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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
APRIL 2000 Session SAM LEE SIMPSON, ET AL. v. ADDIE WILLIAMS DAVIS, ET AL.
Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Fayette County No. 12122; The Honorable Martha B. Brasfield, Chancellor

No. W1999-00689-COA-R3-CV - Filed September 15, 2000

This appeal arises from a breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment action initiated by Sam Simpson against Addie Davis.1 Simpson alleged Davis breached her duty as trustee of her deceased mother's estate and was unjustly enriched by Simpson's construction of a residence on Davis' property. The trial court held that although Davis did not breach a fiduciary duty, she was unjustly enriched. The court ordered the sale of both the property and residence with proceeds to be allocated between the parties.2 Davis appeals. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed ALAN E. HIGHERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FARMER , J., and LILLARD, J., joined. Ivan D. Harris, Jr., Collierville, for Appellant J. Payson Matthews, Somerville, for Appellee OPINION Sam and Lillie Simpson, sister of Addie Davis, moved to Fayette County in 1993 and constructed a residence on the subject real estate. Lillie Simpson died in 1995. On May 1, 1998, Sam Simpson filed suit against Davis in the Fayette County Chancery Court, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. Simpson alleged that Davis breached her fiduciary duty as trustee and perpetrated a fraud on her deceased mother's estate by obtaining quitclaim deeds for the property from the beneficiaries for little or no consideration. Simpson also claimed that Davis pocketed forty-five thousand dollars in proceeds from the sale of a portion of the land, and that Davis did not make an

Davis was named individually, in her capacity as executrix of her deceased mother's estate , and in her ca pacity as trustee of the d eceased's tru st.
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Simpson is now deceased. The executor of Simpson's estate is pursuing the action.

accounting to the estate and trust beneficiaries. In addition, Simpson claimed that Davis was unjustly enriched by Simpson's construction of a residence on her land in Fayette County. The following testimony was presented at trial on the matter on April 23, 1999. Davis testified that she and her brother were appointed executors of their mother's estate in March 1986. Davis' brother died shortly thereafter, leaving Davis as sole executor and trustee. The decedent's estate included approximately one hundred and ten acres in Fayette County, Tennessee. This land was held in trust for the benefit of Davis and Davis' six remaining siblings. For the two years following Davis' appointment the land was rented. Pursuant to her duties, Davis divided property income with other trust beneficiaries. In the period between October 1990 and January 1991, Davis' siblings (or their heirs) transferred title of the property to Davis via quitclaim deeds. The named consideration for these deeds ranged from zero to ten dollars. At trial, Davis claimed she actually paid four thousand dollars for each of the quitclaim deeds. In addition, Davis testified that the execution of the quitclaim deeds and subsequent resale of the land was a joint decision by the beneficiaries to raise funds. Following the transfer, Davis sold part of the land for forty-five thousand dollars. Davis claimed Simpson knew of the land's status and had been present during discussions regarding land ownership. Davis also refuted all allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. One of Davis' other sisters also built a residence on the land. This sister testified that she was aware of Davis' ownership when she built the house. During the trial, excerpts of a discovery deposition of Simpson were read into evidence.3 This testimony indicated that in April 1993, Davis' sister, Lillie, and Lillie's husband ("Simpson") moved to Fayette County and built a residence on part of the land. Simpson used his own funds to finance the house construction. At the time Simpson built the house, he was unaware that Davis was the sole owner of the land. Simpson believed that the property was owned jointly by Lillie and her siblings. Lillie died intestate in 1995. According to Simpson, he did not learn of Davis' ownership of the land until he received a document to that effect sometime in 1997. Following the trial, the judge issued a ruling from the bench holding that Davis did not abuse her fiduciary duties and that she held valid title to the land. The court did, however, find Davis was unjustly enriched by Simpson's construction of a residence on the land. Based on this finding, the trial court ordered that the residence and the acre of land where the residence was located be appraised and sold. The court ordered that Davis be given proceeds equal to the amount of the land itself and that Simpson be given proceeds equal to the value of the residence. Davis appeals. On appeal, Davis asserts that the trial court erred in allowing Simpson's deposition testimony to be entered into evidence contrary to Tennessee's Dead Man's Statute. In addition, Davis asserts

Both prior to and during the testim ony, Davis objected to the inclusion of a portion of the depo sition testimony, claiming that it violated Tennessee's Dead Man's Statute. The objection centered on Simpson's deposition statement that he and L illie never discu ssed the ow nership of the property. T he court allo wed the testim ony.

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that the trial court erred in finding that Davis was unjustly enriched by Simpson's construction of a residence on Davis' land. As a final point, Davis alleges that the trial court erred in ordering the sale of the residence and surrounding acre of land. Simpson presents an additional issue on appeal. Simpson asserts that the trial court erred in finding that Davis did not violate her fiduciary duty.

ANALYSIS The standard of review for a non-jury case is de novo upon the record. Wright v. City of Knoxville, 898 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995). There is a presumption of correctness as to the trial court's factual findings, unless the "preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." TENN . R. APP . P. Rule 13(d). For issues of law, the standard of review is de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tenn. 1996).

A. Dead Man's Statute On appeal, Davis asserts that the trial court erred in allowing certain portions of Simpson's deposition testimony into evidence. Davis claims that this testimony should have been excluded pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.

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