Cain Mancha Ramirez v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 368th District Court of Williamson County

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 3rd District Court of Appeals » 1994 » Cain Mancha Ramirez v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 368th District Court of Williamson County

State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 03-94-00608-CR

Case Date: 11/23/1994

Plaintiff: Danielle Lafayette

Defendant: The State of Texas--Appeal from 241st District Court of Smith County

Preview:Charnell Blaylock, Jr. v. The State of Texas--Appeal
from 42nd District Court of Taylor County
11th Court of Appeals
Eastland, Texas
Opinion
Charnell Blaylock, Jr.
Appellant
Vs. No. 11-03-00270-CR B Appeal from Taylor County
State of Texas
Appellee
The jury convicted appellant of burglary of a habitation. Appellant pleaded true to two enhancement allegations, and
the jury assessed punishment at 25 years imprisonment. We affirm.
Background
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. ' 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003) provides that a person commits the offense of burglary of a
habitation if, without the effective consent of the owner, the person enters a habitation with intent to commit a felony,
theft, or an assault. The indictment alleged that, on or about January 10, 2002, appellant intentionally and knowingly
entered Sheila Pierre=s habitation, without her effective consent, with the intent to commit assault. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. ' 22.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004) provides that a person commits the offense of assault if the person:
(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person=s spouse;
(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury, including the person=s spouse; or
(3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably
believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.
Issue on Appeal
In his sole point of error, appellant argues that the evidence was factually insufficient to prove that he intended to
commit the offense of assault at the time he entered Pierre=s house.
Standard of Review
In order to determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we must review all of the evi-dence in a neutral light and
determine whether the evidence supporting guilt is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or
whether the evidence contrary to the verdict is so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof could not
have been met. Zuniga v. State, No. 539-02, 2004 WL 840786 (Tex.Cr.App. April 21, 2004); Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d
618 (Tex. Cr.App.2004); Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex.Cr.App.2002); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404
(Tex.Cr.App.1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Cr.App.1996). The jury is the sole judge of the weight and
credibility of the witnesses= testimony, and due deference must be given to the jury=s determination. TEX. CODE
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CRIM. PRO. ANN. arts. 36.13 & 38.04 (Vernon 1979 & 1981); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.Cr.App.2000).
. Testimony
Pierre testified that the incident occurred on January 10, 2002, at about 6:45 p.m. at her house at 5214 Durango Street
in Abilene, Taylor County. Pierre said that she and appellant had dated and had later lived together for about six
months during 2001. She and appellant had moved into the house on Durango Street in October 2001. Appellant had
moved out of the house about two weeks later. Pierre said that appellant had not spent the night with her on the night
before the incident.
Pierre testified about the incident. She said that her doorbell rang on January 10, 2002, at about 6:45 p.m. She looked
out of a window and saw appellant at the door. She said that appellant had his bicycle with him. Pierre said that she
did not answer the door because she did not want to see appellant. Appellant then knocked on the door. Pierre did not
answer the door, and appellant rode off on his bike. Within about five minutes, appellant came back to Pierre=s house
and knocked on the back door. Pierre did not answer the door. Pierre testified that appellant said: AI know you=re in
there. Open this door.@ Appellant kept knocking on the door. Pierre eventually told appellant that she did not want to
be bothered and that he should go away.
Pierre said that appellant went to the front door and then came back to the back door. Pierre told appellant that she had
company and that she did not want to be bothered. Pierre testified that she did not have company but told appellant
that she did in an attempt to get him to leave. Pierre said that appellant seemed to get more irritated when she told him
that she had company. Pierre testified that appellant said: AYou=re going to open up this f-----g door.@ Pierre said
that appellant went back to the front door. She said that the front door was locked with two locks. Pierre said that
appellant kicked in the door, breaking the doorjamb.
Pierre testified that appellant went from room to room in the house to see whether anyone was there. Appellant told
her that he loved her and wanted to get back together. Pierre told appellant that she wanted him to leave. Pierre said
that appellant grabbed her leg. She said that appellant started ranting, raving, and crying. She said that appellant was
acting crazy, like a Amad man.@ Appellant begged Pierre to take him back. Pierre told appellant that it was over.
Appellant continued to hold onto Pierre=s leg, and she tried to get away. Pierre said that appellant became violent.
Appellant tried to bite Pierre on her ear. Appellant got her up against a wall, put his hand around her throat, and
choked her. Pierre told appellant that she could not breathe. Pierre said that the choking was painful. After a few
seconds, Pierre was able to get away from appellant. Pierre said that appellant finally left.
Pierre testified that the incident lasted about ten minutes. She said that she believed her life was on the line when
appellant was in the house.
Abilene Police Officer Eric Katona testified that, on January 10, 2002, at about 6:50 p.m., he received a call about an
incident that had occurred at a Durango Street address. He was asked to assist in locating appellant. He said that he
found appellant about 30 minutes after receiving the call. Appellant told Officer Katona that he had not been on
Durango Street at anyone=s residence that day and that he did not know anyone who lived on Durango Street.
Abilene Police Detective Willie Ford testified that, on January 16, 2002, appellant came to his office. Detective Ford
read appellant his Miranda [1] rights and told him that he was free to leave. Appellant gave him a written statement
about the incident. In the statement, appellant said (1) that he had knocked on Pierre=s front door and then gone
around to the back door; (2) that he saw a light go off in the house; (3) that seeing the light go off aggravated him; (4)
that he kept knocking on the door; (5) that Pierre said that she had company and told him to go away; (6) that Pierre=s
statement that she had company really bothered him because he thought that Pierre had another man in the house; (7)
that he kicked the front door in and went inside the house; (8) that he grabbed Pierre=s leg and hugged her; (9) that
Pierre tried to get away; (10) that he just wanted to talk to Pierre; and (11) that he got angry because Pierre would not
talk to him.
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Appellant told Detective Ford that he was taking Pierre job applications on the night of the incident. Appellant told
Detective Ford that he did not choke or assault Pierre.
Appellant testified that he and Pierre moved into the house on Durango Street in October 2001. Appellant moved out
of the house about two and one-half weeks later. He said that he did not go to Pierre=s house during November and
December of 2001. Appellant said that he spent the night with Pierre at her house on January 9, 2002. He testified that
he told her that he would bring her some job applications.
Appellant said that, after he got off of work on January 10, he rode his bicycle to Pierre=s house. He said that he had
Pierre=s job applications with him. Appellant testified that he knocked on Pierre=s front door but that there was no
answer. He left and then went back to Pierre=s house. When there was no answer, appellant went to the back door. He
said that he saw the bathroom light go off. He told Pierre to let him know if she was in the house. Appellant testified
that he told Pierre that he wanted to talk to her and that he had job applications for her. Pierre said that she had
company and told appellant to leave. Appellant said that he was upset because he thought that Pierre had another man
in the house. He said that he pushed the front door in with his shoulder. He said that he did not kick the door in. He
said that two of the locks were in the locked position when he pushed the door in. He said that he entered Pierre=s
house out of anger.
Appellant testified that he did not go from room to room looking for someone in the house. He said that he told Pierre
that he had her job applications and that he had gotten his job back. Appellant said that he wanted to let Pierre know
how much he cared for her. Appellant said that Pierre got hysterical and said: ALook what you did to the door.@
Appellant said that he grabbed Pierre around her waist and hugged her legs. Appellant testified that he and Pierre were
wrestling. Appellant was trying to hold Pierre, and she was trying to get away from him. Appellant said that he did not
choke Pierre. He testified that he did not want to hurt Pierre in anyway. He said that he did not intend to assault
anybody. He said that he left after Pierre told him to go home.
Appellant said that he talked with Officer Katona. He said that he told Officer Katona that he had not been on Durango
Street on the night of the incident and that he did not know anybody who lived on Durango Street.
Analysis
In a prosecution for burglary, the State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended
to commit the felony, theft, or assault at the time of his entry. Linder v. State, 828 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex.App. -
Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet=n ref=d). The issue of intent may not be left simply to speculation or surmise. However,
the jury is exclusively empowered to determine the issue of intent, and the events of a burglary may imply the intent
with which the defendant entered. Nunez v. State, 117 S.W.3d 309, 322 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi 2003, no pet=n);
Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d 529, 539 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 2001, pet=n ref=d); McGee v. State, 923 S.W.2d 605, 608
(Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet=n). Therefore, intent may be inferred from the defendant=s conduct and
surrounding circumstances. Nunez v. State, supra; Moore v. State, supra.
Viewing all of the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot conclude that the evidence supporting appellant=s guilt of the
offense of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit assault is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and
manifestly unjust or that the contrary evidence is so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could
not have been met. Pierre said that appellant became more irritated when she told him that she had company. She said
that appellant told her: AYou=re going to open up this f-----g door.@ Appellant testified that he was upset because he
thought that there was another man in the house. Appellant kicked in Pierre=s front door that was locked with two
locks. Appellant admitted that he entered the house out of anger. Pierre said that appellant was ranting, raving, and
acting like a Amad man.@ Pierre testified that appellant searched the house to see whether anyone else was there.
Pierre said that appellant held her by her leg and choked her when he was in the house. Appellant testified that Pierre
was trying to get away from him. Appellant said that he only wanted to talk to Pierre and denied choking Pierre.
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However, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, the jury was
free to believe or disbelieve all or any part of the testimony. Article 38.04; Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 684
(Tex.Cr.App.1987). The evidence was factually sufficient to prove that appellant intended to commit assault at the time
that he entered Pierre=s house. Appellant=s point of error is overruled.
This Court=s Ruling
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
TERRY McCALL
JUSTICE
September 9, 2004
Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and
Wright, J., and McCall, J.
[1]Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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