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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE
July 14, 2005 Session JAY GUINN CHRISTENBERRY v. DORIS ANNETTE CHRISTENBERRY
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Blount County No. E-19439 W. Dale Young, Judge

No. E2004-02193-COA-R3-CV - FILED AUGUST 19, 2005

This is an appeal of a divorce action in which the Wife argues that the trial court failed to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate and the trial court erred in dismissing her independent lawsuit against Husband, and a corporation owned by Husband, for wages claimed to be earned by Wife and owing by the corporation. We hold that the distribution of marital property should be modified so as to award Wife sole ownership of the marital home, subject to Husband's right of first refusal to purchase the home in the event it is sold, and Husband's right to visit and maintain the gravesite of the parties' daughter, located near the home on part of the marital estate, upon Husband's providing reasonable notice to Wife. We further find that the trial court erred in dismissing Wife's lawsuit against Husband and therefore vacate the trial court's order dismissing with prejudice the Wife's lawsuit against Husband and the corporation. We affirm the trial court's ruling in all other respects. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed as Modified in Part and Vacated in Part ; Case Remanded SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D. SUSANO , JR. and D. MICHAEL SWINEY , JJ., joined. R. Deno Cole, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Doris Annette Christenberry. John D. Lockridge, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Jay Guinn Christenberry. OPINION I On December 11, 2002, Jay Guinn Christenberry ("Husband") filed this action for divorce against the Appellant, Doris Annette Christenberry (Wife"). Wife filed an answer and a counterclaim. The parties agreed and stipulated that there were grounds for a divorce and that each

party was entitled to a divorce upon stipulated grounds. By order entered January 14, 2004, the trial court ordered each party to be divorced from the other, and a hearing was set to determine the division and distribution of marital property. The parties presented testimony and evidence over the course of a three-day hearing ending on May 11, 2004. The trial court determined that all of the parties' property was marital property, and neither party disputes this ruling. After the hearing, the trial court ruled as follows in part pertinent to this appeal: IT IS ORDERED that the [Wife] is awarded fee simple in the home of the parties situated on 1.90 acres at Chris Haven farm subject to a life estate interest reserved to the [Husband] in the event the [Wife] predeceases the [Husband]. The contents of the home shall be awarded to the [Wife].1 * * * IT IS ORDERED that the [Husband] is awarded the [Wife's] stock ownership in H.A.G., Inc., which property is described as being situated in the 13th District of Blount County, Tennessee, consisting of a golf course, a rental farm house and property referred to as an inn. The [Husband] shall assume the indebtedness thereon and hold the [Wife] harmless. The ORDER finds that any future claims, pending claims or lawsuits or disputed interests that the Defendant may assert or claim are herein declared null and void and the pending lawsuit styled Doris Christenberry v. H.A.G., Inc., and Jay Christenberry is hereby dismissed with prejudice and defendant taxed with the costs.

Wife appeals, raising the issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to award her an equitable share of the marital estate. In her brief, Wife breaks this issue into the following subissues, which we quote: 1. Did the Court err in awarding the marital home to Wife, subject to a life estate interest? 2. Did the Court err in failing to award Wife the Farm, which is part of the marital home?

The court's original order mistakenly stated "The contents of the home shall be awarded to the Plaintiff [Husband]," but the court corrected it to award the home's contents to W ife in a subsequent order.

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3. Alternatively, did the Court err in awarding 1.9 acres of land in conjunction with the marital home, in lieu of 3.5 acres, as set forth in a map Plot? 4. In awarding the golf course, i.e. 100% stock in H.A.G., Inc., to Husband, did the Court err in awarding the golf course, rental house, and Country Inn as a part of the golf course? 5. Did the Court err in awarding Wife $20,000.00 for her share of the rental house situated at 1263 Tittsworth Road, Seymour, Tennessee, in lieu of ordering the house to be awarded to Wife, or alternatively, in lieu of ordering the sale of said house and equally dividing the proceeds therefrom? 6. Did the Court err in equally dividing speculative proceeds from a draft copy of Wife's writings, and did the Court err in awarding Wife the physical copy of said writings? 7. Did the trial court err in dismissing Wife's independent cause of action against H.A.G., Inc., and Husband, and in enjoining Wife from all future such actions?

II In this non-jury case, our review is de novo upon the record of the proceedings below; but the record comes to us with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court's factual determinations that we must honor unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Wright v. City of Knoxville, 898 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are accorded no such presumption. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996); Presley v. Bennett, 860 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1993).

III The controlling statute in this case, Tenn. Code Ann.

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