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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE
September 9, 2004 Session THELMA WILLIAMS v. JEFF TROYER, ET AL.
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Maury County No. 02-489 Robert Holloway, Judge

No. M2003-01573-COA-R3-CV - Filed December 15, 2004

Plaintiff filed suit asserting that she was the owner by adverse possession of four acres of farmland in Maury County. Defendants, who purchased adjoining property in 2001, assert that they are by deed the true and rightful owners of the disputed parcel. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff was the owner of the property by adverse possession based on a finding that she and her predecessors in interest had possessed the property visibly, exclusively, actually, continuously, openly, and notoriously for twenty years. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed. FRANK G. CLEMENT , JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM C. KOCH , JR., P.J., and PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, J., joined. Trippe S. Fried, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Jeff and Sherry Troyer. Scott C. Williams and Stephanie S. Maxwell, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellee, Thelma Williams. OPINION This appeal arises out of the filing of a Complaint for Declaration of Title by Adverse Possession. In 1972, Plaintiff's husband, Clyde Williams, purchased 77-11/30 acres, identified as Tax Map 31, Parcel 7, Maury County, Tennessee, from Opal Reed. Plaintiff inherited the property from her husband Clyde Williams upon his death in January 1996. She contends that the disputed parcel, approximately four acres, was part of the property her husband purchased from Ms. Reed in 1972. Further, Plaintiff contends that she and her predecessors in interest have actually, visibly, openly and notoriously exercised dominion and control over the disputed parcel for more than thirty years.1 Defendants, who purchased adjoining property in 2001, claim the property they purchased,

Opal Reed had owned the property since 1948. Counting the time Ms. Reed owned the property, Plaintiff contends that she and her predecessors in interest have adversely possessed the disputed parcel for fifty years.

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designated as Tax Map 31, Parcel 18, contains the disputed parcel and that Plaintiff has no right, title or interest in the disputed parcel. Prior to the 1980's, tax maps in the office of the Assessor of Property for Maury County identified Map 31, Parcel 7 (Plaintiff's property) as containing 77-11/30 acres. The tax maps of the Assessor of Property were redrawn in the 1980s. Ever since the tax maps were redrawn, the disputed parcel has been identified as part of Parcel 18, not Parcel 7 as before. However, the records of the Assessor of Property also reveal that the total of the assessed acreage for Plaintiff's property at Map 31, Parcel 7 did not change when the tax maps were redrawn and that Plaintiff has been taxed on the same acreage since her husband acquired the property in 1972.2 Plaintiff confirmed this by testifying that neither she nor her husband ever received a notice from the Assessor of Property that the acreage upon which her property was taxed had changed. After purchasing the adjoining property in 2001, Defendants installed a gate in the fence bordering the disputed parcel. It was shortly after the installation of the gate that Plaintiff learned that the ownership of the parcel was disputed, which prompted Plaintiff to commence this action. Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled that Plaintiff was the owner of the disputed parcel. The final order reads in pertinent part: Plaintiff, and her predecessors in title, have possessed the property in question visibly, exclusively, actually, adversely, continuously, openly, notoriously, and under claim of right, for more than twenty years, the period required for adverse possession without claim of right or title. Plaintiff has title to the disputed property through adverse possession. Defendants appeal arguing that Plaintiff failed to establish the elements of adverse possession and that they are the true owners, by deed, of the disputed parcel. Standard of Review On appeal from a bench trial, we review the record de novo and presume that the findings of fact are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We also give great weight to a trial court's determinations of credibility. Estate of Walton v. Young, 950 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tenn. 1997); B & G Construction, Inc. v. Polk, 37 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). However, if the trial judge has not made a specific finding of fact on a particular matter, we will review the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies without employing a presumption of correctness. Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997). Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) requires appellate courts to weigh the evidence to determine in which party's favor the weight of the aggregated evidence falls. There is a reasonable probability that a
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The acreage actually changed but only by an insignificant fraction of a acre.

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proposition is true when there is more evidence in its favor than there is against it. Thus, the prevailing party is the one in whose favor the evidentiary scale tips, no matter how slightly. Parks Props. v. Maury County, 70 S.W.3d 735, 741 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Realty Shop, Inc. v. RR Westminster Holding, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). The presumption of correctness in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) requires appellate courts to defer to a trial court's findings of fact. Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Because of the presumption, an appellate court must leave a trial court's finding of fact undisturbed unless it determines that the aggregate weight of the evidence demonstrates that a finding of fact other than the one found by the trial court is more likely to be true. Parks Props. v. Maury County, 70 S.W.3d at 742. For the evidence to preponderate against a trial court's finding of fact, it must support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect. Walker v. Sidney Gilreath & Assocs., 40 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). The presumption of correctness in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) applies only to findings of fact. No such presumption of correctness attaches to the trial court's conclusions of law. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995). Accordingly, appellate courts review a trial court's resolution of legal issues without a presumption of correctness and reach their own independent conclusions regarding these issues. Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tenn. 2001); Nutt v. Chamption Int'l Corp., 980 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn. 1998). Adverse Possession To establish adverse possession, a plaintiff must show that she had exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open and notorious possession of the disputed parcel for the entire prescriptive period. Tidwell v. Van Deventer, 686 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). For those individuals whose possession thereof is by color of right or title, that prescriptive period is set by statute at seven years. Tenn. Code Ann.

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