Danielle Prince v. National Smart Healthcare Services, Inc. and Richard Denegall--Appeal from 125th District Court of Harris County

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State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 01-09-00916-CV

Case Date: 04/28/2011

Plaintiff: Danielle Prince

Defendant: National Smart Healthcare Services, Inc. and Richard Denegall--Appeal from 125th District Court of

Preview:Opinion issued April 28, 2011

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
------------------------

NO. 01-09-00916-CV ---------------------- DANIELLE PRINCE, Appellant V. NATIONAL SMART HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. AND RICHARD DENEGALL, Appellees

On Appeal from the 125th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2007-36133

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Danielle Prince sued appellees National Smart Healthcare Services and Richard Denegall for tortious interference with a contract, invasion of privacy, and slander. NSHS and Denegall filed a joint motion for summary

judgment. Prince filed a response, arguing that the appellees had not established their entitlement to summary judgment. She also filed a motion for continuance, requesting more time to conduct discovery and to adequately respond to the summary-judgment motion. The trial court denied the motion for continuance and granted summary judgment in favor of NSHS and Denegall. On appeal, Prince challenges the trial court's denial of its motion for continuance and the order granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees. We affirm. Background Danielle Prince worked full-time for Denegall, the president of NSHS, and part-time under the supervision of Dr. Paul Bettega at Harmony House. While Prince was employed at NSHS, Denegall required her to sign a confidentiality agreement in which she agreed not to disclose any confidential information related to NSHS. Prince alleged that Denegall withheld her paycheck until she agreed to sign the form and that the agreement implied that she was not to associate with two of her friends outside of work. Prince claims that Denegall told her it was

inappropriate for her to associate with the two friends and that she better not attend a baby shower hosted by one of them. Denegall contends, however, that he required Prince to sign the form because her two friends were claiming unemployment benefits against NSHS and he did not want Prince to discuss confidential information with them. 2

After signing the agreement, Prince resigned from NSHS. Prince alleged that, [a]s soon as [she] left NSHS, she received a call from Christine Burns, a coworker at Harmony House. Burnes told her Denegall had called Bettega, and as a result of their conversation, Bettega was no longer comfortable with me working at Harmony House. Denegall claims that Prince was never fired from Harmony House, and that, even if she had been, he, as a co-manager of Harmony House, had the authority to fire her. Prince sued NSHS and Denegall for invasion of privacy, tortious interference with a contract, and slander. The trial court entered a docket control order that provided for an initial trial date, as well as a dispositive motion deadline and discovery deadline. After the dispositive motion deadline and discovery

deadlines passed, NSHS and Denegall filed a traditional motion for summary judgment. Prince filed a joint response and motion for continuance requesting time to depose Denegall, Bettega, and Burns. The trial court granted summary

judgment in favor of NSHS and Denegall, thereby denying Prince's motion for continuance. On appeal, Prince argues that the trial court erred in considering the motion for summary judgment without also allowing additional time for discovery and in denying her motion for continuance. She also contends that summary judgment was improper because she raised questions of material fact as to her claims for tortious interference with a contract and invasion of privacy. 3

Analysis I. Motion for continuance In two issues, Prince complains that the trial court erred in considering the NSHS and Denegall's motion for summary judgment without reopening the discovery period and in refusing to grant her motion for continuance. Prince argues that the trial court should have granted her motion for continuance so that she could properly respond to the summary-judgment motion, and she contends that the trial court should have reopened the discovery period because NSHS and Denegall filed for summary judgment after the deadline on the court's docket control order. We review a denial of a motion for continuance under an abuse of discretion standard. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to guiding rules or principles. See Garcia v. Martinez, 988 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. 1999). There are three relevant factors used in deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance. Laughlin v. Bergman, 962 S.W.2d 64, 65

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