claim  therein,  is  dismissed
without prejudice under this subsection, a new action based on the
same  claim  may  be  commenced  within  one  year  after  such  dismissal
.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1, Rule  41(a)(1)  (2004).    However,
Mr. Yandle’s claim in  04 CVS  12633 is not the same claim as  99 CVS
9879,  but  is  instead  a  complaint  asking  the  court  to  enforce  an
arbitration award.    Therefore, Rule  41(a)(1) is not applicable.
Moreover, Defendants voluntarily participated in arbitration
on the same issues alleged in the first complaint.   They cannot now
attack  an  order  confirming  the  arbitration  award  as  time  barred,




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when they voluntarily participated in the arbitration.   See Andrews
v. Jordan,  205 N.C.  618,  172 S.E.  319  (1934)  (Court held that the
defendants  waived  any  objection  to  the  arbitrator’s  failure  to
comply  with  statutorily  prescribed  deadlines  by  participating  in
arbitration);  WMS,  Inc.  v.  Weaver,                                    166  N.C.  App.   352,   367,   602
S.E.2d 706, 716, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 197, 608 S.E.2d 330
(2004).
In sum, as the arbitrator did not exceed his authority and the
order to enforce the arbitration award was timely filed, the trial
court did not err in denying Defendants’ motion to vacate or modify
the  arbitration  award  and  in  granting  Mr.  Yandle’s  motion  to
confirm the arbitration award.
Affirmed.
Judges STEELMAN and SMITH concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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