CROY CODY ROUSH, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 05-08-00616-CR

Case Date: 12/08/2009

Plaintiff: CROY CODY ROUSH, Appellant

Defendant: THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Preview:CROY CODY ROUSH, Appellant v. THE STATE OF
TEXAS, Appellee
AFFIRM; Opinion issued December 8, 2009
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-08-00616-CR
CROY CODY ROUSH, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 199-80521-07
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Wright and Justices FitzGerald and Murphy
Opinion By Chief Justice Wright
Croy Cody Roush appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. After appellant pleaded guilty to the jury, it
assessed punishment at twenty-one years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. In two issues, appellant contends the trial
court erred by denying his motion for new trial because the jury was not fair and impartial and because of jury
misconduct. We overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial on the
ground that the jury was not fair and impartial. Apparently, appellant's complaint is directed to the trial court's failure
to strike Juror Montes for cause. Under this issue, appellant contends he has adequately preserved error regarding his
complaint about the denial of a challenge for cause and that the denial caused him harm. However, appellant does not
specify what legal basis his challenge for cause was based upon and makes no argument concerning why Juror Montes
should have been struck for cause. Rather, he only states this Court should sustain his issue and reverse his conviction
because the trial court's denial of his “challenge for cause resulted in constitutional error.” Because appellant did not
adequately brief this issue, we decline to address it. See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
(“Appellant leaves us to find error and argue his case for him; this is inadequate briefing, and as such, it presents
nothing for our review.”). We overrule appellant's first issue.
In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial
based on jury misconduct. In particular, appellant contends the record shows the jury reached its verdict by quotient.
According to appellant, the evidence shows Juror Brown encouraged the jury to assess the maximum punishment of
thirty-two years and because the minimum was ten years, “the only reasonable inference is that the jurors reached a
quotient verdict.”
Jurors may not reach their verdict by lot or in any other manner that is not a fair expression of the jurors' opinion.
Tex. R. App. P. 21.3. Appellant alleges that the punishment was assessed by a quotient verdict in violation of rule 21.3
and that he learned of the improper verdict when he and the prosecutor remained after trial to discuss the verdict with
the jurors.
Where a jury agrees to adopt and be bound by a so-called “quotient verdict,” or “verdict by lot,” a defendant is
entitled to a new trial. Ramsey v. State, 146 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940). However, before a new trial will
be granted on this basis, the jurors must have agreed to be bound by the result of the averaging process. Martinez v.
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State, 496 S.W.2d 612, 613-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Absent such an agreement, there is no error in the jurors using
this device. Id. at 613; Malbrough v. State 846 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd).
Initially, we question whether appellant has shown the jurors averaged their positions to arrive at the sentence
assessed. However, assuming without deciding that the sworn motion for new trial shows the jurors averaged the
punishment range, we conclude the record is insufficient to show jury misconduct because there is no evidence of any
agreement by the jurors to be bound by the averaging of their respective positions on the appropriate punishment in
this case. Under these circumstances, there is no error. Martinez, 496 S.W.2d at 613; Malbrough, 846 S.W.2d at 927.
We overrule appellant's second issue.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
CAROLYN WRIGHT
CHIEF JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
080616F.U05
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