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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs November 23, 1998 C.D. BOYD v. TENNESSEE BOARD OF PAROLES, ET AL.
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 97-3614-I Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor

No. M1998-00914-COA-R3-CV - Filed April 12, 2001

This appeal involves an prisoner's efforts to be paroled from a 35-year sentence for second degree murder. After the Tennessee Board of Paroles declined to parole the prisoner for the sixth time, the prisoner filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board's latest decision. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the prisoner has appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the prisoner's petition. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM B. CAIN and PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JJ., joined. C.D. Boyd, Pikeville, Tennessee, Pro Se. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and Rebecca E. Miller, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Board of Paroles. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 In 1982, C. D. Boyd2 was charged with first degree murder in Shelby County. To avoid the possibility of being sentenced to either death or life imprisonment, she agreed to plead guilty to
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Tenn. Ct. Ap p. R. 10(b) pro vides: The Court, with the concur rence of all judges p articipating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court b y m e m orandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designate d "ME MOR AND UM O PINIO N," shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in a subsequent unrelated case.

C. D. Boyd, fo rmerly kno wn as Terry Boyd, describ es herself as a male to female pre-operative transsexual and has requested that she be referred to as a female.

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second degree murder. Accordingly, in November 1983, she was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison. She is currently serving her sentence at the Southeastern Tennessee State Regional Central Correctional Facility in Pikeville. Ms. Boyd first became eligible to be considered for parole in 1989. Between 1989 and 1997, the Tennessee Board of Paroles declined to release her on parole six times. In November 1997, Ms. Boyd filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County to review the Board's latest refusal to release her on parole. Her petition contains the stock challenges to the Board's decision to deny parole that have been repeatedly raised with little success. Accordingly, on March 3, 1998, the trial court granted the Board's motion to dismiss Ms. Boyd's petition. Ms. Boyd has appealed. I. The scope of review under a common-law writ of certiorari is limited. Courts do not issue the writ to review the intrinsic correctness of an inferior tribunal's decision. Rather, the writ lies to inquire into whether the original decisionmaker exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily. Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tenn. 1997). Courts grant relief under the common law certiorari writ when the decision being reviewed was arrived at in an unlawful manner. Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Bd., 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). Thus, if we find that the procedures complained of in this case comport with all constitutional and statutory requirements, we must affirm the trial court's dismissal. Guided by these legal standards, we turn to Ms. Boyd's arguments. Ms. Boyd first argues that when she was incarcerated in November 1983, the Board's rules contained a presumption that all inmates would be released upon the inmate first becoming eligible for parole.3 Even though the Board rescinded this presumption in 1985 prior to her first parole hearing, Ms. Boyd contends that the presumption applies to her and that repealing it constitutes an impermissible ex post facto law. We have previously considered and rejected that argument with regard to prisoners in circumstances similar to Ms. Boyd. Kaylor v. Bradley, 912 S.W.2d 728, 73234 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). We reject the argument again in this case. Second, Ms. Boyd argues that the Board violated due process rights by basing its decision to deny her parole on the seriousness of her offense. We have previously considered and rejected that argument. The Board may properly consider the seriousness of an offender's crime in denying parole. Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d at 482-83; Perry v. Board of Paroles, No. M1998-01018-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 46990, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2001) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). This argument fails to state a legal claim.

Ms. Boyd cites a superseded rule that stated: "The Board operates under the presumption that each resident who is eligible for parole is a worthy candidate and thus the board presumes that he will be released on parole when he is first eligible." Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 1100-1-1-.06 (superseded).

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Third, Ms. Boyd argues that the Board acted illegally by failing to provide her with a detailed written statement of its reasons for denying parole. We note first that the Board did give her copies of the form the hearing officer and his Board colleagues completed regarding her hearing which contained the reasons for denying her parole. We also note, as we have previously held, that no law requires that state prisoners receive detailed written statements setting out "with particularity" the reasons behind the Board's parole decisions. Perry v. Board of Paroles, 2001 WL 46990, at *2. This argument also states no legal claim. Fourth, Ms. Boyd insists that "Board policy" requires all members, or at least a quorum of the Board, to be present when an inmate convicted of murder is considered for parole release. However, Ms. Boyd does not identify this "policy" or provide any evidence that such a "policy" exists. We note that Tenn. Code Ann.

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