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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE
July 11, 2012 Session IN RE ESTATE OF OMER STIDHAM
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hamblen County No. 2009P180 Hon. Thomas R. Frierson, II, Chancellor

No. E2011-02507-COA-R3-CV-FILED-AUGUST 23, 2012

The Bureau of TennCare filed a petition to appoint an administrator of Omer Stidham's estate in order to file a claim against the estate for medical assistance rendered. The court appointed an administrator, and the Bureau of TennCare filed its claim. The administrator found that the estate was insolvent but moved the court to determine whether real property held in a revocable trust could be used to satisfy the debts of the estate. The heirs objected, arguing that the claim was untimely and that the property could not be reached because it was held in a revocable trust. The court authorized the use of the property to satisfy the debts of the estate, finding that the claim was not untimely and that the revocable trust was subject to claims against the estate. The heirs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed; Case Remanded J OHN W. M CC LARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which C HARLES D. S USANO, J R., J., and N ORMA M CG EE O GLE, SP. J.,1 joined. Alexander M. Taylor and Briton S. Collins, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Karen A. Scott, Mary Jo White, Judy Wright, David Stidham, Suzanne E. Brooks, Rebecca Ball, and Terri Lane. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; William E. Young, Solicitor General; L. Vincent Williams, Deputy Attorney General; and Richard F. Clippard, Assistant Attorney General, General Civil Division, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Bureau of TennCare.

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Judge on the Court of Criminal Appeals sitting by special designation.

OPINION I. BACKGROUND On October 27, 2008, Omer Stidham ("Decedent") died while a resident at Life Care Center in Morristown, Tennessee. Prior to his death, Decedent and his wife, who preceded him in death, owned real property that had been transferred into a revocable trust. Following his death, his heirs did not attempt to administer his estate because absent the property held in the trust, the estate was insolvent. On November 4, 2009, the Bureau of TennCare ("the Bureau") filed a petition to appoint an administrator of the estate, alleging that Decedent had received TennCare services and that it was entitled to reimbursement from the estate for those services. The court appointed Scott Hodge ("Administrator") as the administrator of the estate, and the Bureau filed a claim in the amount of $87,295.97. Administrator found that the estate was insolvent because Decedent's only known asset was the real property held in the revocable trust. Administrator requested a hearing to determine whether the real property could be brought into the estate for the purpose of paying the estate's debts. The heirs objected, arguing that the Bureau's claim against the estate was time-barred and that the Bureau could not access the property because the revocable trust was not part of the estate. The Bureau asserted that the claim was not time-barred because it did not receive notice of Decedent's death as required and that property held in a revocable trust should not be held inaccessible from proceedings to satisfy just debts. Following a hearing, the court denied the objections submitted by the heirs, holding that the claim was not barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-2-310 and that Administrator could use the real property located in the revocable trust for the purpose of satisfying the Bureau's claim against the estate. The heirs filed a timely appeal. II. ISSUES We consolidate and restate the issues raised on appeal as follows: A. Whether the statute of limitations precluded the Bureau's claim for the recovery of justly paid medical benefits. B. Whether the Bureau may use assets held in a revocable trust to satisfy a claim against an estate for medical benefits. C. Whether allowing the Bureau to recover assets in similar claims places an unintended and unlawful obligation upon the trustees of revocable trusts. -2-

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The facts are not in dispute, and the issues before this court involve the interpretation of statutes and case law. "Statutory construction is a question of law that is reviewable on a de novo basis without any presumption of correctness." In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tenn. 2009). Likewise, the trial court's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no presumption of correctness. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn. 2008); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). The Supreme Court of Tennessee has recapitulated the primary principles of statutory construction as follows: [T]here are a number of principles of statutory construction, among which is the most basic rule of statutory construction: to ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature. However, the court must ascertain the intent without unduly restricting or expanding the statute's coverage beyond its intended scope. The legislative intent and purpose are to be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language, without a forced or subtle interpretation that would limit or extend the statute's application. Mooney v. Sneed, 30 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tenn. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This court is not permitted "to alter or amend a statute." Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Tenn. 2000). "The reasonableness of a statute may not be questioned by a court, and a court may not substitute its own policy judgments for those of the legislature." Mooney, 30 S.W.3d at 306 (citing Gleaves, 15 S.W.3d at 803). "It is presumed that the Legislature in enacting [a] statute did not intend an absurdity, and such a result will be avoided if the terms of the statute admit of it by a reasonable construction." Epstein v. State, 366 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tenn. 1963). "[C]ourts must `presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.'" Gleaves, 15 S.W.3d at 803 (quoting BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Greer, 972 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)).

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IV. DISCUSSION A. Tennessee imposes a one-year statute of limitations upon claims made by the Bureau against an estate. See Tenn. Code Ann.

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