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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON RICHARD A. LEEMIS v. PAUL O. RUSSELL, JR.
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County No. 97974 Robert A. Lanier, Judge

No. W1999-00352-COA-R3-CV - Decided May 24, 2000

This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the termination of Plaintiff Richard A. Leemis from his employment with the Regional Medical Center at Memphis ("The Med"). Mr. Leemis filed a complaint against Defendant Paul O. Russell, Jr., the president of Medical Services Research Group, Inc. ("MSRG"), alleging that Mr. Russell intentionally interfered with his employment relationship with The Med and induced or procured the termination of his employment. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Mr. Russell, finding that Mr. Leemis' complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. We conclude on appeal that, although Mr. Leemis' complaint does not state a cause of action for inducement or procurement of a breach of contract, it does state a claim for intentional interference with employment relations. Thus, insofar as it disposed of Mr. Leemis' procurement or inducement claim, the trial court's order is affirmed. To the extent, however, that it disposed of Mr. Leemis' interference claim, the trial court's order granted a summary judgment to Mr. Russell is reversed. Accordingly, we remand the cause for a trial to determine the merits of Mr. Leemis' claim against Mr. Russell for intentional interference with employment relations. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; and Remanded FARMER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CRAWFORD , P.J., W.S., and HIGHERS , J., joined. Erich M. Shultz, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Richard A. Leemis. Stephen H. Biller, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Paul O. Russell, Jr. OPINION Mr. Leemis was an employee of MSRG. Mr. Russell is the president of MSRG. In July of 1996, Mr. Leemis was terminated from his employment with MSRG. In July of 1997, with the recommendation of Mr. Russell, Mr. Leemis was hired by The Med as its Director of Planning and Research. Mr. Leemis' relationship with The Med was one of employment at will. Also in July of

1997, Mr. Leemis filed a complaint against MSRG regarding matters related to his former employment. It is alleged by Mr. Leemis that Mr. Russell subsequently contacted his superiors and other officers at The Med concerning the litigation pending between Mr. Leemis and MSRG, suggesting that The Med or its agents would be involved in the litigation. Mr. Leemis was terminated from his employment with The Med in November of 1997. According to Mr. Leemis, his termination was the result of the aforementioned conversations between Mr. Russell and his superiors and other officers at The Med. In November of 1998, Mr. Leemis filed a complaint against Mr. Russell alleging that he intentionally interfered with Mr. Leemis' employment relationship with The Med and procured the termination of his employment. Mr. Russell subsequently filed an answer (1) denying that he intentionally interfered with Mr. Leemis' employment relationship with The Med, (2) noting that Mr. Leemis did not have an employment contract with The Med and was therefore an at will employee, and (3) requesting that Mr. Leemis' complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Mr. Russell then filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by the affidavit of Deanie Parker, the Vice-President of Marketing at The Med, and certain documents relative to Mr. Leemis' employment with The Med. Mr. Leemis filed a response to the motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a second affidavit of Ms. Parker. Both affidavits state that Dave Bussone, interim CEO and President at The Med, informed Ms. Parker that Mr. Leemis' position was being eliminated. At the conclusion of a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment.1 An order reciting this ruling was entered by the court on August 26, 1999. In its order granting the motion for summary judgment, the trial court specifically found that Mr. Leemis had failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. This appeal by Mr. Leemis followed. The sole issue raised on appeal by Mr. Leemis is whether the trial court erred in finding that he failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted and in consequently granting Mr. Russell's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the party seeking summary judgment demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and further shows that, under the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tenn. 1998)(citing Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993)). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and discarding all countervailing evidence. See id. at 529 (citing Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210-11). If there is a dispute as to any material fact or any doubt as to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence, the motion must be denied. See Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. App. 1990)(citing Phillips v. Pittsburgh Consol. Coal Co., 541 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tenn. 1976)). Because this is solely a legal determination, our review of the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See
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The defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted may be raised by written motion. If matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment. See T.R.C.P. 12.02.

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White, 975 S.W.2d at 528-29 (citing Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997)); T.R.A.P. 13(d). Mr. Leemis alleged in his complaint that, through Mr. Russell's contacts with his supervisors and various officials at The Med, Mr. Russell intended to induce or procure the termination of his employment with The Med. Under Tennessee law, there is both a common law and a statutory cause of action for unlawful inducement or procurement of a breach of contract. See Polk and Sullivan, Inc. v. United Cities Gas Co., 783 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tenn. 1989); Shahrdar v. Global Hous., Inc., 983 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Riggs v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Campbell v. Matlock, 749 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann.

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