Preview:

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE
Assigned on Briefs July 28, 2004 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROBERT LOVE TAYLOR
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County No. S44,631 Phyllis H. Miller, Judge

No. E2003-01931-CCA-R3-CD Filed September 13, 2004

The appellant, Robert Love Taylor, was convicted by a jury of driving while declared a habitual motor vehicle offender. He was sentenced to four years incarceration and fined $3,000 for the offense. Two motions for new trial were filed - one filed by the appellant pro se and one filed by trial counsel on behalf of the appellant. The trial court denied the motion for new trial filed by appellant's trial counsel and did not consider the motion filed by the appellant. The appellant requested to proceed pro se on appeal. The trial court granted the request and this appeal ensued. In this pro se appeal, the appellant presents various issues that were not addressed in a properly filed motion for new trial. The appellant waived consideration of these issues for failing to address them in a motion for new trial. Thus, this Court may only review the sufficiency of the evidence as that was the sole issue raised in the motion for new trial filed by trial counsel. After a review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court is Affirmed. JERRY L. SMITH , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and JAMES CURWOOD WITT , JR., JJ., joined. Robert Love Taylor, pro se, Tiptonville, Tennessee. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michelle Chapman McIntire, Assistant Attorney General; Greeley Wells, District Attorney General; and J. Lewis Combs, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION Factual Background On October 14, 2000, at approximately 2:50 p.m., Officer Jason McClain of the Kingsport Police Department was on routine patrol when he observed the appellant operating a motor vehicle on North Clay Street, a public roadway located in Sullivan County, Tennessee. Officer McClain knew the appellant was declared a habitual motor vehicle offender ("HMVO"), so he initiated a stop of the appellant's vehicle. The appellant complied, immediately pulling over to accommodate the officer's request. Upon running the appellant's license plate number, Officer McClaim confirmed that the appellant's driver's license was revoked because he was a HMVO. Officer McClain arrested the appellant. In January of 2001, the appellant was indicted for operating a vehicle while being declared a HMVO. The public defender was appointed to represent the appellant at trial. Subsequent to the appointment of counsel, but prior to trial, the appellant filed several pro se documents with the court. These documents had various titles, including: (1) "announcement;" (2) "defendant motion to dismiss and purge feloniously obtained habitual traffic offender status with supporting facts;" (3) "demand for change of venue;" (4) several "requests for document subpoenas;" (5) "request for adjudication recusal and supporting facts;" (6) "defendant motion to invalidate action of habitual traffic offender status;" and (7) "motion to compel sheriff to provide minimum law library." It does not appear that any of these documents or pleadings were considered by, or ruled on, by the trial court. At trial, prior to jury selection, the appellant notified the court that he wished to represent himself. After being asked a litany of questions by the trial court about his education and knowledge of the law, however, the appellant changed his mind, deciding that he did not want to represent himself after all. The trial proceeded at that time. The State's proof included the testimony from Officer McClain, as well as testimony from Raymond W. Winters, the Circuit Court Clerk for Sullivan County. Mr. Winters testified that the appellant was declared a HMVO by a judgment entered on September 3, 1993, and that the appellant's HMVO status was still in effect on the date of the current offense. The appellant testified on his own behalf. While on the witness stand, he admitted that he was driving the vehicle in question on October 14, 2000, and admitted that there was an order entered on September 3, 1993, declaring him a HMVO. The appellant testified that he did not believe that this order had been set aside. The appellant also admitted that he signed a copy of this order, but he claimed that the order was invalid because it was based on perjured testimony.

-2-

The jury found the appellant guilty and recommended a $3,000 fine. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to four years as a Range Two, Multiple Offender. At the sentencing hearing, the appellant again voiced his preference for representing himself. The trial court refused to relieve the public defender from representation at that time, stating that the appellant had no "idea on how to represent . . . [himself] on appeal" and that the actions he had taken thus far were "totally incompetent." After the sentencing hearing, the appellant filed a pro se motion for new trial. In that motion, the appellant claimed that (1) he made a "lawful announcement of his decision to represent himself;" (2) the judge acted with the prosecutor, public defender, court clerk, and co-conspirators from 1993 to the present to deny the appellant access to the court; (3) the trial was not a public trial; (4) the appellant's driving record is "tainted with the information that Robert Love Taylor is an [sic] habitual traffic offender;" (5) "there are so many felons working in this court district that a fair trial is impossible;" and (6) a new trial is "undeniable." The appellant also demanded recusal of the judge, prosecutor, public defender, and others. Trial counsel for the appellant filed a motion for new trial challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court held a hearing on the motion for new trial filed by trial counsel. At that hearing, the trial court denied the motion filed by trial counsel for the appellant and did not consider the motion for new trial filed by the appellant because he "was represented by an attorney and the court doesn't hear motions by defendant pro se when they're represented by an attorney." At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion for new trial, the appellant again sought to represent himself. This time, the trial court complied, finding that the appellant "knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel on appeal." The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The issues, as presented by the appellant, are as follows: (1) appellant will first present that there is no precedent to his knowledge, of any of the actions of persons involved in the due process of court actions predicate to the action in this appellant procedure. (2) appellant was convicted by a jury for the violation of the habitual traffic offender statute of the T.C.A.

Download taylorrobert.pdf

Tennessee Law