Daniel Chacon Rodriguez v. State of Texas--Appeal from 216th Judicial District Court of Kerr County

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 4th District Court of Appeals » 2001 » Daniel Chacon Rodriguez v. State of Texas--Appeal from 216th Judicial District Court of Kerr County

State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 04-00-00579-CR

Case Date: 11/07/2001

Plaintiff: RICHARD TUCKER

Defendant: THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from 28th District Court of Nueces County

Preview:Daniel Chacon Rodriguez v. State of Texas--Appeal from 216th Judicial District Court of Kerr County
No. 04-00-00579-CR Daniel Chacon RODRIGUEZ, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas Trial Court No. A-99-250 Honorable Stephen B. Ables, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Justice Catherine Stone, Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Delivered and Filed: November 7, 2001 AFFIRMED A jury found Daniel Chacon Rodriguez guilty of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 70 years imprisonment. Rodriguez challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm his conviction. BACKGROUND On November 20, 1999, Rodriguez, accompanied by Joseph Garza, entered the Kerrville Exxon station at which Jerry Jenkins worked as a night clerk. A short while after entering the store, Rodriguez and Jenkins had an altercation. This altercation diverted Jenkins's attention from Garza who attempted to steal the store's cash register. Jenkins successfully chased Rodriguez and Garza out of the store before they were able to escape with the register or its contents. However, as Jenkins tried to get Rodriguez and Garza's license plate number for authorities, he was struck by their car as it sped from the station. Law enforcement officials apprehended Rodriguez and Garza later that day after an intense search. During Rodriguez's trial, the State offered the testimony of both Jenkins and Rodriguez's arresting officer. The State also presented a video recording of the robbery. Based on this evidence, the jury found Rodriguez guilty of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to 70 years imprisonment. On appeal, Rodriguez contends that the jury could not have found him guilty of the charged offense because the State failed to prove that he: (1) had prior knowledge of Garza's intentions to rob the store; (2) took anything from the store or from the person of Jenkins; or (3) had any role in the robbery. STANDARD OF REVIEW Rodriguez challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. To review legal sufficiency points, this court shall "view the relevant evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In factual sufficiency challenges, on the other hand, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light and set "aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Id. Evidence is considered factually insufficient when: (1) the State has the burden of proof and the

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evidence supporting a conviction is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination; or (2) the defendant has the burden of proof or musters evidence contrary to the State's and the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the available evidence. Id. at 11. EVIDENCE OF GUILT Legal Sufficiency A person is guilty of aggravated robbery if the State's evidence establishes all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, a person is guilty of aggravated robbery as a principal to the offense when the State's evidence shows that (1) in the course of committing theft (2) with the intent to obtain or maintain control of property (3) he or she intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (4) caused bodily injury or (5) threatened or placed another in fear of (5) imminent bodily injury or death and (6) used or exhibited a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 29.02, 29.03 (Vernon 1994). A person is criminally responsible as a party to this offense if the State's evidence shows that, while acting with the intent to promote or assist in the offense, he or she solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid another person in the commission of the offense. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1994). Evidence is sufficient to convict a person under the law of parties when the person is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages its commission through words or other agreement. Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). The evidence must show that at the time of the offense the parties were acting together, each contributing some part towards the execution of their common purpose. Id. In determining whether the accused participated as a party to the offense, the court may examine the events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to commit the offense. Id. Circumstantial evidence may be used to prove one is a party to the offense. Id. In this case, the record shows that the State introduced testimony from Jenkins, the individual whom Rodriguez and Garza assailed the morning of the robbery. The following is a summary of his testimony. (1) Upon their arrival, Rodriguez and Garza drove into the parking lot and proceeded past the store's entrance. They then circled the fuel pumping area back to where they had first entered the lot and backed into a handicapped parking space. (2) Rodriguez and Garza exited their car and entered the station. Rodriguez was dressed in black and Garza in plaid. Once inside the store, Rodriguez requested to use the station's restroom facilities. Jenkins informed Rodriguez that the restroom was out of order and suggested that Rodriguez relieve himself in the wooded area behind the station instead. As Jenkins was showing Rodriguez where to go, Rodriguez pushed him, declaring that he [Rodriguez] was going to "kick Jenkins's ass." (3) In response to Rodriguez's aggressive behavior, Jenkins grabbed a tool from a nearby tire machine and threatened Rodriguez. Rodriguez shoved Jenkins again and ran from the building. Jenkins immediately turned his attention to Garza and saw him trying to steal the store's cash register. A wrestling match ensued and Jenkins was knocked to the ground. Garza ran. Jenkins dialed 911 and left the store to get their license plate number for authorities before they drove off. Once outside, Jenkins approached the vehicle while it was still parked, but was struck by it as Rodriguez and Garza fled from the parking lot. Jenkins was tossed over the vehicle's hood and onto the pavement. Rodriguez and Garza then struck another vehicle and sped off. Jenkins later identified Rodriguez as the driver of the getaway vehicle. The State also offered the testimony of Officer Kenneth D. Wilke ("Wilke"). According to Wilke, immediately after the robbery occurred, dispatch informed him to be on the lookout for a white Ford Taurus. Wilke discovered a vehicle that fit dispatch's description and began pursuit of the vehicle. The vehicle led Wilke on a chase until it became entrapped by a dead-end street, at which time the occupants offered themselves up to Wilke. (4) Minutes later, while face down on the ground, the two suspects turned towards one another as if having a conversation. Upon the conclusion of this conversation, both Rodriguez and Garza jumped up from the ground and ran from Wilke and the other officer who had just arrived at the scene. The suspects were recaptured a short while later. Wilke also testified that he made a mistake in his initial police report concerning the identities of Rodriguez and Garza. According to Wilke, his original report stated that Garza was the driver of the vehicle, while Rodriguez was the
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passenger when he stopped them. In fact, his report should have stated that the individual dressed in black [Rodriguez] was the driver of the vehicle, while the individual dressed in plaid [Garza] was the passenger. Wilke also stated that he did not discover this mistake until shortly before the present proceeding despite already testifying to the contrary at Garza's trial. Based on this testimony, Rodriguez believes that the State failed to prove that he: (1) had prior knowledge of Garza's intentions to rob the store; (2) took anything from the store or from the person of Jenkins; or (3) had any role in the robbery. Therefore, no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty of aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. While the evidence presented at trial may not be legally sufficient to convict Rodriguez as a principal to the offense, it is sufficient to convict Rodriguez under the law of parties. Rodriguez was physically present at the time of the robbery. Moreover, his conduct from the time he and Garza pulled up to the station until the time he was captured suggests that he and Garza were acting in concert with one another. The record indicates that prior to the commission of the offense, Rodriguez and Garza drove to the station together. Later, they backed their vehicle into a parking space near the station's entrance. Several minutes after entering the store, Rodriguez and Garza had a conversation in Spanish. Immediately following their conversation they acted in unison, Rodriguez pushed Jenkins away from the cash register area threatening to "kick his ass," while Garza attempted to steal the store's cash register. Rodriguez and Garza then fled together. During the course of their getaway, they drove in such a manner as to hit not only Jenkins, but another automobile as well. Lastly, both Rodriguez and Garza attempted to avoid apprehension by trying to flee from authorities on two separate occasions. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that a rational juror could have found that Rodriguez was guilty of aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY Rodriguez contends that because the State failed to present any credible witnesses in support of its case, the jury's finding is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We disagree. The jury heard the testimony of Jenkins and Wilke and also viewed a video recording from the morning of the robbery. In addition, the jury heard Rodriguez's attorney challenge the credibility of Jenkins and Wilke on his cross-examination of them. Despite the attacks on Jenkins and Wilke's credibility, the jury chose to believe their testimony. Our analysis of the factual sufficiency of the evidence may only consider those matters bearing on credibility that can be fully determined from a cold appellate record. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8. We may disagree with the jury's determinations when the record clearly indicates that such a step is necessary to avoid a manifest injustice. Id. at 9. Otherwise, we must afford deference to the jury's determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. This case does not present a situation where the question of credibility can be fully determined from a cold appellate record. Instead, we have a situation where the jury was better positioned to resolve the question of the witnesses' credibility because it was able to personally observe the appearance, demeanor, and cadence of speech of Jenkins and Wilke. While the record contains a surveillance video from the morning in question, it contains only those events occurring directly in its viewing area. A large percentage of the events that the witnesses testified to did not take place on camera and, as a result, cannot be corroborated by the surveillance video. We must therefore defer to the jury's decision regarding the credibility of Jenkins and Wilke and the weight afforded to their testimony. Accordingly, we cannot say that the evidence supporting Rodriguez's conviction is so obviously weak as to undermine the jury's determination of his guilt. We hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support Rodriguez's conviction. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 11.CONCLUSION Overruling Rodriguez's challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm the conviction. Catherine Stone, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH

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1. In addition to hearing Jenkin's testimony, the jury viewed a surveillance video of some of the events that he described. 2. According to Jenkins, in his experience, it was unusual for any vehicle to back into a parking space at the station. 3. Jenkins also testified that Rodriguez and Garza had a conversation together in Spanish immediately before Rodriguez became hostile towards him. 4. The occupants were later identified as Rodriguez and Garza.

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