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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
August 5, 2003 Session TAURYS K. WALLS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. P-23193 Arthur T. Bennett, Judge

No. W2002-01330-CCA-R3-PC - Filed December 22, 2003

Petitioner, Taurys K. Walls, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner argues that his confession was coerced in violation of the United States and Tennessee constitutions. Additionally, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Post-Conviction Court Affirmed THOMAS T. WOODA LL, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE OGLE and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER , JJ., joined. Marty B. McAfee, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Taurys K. Walls. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; J. Ross Dyer, Assistant Attorney General; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; Julie Mosley; Assistant District Attorney General. OPINION Petitioner was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first degree murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction. State v. Taurys K. Walls, No. 02C01-9601-CR-00019, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1063, 1998 WL 713294 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, October 14, 1998), perm. to app. denied (Tenn. 1999). Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner, and an amended petition for post-conviction relief was filed. A second amended petition for post-conviction relief was filed. An evidentiary hearing was conducted. Petitioner's trial counsel testified at the hearing. Gerald Skahan testified that he represented Petitioner at trial and on direct appeal. Mr. Skahan testified that on direct appeal from the trial

court's judgment, Petitioner challenged the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress a statement given by Petitioner to the police following his arrest. Mr. Skahan testified that he discussed the statement with Petitioner, and he believed that Petitioner was truthful regarding the circumstances surrounding the statement. Petitioner contended that he was never advised of his Miranda rights. Mr. Skahan did not specifically challenge the admission of the statement into evidence under the Sixth Amendment, Fourth Amendment, or Rule 5 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure in either the motion to suppress or on direct appeal to this Court. Those issues were discussed in the dissenting opinion however. Counsel's argument in the motion for new trial and on direct appeal centered mainly on Miranda issues under the Fifth Amendment, but he testified at the postconviction hearing that he incorporated all of the constitutional issues surrounding Petitioner's arrest and subsequent confession in a "totality of the circumstances" argument. Ronald F. Wilkinson, formerly of the Memphis Police Department, testified that Petitioner was arrested pursuant to a warrant, and Mr. Wilkinson completed the arresting papers. Wilkinson testified that he did not know whether Petitioner had appeared before a magistrate within 48 hours of his arrest. Samuel Williams of the Memphis Police Department acted as the case coordinator in the homicide investigation involving Petitioner. He testified that Petitioner was arrested on June 16, 1993. Williams took a statement from Petitioner on June 19, 1993. Williams did not personally take Petitioner to appear before a judge after his arrest. He testified, however, that the duties of his position do not include escorting defendants to their arraignments. Williams testified that he advised Petitioner of his Miranda rights, and Petitioner indicated that he understood those rights. With regard to Petitioner's confession, this Court noted the following in the opinion in the direct appeal: At the hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress his statement, Sergeant Ronald Wilkinson of the Memphis Police Department testified that Appellant was arrested on the afternoon of June 16, 1993. Sergeant Wilkinson further testified that he acted as the arresting officer on that day because Sergeant Samuel Williams, the lead officer on the Ferguson case, was not on duty. Wilkinson stated that on June 16, he did not attempt to question Appellant respecting the incident. Additionally, Sergeant Wilkinson averred that if an arrestee requested an attorney, this would be noted in the arrestee's case file. Finally, he stated that no such notation existed in Appellant's file. Sergeant Samuel Williams testified that on June 19, 1993, Williams had Appellant brought into his office. Williams said that he was "sure" that he administered Appellant his Miranda rights before speaking with him. Sergeant Williams then engaged Appellant in an informal discussion concerning the events surrounding Melvin Ferguson's death. Finally, when Appellant "decided he'd tell" Sergeant Williams what Williams "felt was the truth," Williams asked Appellant if he would be willing to give a formal statement. When Appellant affirmed his willingness to give a statement, Williams -2-

again advised Appellant of his Miranda rights. A typist transcribed Sergeant Williams' questions and Appellant's responses. After being read his rights, Appellant acknowledged that he understood those rights. When Sergeant Williams had completed Appellant's interrogation, he asked Appellant to read over the statement to ensure its correctness, to initial every page, and to sign and date the last page. Appellant incorrectly dated his statement "6/20/93." On cross-examination, Sergeant Williams acknowledged that on the day that Appellant was arrested, Appellant informed a member of the police department that he did not wish to give a statement and that he knew nothing about Mr. Ferguson's death. Sergeant Williams also stated that he did not know whether or not Appellant had requested an attorney; however, he also explained that if an arrestee made such a request, this would be noted in that person's case file and that police would cease all questioning. .... At the suppression hearing, Appellant testified that he informed police of his whereabouts so that he could be picked up because an officer had telephoned his grandmother and stated that the police wanted to interrogate Appellant regarding a hit-and-run incident. According to Appellant's testimony, officers transported him to the homicide office and then held him in an interview room for two to three hours. At some point, an officer asked Appellant whether he wished to give a statement and Appellant replied that he would not do so until he had spoken with a lawyer. Appellant further testified that he was again brought to the homicide office three days later and that he once more refused to give a statement without an attorney. Despite this refusal, when another officer inquired whether Appellant wished to give a statement, he agreed to do so. According to Appellant, after he gave his statement, he was shackled to a bench for approximately twenty minutes. An officer brought Appellant a statement and directed him to initial each page and to sign the last page. Appellant alleged that the statement contained numerous inaccuracies but acknowledged that the signature on the statement was his own. Finally, Appellant denied that he was ever advised of his constitutional rights before giving his statement. Id. In this appeal from the trial court's denial of his post-conviction petition, Petitioner argues that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Rule 5 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure were violated. He also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain issues at trial and on direct appeal. -3-

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel For a petitioner to successfully overturn a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must first establish that the services rendered or the advice given was below "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). Second, the petitioner must show that the deficiencies "actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Should the petitioner fail to establish either factor, the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Our supreme court described the standard of review as follows: Because a petitioner must establish both prongs of the test, a failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim. Indeed, a court need not address the components in any particular order or even address both if the defendant makes an insufficient showing of one component. Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069). The petitioner bears the burden of proving the factual allegations that would entitle petitioner to relief by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann.

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