Benjamin Frank Goebler v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court at Law of Brown County (Majority)

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 11th District Court of Appeals » 2012 » Benjamin Frank Goebler v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court at Law of Brown County (Majority)

State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 11-11-00052-CR

Case Date: 08/23/2012

Plaintiff: Benjamin Frank Goebler

Defendant: The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court at Law of Brown County (Majority)

Preview:Opinion filed August 23, 2012

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-11-00052-CR __________ BENJAMIN FRANK GOEBLER, Appellant V. STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court of Law Brown County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 0800267 MEMORANDUM OPINION Benjamin Frank Goebler entered a plea of "no contest" to the offense of driving while intoxicated, second offense. The trial court assessed his punishment at confinement in the Brown County Jail for a term of one-year and a fine of $500. However, the trial court probated the imposition of confinement for a period of two years by placing appellant on community supervision. Appellant challenges his conviction in a single issue. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. We affirm. Background Facts The complaint and information alleged that appellant committed the charged offense on or about March 6, 2008. The case was filed on April 11, 2008. The court set the case for

arraignment on November 24, 2008.1 However, appellant did not appear on that date. The trial court issued a warrant for appellant's arrest based on his failure to appear. The trial court subsequently withdrew the warrant when the court received notice that appellant was in a rehabilitation facility in Houston. An assistant district attorney initially notified the trial court of appellant's status and she requested that the case be reset for ninety days. The trial court subsequently received a letter from an entity known as "DAPA," a psychiatric and substance abuse program in Houston. The letter advised the trial court that appellant had been admitted on November 18, 2008, into DAPA's partial hospital program to treat his bipolar disorder and alcohol dependence.2 Nothing further happened in the case until November 2010. Brenda Sue Arp, the trial court's administrator, testified that she did not set the case earlier because she was waiting for more information about appellant's release from DAPA. She set the case for a status

conference on November 3, 2010, when she received notice that appellant had been released from DAPA. The trial court subsequently set the case for jury trial on January 31, 2011. Appellant filed his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds on January 14, 2011. The trial court heard the motion on January 27, 2011. Appellant entered his no contest plea on that date after the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Analysis Appellant premised his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds under the Federal Constitution. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused's right to a speedy trial. Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI. We use a bifurcated standard of review when reviewing the trial court's ruling on a speedy trial motion. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We apply "an abuse of discretion standard for factual components, and a de novo standard for the legal components." Id. The trial court's ruling will be affirmed only if it is supported by the record and is correct under the applicable law. Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). When, as in this case, the trial court does not make written findings of fact and conclusions of law, findings supported by evidence will be implied in favor

1 The trial court had initially set the case for arraignment on July 28, 2008. However, the court administrator was unable to determine from the court's records why the arraignment did not occur on that date. 2 The letter from DAPA also advised the court that appellant had previously been admitted to the facility from July 2, 2008, to September 27, 2008, and from September 30, 2008, to October 21, 2008.

2

of the trial court's ruling, and we must defer to such findings. See State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In determining whether a defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial, we consider four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's effort to obtain a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). No single factor is necessary or sufficient to establish a violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533; Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 889. The length of the delay is a triggering mechanism for a speedy trial analysis; absent a presumptively prejudicial delay, we need not consider the other Barker factors. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 820. Dismissal of the charging instrument with prejudice is mandated only upon a finding that an accused's Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right was actually violated. Cantu, 253

S.W.3d at 281. Because dismissal of the charges is a radical remedy, a wooden application of the Barker factors would infringe upon the societal interest in trying people accused of crime, rather than granting them immunization because of legal error. Id. (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 121 (1966)). Therefore, we must apply the Barker balancing test with common sense and sensitivity to ensure that charges are dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant's actual and asserted interest in a speedy trial has been infringed. Id.; see Barker, 407 U.S. at 534

Download 11-11-00052-cr.pdf