Bryan Leslie Hurt v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 264th District Court of Bell County

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State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 03-05-00228-CR

Case Date: 05/16/2005

Plaintiff: LUIS GONZALEZ PEREZ

Defendant: THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from 103rd District Court of Cameron County

Preview:George Whitfield, Jr. v. Vivian Burleson Whitfield--
Appeal from 45th Judicial District Court of Bexar
County
No. 04-99-00198-CV
George WHITFIELD, Jr.,
Appellant
v.
Vivian Burleson WHITFIELD,
Appellee
From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 86-CI-15455
Honorable Michael Peden, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Paul W. Green, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice
Paul W. Green, Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Delivered and Filed: March 28, 2001
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Appellant, George Whitfield, Jr., appeals from the First Amended Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO)
entered in favor of his former spouse, Vivian Burleson Whitfield. George claims the order impermissibly modifies the
parties' divorce decree by awarding Vivian a percentage of his monthly retirement benefits. Because we agree the
QDRO is an improper modification of the divorce decree, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for
further proceedings.
Background
George and Vivian were divorced in 1987. George and Vivian consented to the terms of the decree, except for the
amount of child support, which was set by the court. With regard to George's retirement benefits, the divorce decree
recites that George was a participant in a retirement program through the City of San Antonio and would receive either
a monthly benefit or a lump sum payment upon retirement. The decree provides a formula for determining the
community interest if monthly retirement benefits are paid and orders that Vivian shall have judgment for her interest
if and when George receives retirement benefits.
In the third paragraph devoted to division of George's retirement benefits, the decree states:
In the event [George] was not entitled to a monthly retirement benefit on the date of divorce, then [Vivian] will have
one-half interest in any contributions that were made to the City of San Antonio Retirement System by [George]
during the marriage of the parties.
Although testimony showed George was not receiving and was not entitled to receive monthly benefits at the time of
the divorce, (1) the trial court awarded Vivian a percentage of George's monthly retirement benefits.
Discussion
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After a divorce decree becomes final, the trial court has no power to "amend, modify, alter, or change the division of
property made or approved in the decree." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 9.007(a) (Vernon 1998). The trial court's authority is
limited to orders that implement or clarify the division of property. Id. If the division of property is unambiguous, an
order that alters or changes the substantive division of property is unenforceable. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 9.007(a-b);
Echols v. Echols, 900 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995, writ denied); Pierce v. Pierce, 850 S.W.2d 675,
679 (Tex. App.- El Paso 1993, writ denied). Whether the trial court's order is a clarification or an improper
modification is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Tyler v. Tyler, 742 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied).
Because the parties entered an agreed divorce decree, we treat the decree as a contract and interpret its provisions
according to contract law. Dechon v. Dechon, 909 S.W.2d 950, 956 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ). The entire
decree must be interpreted in such a way that all of its provisions are given effect and none is rendered meaningless.
Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983); Wilson v. Uzzel, 953 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no
writ). If the contract is subject to only one reasonable interpretation, it is not ambiguous, and we construe it as a matter
of law. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393.
In this case, although the third paragraph of the retirement division may be somewhat ambiguous, the decree as a
whole is subject to only one reasonable interpretation. The third paragraph limits Vivian's interest to half the
contributions made during marriage if, at the time of divorce, (1) George was not actually receiving or entitled to
receive benefits at the time of divorce, or (2) he was not entitled to receive benefits in the future, in other words, not
"vested" in his retirement plan. (2) The testimony establishes George was not receiving benefits at the time of divorce
nor would he have been eligible to receive benefits had he applied for them at that time. The testimony also shows
George was not vested in his retirement plan, therefore, at the time of divorce, he was not yet eligible to receive future
monthly payments. In either case, paragraph three mandates that Vivian may only recover half of any contributions
George made to the retirement plan during the marriage.
Conclusion
Because we hold the divorce decree is not ambiguous, it must be enforced as written. See Baxter v. Ruddle, 794
S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. 1990). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for further
proceedings enforcing the division of property in accordance with this opinion.
PAUL W. GREEN,
JUSTICE
DO NOT PUBLISH
1. George testified he worked for the City twelve years before the divorce, and his retirement plan at that time required
twenty-five years of employment to become vested.
2. We use the term "vested" to mean a person who has met all the criteria for receipt of retirement benefits but must
wait until retirement age to draw those funds.
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