Edward D. Mondragon v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 144th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

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State: Texas

Court: Criminal Court of Appeals

Docket No: 04-03-00234-CR

Case Date: 12/17/2003

Plaintiff: RIGOBERTO SOLIS-REYES A/K/A EUGENIO SANDOVAL

Defendant: THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from 214th District Court of Nueces County

Preview:Edward D. Mondragon v. The State of Texas--Appeal
from 144th Judicial District Court of Bexar County
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-03-00234-CR
Edward MONDRAGON,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2002-CR-4611
Honorable Mark R. Luitjen, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
Sitting: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 17, 2003
AFFIRMED
Edward Mondragon appeals the trial court's judgment convicting him of the state jail felony offense of failure to
comply with the reporting requirement of article 62.06 of the Sexual Offender Registration Program. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.10(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002) ("A person commits an offense if the person is required to register
and fails to comply with any requirement of this chapter."). Mondragon argues that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
articles 62.02 and 62.06, which require convicted sex offenders to register with law enforcement, are
"unconstitutionally void for vagueness[,]" thereby violating the due process provisions of the federal constitution and
the due process and equal protection provisions of the state constitution. We disagree and affirm the trial court's
judgment.
1. Mondragon first argues that articles 62.02 and 62.06 violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. Specifically, Mondragon contends that he satisfied the Legislature's intent in enacting the Sexual
Offender Registration Program - that a sex offender register only once per calendar year - when he registered with the
San Antonio Police Department upon his release from prison, in compliance with article 62.02. Therefore, according to
Mondragon, he should not have been required to verify his registration within the first year of his release pursuant to
article 62.06. We disagree.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 62.02 requires a convicted sex offender to register "with the local law
enforcement authority in any municipality where the person resides or intends to reside for more than seven days."
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Article 62.06 further requires, in pertinent part, that
"[a] person subject to registration under this chapter who is not subject to the 90-day reporting requirement described
by this subsection shall report to the local law enforcement authority with whom the person is required to register once
each year not earlier than the 30th day before and not later than the 30th day after the anniversary of the person's date
of birth to verify the information in the registration form maintained by the authority for that person." Id. at 62.06(a).
The Texas Legislature amended Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1997 to include article 62.06. (1) In
so doing, the Legislature easily could have required that article 62.06's verification provision supplant the registration
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requirement of article 62.02. See Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("[H]ad the legislature
intended to apply a reasonable person standard, they easily could have specified one, or a clear synonym."). It did not.
Instead, the plain meaning of articles 62.02 and 62.06 evince the Legislature's intent to establish two separate and
distinct reporting requirements. See Reyes v. State, No. 04-03-00005-CR, 2003 WL 22023196, at *2 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio Aug. 29, 2003, no pet.) ("We interpret a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its words unless the
words are ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to an absurd result."). That this requires a convicted sex offender to
report more than once in a single twelve month period, by itself, does not violate Mondragon's federal constitutional
right to due process.
2. Mondragon next argues that articles 62.02 and 62.06 are unconstitutionally vague under the due course of law
provision of article 1, section 19 of the Texas Constitution. However, Mondragon fails to provide "separate grounds,
with separate substantive analysis or argument" in support of his contention. See Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251
(Tex. Crim. App.) ("State and federal constitutional claims should be argued in separate grounds, with separate
substantive analysis or argument provided for each ground."), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 837 (1993). In fact, Mondragon
concedes that "State courts have not identified a greater protection [in] the Texas Constitution." Therefore, we decline
to address Mondragon's state constitutional vagueness argument. See, e.g, Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 766 n.2
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ("Because appellant does not provide separate authority or argument for his state constitutional
claims, we decline to address them."); Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 251 (concluding that "we need not address appellant's
Texas constitutional claims" because appellant "proffered no argument or authority concerning the protection provided
by the Texas Constitution or how that protection differs from the protection provided by the United States
Constitution.").
3. Mondragon also argues that articles 62.02 and 62.06 are in conflict and therefore violate article 1, sections 3 and 3A
of the Texas Constitution. Mondragon's argument in this regard, and in its entirety, is that "the yearly reporting
requirement under Article 62.06 applies differently to individuals who have complied with the reporting requirement
under 62.02 by requiring a discriminating burden [on the article 62.06 registrants] because their birthday is after the
initial reporting requirement within the same year." We disagree.
Generally, to establish an equal protection violation, the challenged statute must interfere "with the exercise of a
'fundamental' right or [place] a burden on a 'suspect' class[.]" See Clark v. State, 665 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984). However, Mondragon fails to cite any authority, and we find none, that these provisions interfere with a
fundamental right. Moreover, "sex offenders are not a suspect class for equal protection purposes." In re M.A.H., 20
S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.) (citing Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 482 (6th Cir. 1999)
("Convicted sex offenders are not a suspect class."), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1053 (2000)).
Because neither a fundamental right nor suspect class is affected, Mondragon "has the burden to show that the
statutory classification is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838, 847 (Tex.
Crim. App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 843 (1995); accord Clark, 665 S.W.2d at 481. Mondragon fails to provide any
argument or authority for the proposition that requiring convicted sex offenders to register yearly on their date of birth
pursuant to article 62.06, even if they have previously registered within the same twelve-month period pursuant to
article 62.02, "is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 847. Instead, we conclude
that these provisions are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. As we have noted:
The legislature's goal in passing the registration and notification provisions was to advance public safety objectives by
facilitating law enforcement's monitoring of sex offenders and by alerting members of the public who may be in an
especially vulnerable situation to take appropriate precautions which could deter or prevent further crimes. The
legislature continued with these goals when it amended the statute in 1997 to expand the class of persons required to
register as sex offenders and to increase the frequency and duration of registration for those sex offenders who have
been convicted of sexually violent offenses.
Reyes, 2003 WL 22023196, at *2 (internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted). Therefore, Mondragon
fails to establish an equal protection violation.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
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Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
Do not publish
1. The Texas Legislature enacted the Sexual Offender Registration Program in 1991. See Act of May 25, 1991, 72d
Leg., R.S., ch. 572, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2029 (codified as Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-13c.1). In 1997, the
Legislature re-designated the statute as Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Also in 1997, the
Legislature added article 62.06. See Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 668, 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2253, 2258-
59 (codified as Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 62.01-.13).
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