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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT NASHVILLE

CAROLYN LOUISE TAYLOR PERKINS,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/ Appellant,

VS.
JOHN BAUMAN PERKINS, JR.,

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/ Appellee.
) ) ) ) Davidson Circuit No. 93D-1577 ) ) ) Appeal No. 01A01-9504-CV-00158
) ) ) ) )

FILED

November 15, 1995
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE ROBERT L. JACKSON, SPECIAL JUDGE


Mary Ann Reese
Baydoun, Harris & Reese, P.A.

Nashville, Tennessee Attorney for Appellant

Carol L. Soloman
Nashville, Tennessee Attorney for Appellee

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
CONCUR:

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S. HEWITT P. TOMLIN, JR., SP. J.
This is a divorce case in which Wife appeals the judgment of the trial court
testimony.
I.
The pertinent facts are as follows.  Carolyn Louise Taylor Perkins (hereinafter "Wife") and John Bauman Perkins, Jr. (hereinafter "Husband"), were married on June 24, 1966.  One child, now in her majority, was born of the parties' marriage.  During the marriage, both Husband and Wife worked outside of the home.  At the time of the divorce, the parties owned two businesses: Special Security Services, Inc., a private guard duty and funeral escort service, and Special Removal Services, which transported dead bodies. Husband worked at the parties' businesses while Wife worked elsewhere.  However, Wife handled the businesses' payroll and billing requirements from the businesses' inception in 1988 until 1991.
Husband had several extra-marital affairs throughout the parties' marriage.  In March of 1993, Wife learned that Husband was having an affair with Bobbie Denney.  The parties separated at that time.   At the time of  trial, Husband was living with Ms. Denney and her three children.  Husband made minor contributions to the Denney household for food, cleaning, and other household items. Ms. Denney worked for Special Security Services, without pay, but was given a company car to drive.
Wife was granted a divorce on the first day of trial after Husband's admission of adultery.  However, the trial court did not divide the marital estate or consider issues of alimony until almost two months later.  At that time, the trial court divided the marital property as follows.  The equity in the marital residence, in the amount of $54,400, was divided between the parties.  The court apportioned Husband's share in the equity as follows:  one half of Husband's portion, or $13,600, was awarded as alimony in solido, one half was credited against Wife's share in the parties' businesses.  The parties retained the personal property that was in their possession.  Wife was awarded 32 shares of General accounts.  Wife was awarded ownership of the parties' life insurance policy; however, Husband received a credit for his portion of the policy's cash surrender value, which the court applied both to discretionary costs assessed against Husband and to the marital estate judgment awarded to Wife.  The trial court determined that the combined fair market value of Special Security Services, Inc. and Special Removal Services was $130,000, or $65,000 each, which the court divided as follows: Husband was awarded both businesses. Husband received a credit of $13,600, representing part of his share of the equity in the marital residence and reducing  Wife's share in the value of the businesses to the judgment amount of $51,400.  The court ordered that Husband pay the judgment in increments of $500, bearing simple annual interest of 6%. The trial court found that Wife was not entitled to periodic alimony.   Wife was awarded $7,500 in attorney fees, and costs were taxed to Husband.  Wife appeals the trial court's decision.
II.
The first issue raised by Wife is whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Husband's business valuation expert, Gerald LeCroy, when Mr. LeCroy's name was not on Husband's witness list as required by Rule 22 of the Davidson County Local Rules of Court.  Rule 22 states in pertinent part:
Section 22.01 Required Procedure At least 72 hours (excluding weekends and holidays) before the trial of the civil case, opposing counsel shall either meet face-to-face or shall hold a telephone conference for the following purposes:  (a) to exchange names of witnesses, including anticipated impeachment or rebuttal witnesses . . ..
Although the trial judge initially stated that counsel could only call witnesses on the Rule 22 list, Mr. LeCroy was permitted to testify over the objection of Wife's counsel.  
In Airline Construction, Inc. v. Barr, 807 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn. App. 1990), the court,
discovery, stated:
[The trial judge may] permit the witness to testify, or it may
exclude the testimony, or it may grant a continuance so that
the other side may take the deposition of the witness or
otherwise prepare to meet the testimony. . .. However, when
such omission is willful, knowing or deliberate, an exclusion of
the witnesses' testimony  is suggested (emphasis supplied). In the present case, there is no evidence that Husband's counsel deliberately withheld Mr. LeCroy's name from Wife's counsel.  Furthermore, the record reveals that the trial judge considered counsel's explanation for not disclosing Mr. LeCroy's name sooner and determined that his testimony was too important to be excluded. We find no error in the trial court's allowance of Mr. LeCroy's testimony.
The second issue Wife presents is whether the trial court assigned a proper value to the business interests of the parties.  Two experts testified in this case as to the value of both Special Security Services, Inc. and Special Removal Services. Although both experts relied on the valuation guidelines set forth in Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1983), Wife's expert, Mr. Von Harshman, valued the businesses at between $235,000 and $255,000, while Mr. LeCroy, Husband's expert, valued the businesses at $120,000.  The parties do not dispute that both businesses were marital assets.  
Since this case was tried by the court sitting without a jury, we review the case de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact by the trial court.  Unless the evidence preponderates against the findings, we must affirm, absent error of law.  T.R.A.P. 13(d).  
It is well established that the valuation of an asset is a question of fact, and on appeal there is a presumption that the trial court's valuation is correct.  Wallace v. Wallace, 733 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tenn. App. 1987); Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Tenn. App. 1973).  The trial court may properly make a valuation that is within the range of proof submitted.  Wallace, 733 S.W.2d at 107. In the present case, the trial judge of both experts, we cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial judge. See Hardin v. Hardin, 689 S.W .2d 152, 154 (Tenn. App. 1983).  Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision regarding the value of the parties' businesses.
Wife's third and fourth issues on appeal concern specific provisions within the trial court's division of marital property.  Wife argues the following:  she should have received a lump sum payment, rather than installments,  representing her share of the parties' businesses; the interest on the judgment should be 10%, rather than 6%; and that a judgment lien should have been entered to secure Wife's judgment.  
It is a fundamental principle of law that trial courts have broad discretion in dividing the marital estate, and their decisions are afforded great weight on appeal.  Fisher v. Fisher, 648 S.W.2d 244, 245 (1983).  This Court will presume that the findings of the trial court are correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 459 (Tenn. App. 1991).  In making a division of marital property, the trial court is required to consider the factors set forth in T.C.A.

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