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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE
ASSIGNED ON BRIEFS DECEMBER 29, 2000 MARIA NELSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY
Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 99-1448-III; The Honorable Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor

No. M2000-01147-COA-R3-CV - Filed March 20, 2001

This appeal arises from entry of a default judgment by the Appellee against the Appellant following the Appellant's failure to appear at a scheduled hearing. The Appellant filed a petition for judicial review with the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The trial court affirmed. The Appellant appeals from the Chancery Court of Davidson County's decision affirming the default judgment entered against the Appellant. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court's decision. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded ALAN E. HIGHERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID R. FARMER , J., and HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, J., joined. Maria Nelson, pro se Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter, Michael A. Meyer, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee OPINION I. Facts and Procedural History The Appellant, Maria Nelson ("Ms. Nelson") is a resident of West Memphis, Arkansas and holds a valid Arkansas driver's license. On November 5, 1997, Ms. Nelson and another motorist were involved in an automobile accident in Memphis, Tennessee. The accident report stated that the other motorist's automobile struck Ms. Nelson's automobile when Ms. Nelson attempted to make a left turn from the wrong lane. The report also stated that the estimated damage to each automobile was over four hundred dollars. By letter dated September 14, 1998, the Appellee, State of Tennessee Department of Safety ("the Department"), informed Ms. Nelson that her driver's license, driving privileges, and privileges to obtain a license would be revoked on October 4, 1998 unless she

complied with one of the following provisions: (1) submit proof that she had motor vehicle liability insurance at the time of the accident; (2) file a notarized release(s) from all persons who filed claims for damages with the department for the accident; or (3) deposit cash or a corporate surety bond with the department for $2,727.00. The Department also informed Ms. Nelson that she had a right to a hearing on the proposed action if she requested a hearing on or before October 4, 1998. Ms. Nelson requested a hearing on October 5, 1998. By letter dated October 30, 1998, the Department granted Ms. Nelson a hearing scheduled for November 12, 1998. The letter also stated that if Ms. Nelson wished to reschedule the hearing date, she should make the request in writing. On November 5, 1998, Ms. Nelson made a written request to reschedule the hearing. By letter dated November 11, 1998, the Department notified Ms. Nelson that she had lost her driver's license, driving privileges, and privileges to obtain a license. By letter dated December 18, 1998, the Department notified Ms. Nelson that the hearing was rescheduled for January 14, 1999. Ms. Nelson claims that she never received this letter. On January 14, 1999, Ms. Nelson failed to appear at the hearing, and a default judgment was entered. Ms. Nelson submitted a petition for reconsideration on February 16, 1999. On March 18, 1999, the Department denied Ms. Nelson's petition. On May 21, 1999, Ms. Nelson filed a petition for judicial review with the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The trial court affirmed the order of the Department and dismissed Ms. Nelson' petition with prejudice. This appeal followed. II. Standard of Review Our standard of review of this administrative agency is governed by section 4-5-322 of the Tennessee Code, which provides: (h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; (4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (5) Unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record. In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. (i) No agency decision pursuant to a hearing in a -2-

contested case shall be reversed, remanded or modified by the reviewing court unless for errors which affect the merits of such decision. TENN. CODE ANN .

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