In Re: Frank R. Seigel, Epstein Becker & Green, P. C., Sandvik Tamrock LLC F/K/A Tamrock USA, Marakon OY, Sandvik Tamrock OY, and Ilkka Jarvinen--Appeal from of County
State: Texas
Docket No: 08-05-00233-CV
Case Date: 02/16/2006
Preview: In Re: Frank R. Seigel, Epstein Becker & Green, P. C.,
Sandvik Tamrock LLC F/K/A Tamrock USA, Marakon
OY, Sandvik Tamrock OY, and Ilkka Jarvinen--Appeal
from of County
Becker v. State /**/
COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
)
IN RE: ) No. 08-05-00233-CV
)
FRANK R. SEIGEL, EPSTEIN BECKER ) AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
& GREEN, P.C., SANDVIK TAMROCK )
L.L.C. f/k/a TAMROCK USA, ) IN MANDAMUS
MARAKON OY, SANDVIK TAMROCK OY, )
and ILKKA JARVINEN, )
)
Relators. )
O P I N I O N
Relators, Frank R. Seigel, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., Sandvik Tamrock L.L.C. f/k/a Tamrock USA, Marakon Oy,
Sandvik Tamrock Oy, and Ilkka Jarvinen, seek a writ of mandamus directing the Honorable Linda Chew, Judge of the
327th District Court of El Paso County, to withdraw an order compelling discovery of privileged materials. We
conditionally grant relief.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
In May of 2000, Ismael Ortega was fatally injured in an accident involving a truck-mounted Nordberg portable crusher
equipped with a Rammer hydraulic hammer and hydraulic boom. Metso Minerals Tampere Oy manufactured the
portable crusher and Sandvik Tamrock Oy manufactured the hydraulic boom and hammer. Metso Minerals Tampere
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Oy sold the portable crusher with the attached hammer and boom to Metso Minerals Industries, Inc. which in turn sold
the equipment to Mr. Ortega s employer, Jobe Concrete.
Irma Ortega, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Ismael Ortega, and Consuelo Ortega (collectively referred to
as Ortega) filed a wrongful death and survivorship action in the 34th District Court against Metso Minerals Industries,
Inc., Metso Minerals Tampere Oy (collectively referred to as Metso), Sandvik Tamprock Oy, Sandvik Tamrock LLC
f/k/a Tamrock U.S.A., Ilkka Jarvinen (collectively referred to as Sandvik), Marakon Oy, and other defendants. Metso
cross-claimed against Sandvik and Marakon. Ortega was represented by Jim Scherr. Frank R. Seigel and Epstein,
Becker & Green P.C. were among the attorneys and law firms which represented Sandvik.
Ilkka Jarvinen was a division manager of production and engineering for the manufacturer of the hydraulic boom and
hammer, Sandvik Tamrock Oy. At his first deposition on March 26, 2003, Jarvinen testified that Sandvik had no
knowledge that Metso intended to transport the boom horizontally, that safety precautions were not designed for
horizontal transport, and a safe alternative design could have been developed if Sandvik had known of Metso s intent
to transport the boom horizontally. Two months after Jarvinen s first deposition, Ortega, Sandvik, and Marakon
entered into a letter agreement to dismiss these defendants from the suit. The defendants did not pay any consideration
to obtain the dismissal and the agreement expressly provided that it did not constitute a settlement agreement, Mary
Carter agreement, or any document which is discoverable under Texas or federal law. Paragraph 4 of the agreement
provided:
A Specified Defendant, through one of its employees, will be reasonably available to provide Plaintiffs (1) a deposition
for use at trial, or in-person trial testimony; (2) reasonably requested factual and technical advice; (3) reasonably
requested technical records, documents, statistics and other tangible evidence as available; and if such evidence exists,
to state why the Nordberg design for horizontal storage for transport was unsafe and that a safe alternative design could
have been used. At Plaintiffs request, and if such information exists, the Sandvik designated witness will provide
information necessary to qualify the witnesses as an expert. There will be no compensation paid. However, Plaintiffs
will pay for the reasonable costs for transportation, room and board, fax, mail, copying and reasonable and necessary
related expenses.
Ortega non-suited Sandvik, Marakon, and Jarvinen in June 2003 through an amended pleading.
Metso did not seek discovery from Sandvik and Marakon. In early December 2003, Sandvik and Marakon negotiated a
settlement agreement and release of Metso s cross-claim. On December 19, Ortega designated Jarvinen as an expert
witness who would testify as to the negligence of Defendants, the marketing, design and manufacturing defect of the
boom and hammer.
In February 2004, Metso deposed Jarvinen. Relator Seigel represented Jarvinen at that deposition. When asked if there
were an agreement with the plaintiffs that he would provide testimony in exchange for the dismissal of Sandvik,
Jarvinen, testifying through a translator, answered no. Later in the deposition the following exchange took place:
[Metso s counsel]: Do you have any information from any source that, as part of the dismissal agreement, your
company was to provide a witness to testify in this case?
[Jarvinen]: I am not aware of this, but I ve been asked to appear as a witness, and I have answered in the affirmative.
Jarvinen went on to testify, as he had done in March of 2003, that the boom and hammer had been manufactured for
vertical rather than horizontal transport, and that Sandvik had no knowledge of Metso s intent to transport the boom
horizontally. In his opinion, horizontal transport of this boom was unsafe. If Sandvik had known that Metso intended to
transport the boom horizontally, Sandvik could have developed a safe, alternative design. It appears from the
deposition questions that Metso s counsel was suspicious that Jarvinen s testimony was being offered as part of an
agreement with Sandvik and Marakon.
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Shortly before trial, Metso settled with Ortega. On March 9, 2004, Ortega s attorney gave Metso s attorney a copy of
the May 30, 2003 letter agreement. Ortega expressly offered to set aside the settlement agreement with Metso and go to
trial. Metso did not accept this offer. Instead, it filed suit against Relators, alleging they had conspired to fraudulently
induce Metso to dismiss the cross-claims against Sandvik and Marakon and to settle with Ortega. It also pled causes of
action for fraud, abuse of process, and perjury.
Relators have filed special appearances which are still pending. Metso served discovery requests on all Relators
seeking attorney-client communications related to the May 30, 2003 letter agreement. Relators claimed that the
documents were protected by the attorney-client, work-product, and joint defense privileges, and filed privilege logs.
Metso filed a motion to compel raising the crime-fraud exception to the attorney/client privilege. After reviewing the
materials in camera, Respondent overruled Relators objections and granted the motion to compel.
DISCOVERY OF PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS
Relators contend they are entitled to mandamus relief because they established that the documents contained in the
privilege logs are protected by the attorney-client, work product, and joint defense privileges, and Metso Entities failed
to establish an exception.
Standard of Review
Mandamus will lie only to correct a clear abuse of discretion. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.
1992)(orig.proceeding). An appellate court rarely interferes with a trial court s exercise of discretion. A clear abuse of
discretion warranting correction by mandamus occurs when a court issues a decision which is without basis or without
reference to guiding principles of law. See Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985)(orig.
proceeding). With respect to resolution of factual issues or matters committed to the trial court s discretion, the
reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839-40. The relator
must therefore establish that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision. Id. With respect to a trial
court s determination of the legal principles controlling its ruling, the standard is much less deferential. A clear failure
by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion, and may result in
appellate reversal by extraordinary writ. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
An appellate court will deny mandamus relief if another remedy, usually appeal, is available and adequate. Street v.
Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639-40 (Tex. 1986) (orig.proceeding). Generally, privileged matters are not
discoverable. West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1978). If a trial court erroneously orders that privileged material be
disclosed, there is no adequate remedy at law and mandamus is the proper remedy. Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v.
Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843.
The Privileges Asserted by Relators
Relators asserted the attorney-client, work product, and joint defense privileges in response to the discovery requests.
The attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure confidential communications between client and counsel made
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services to the client. Tex.R.Evid. 503(b); Huie v. DeShazo, 922
S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. 1996). This privilege attaches to the complete communication between attorney and client.
Marathon Oil Company v. Moye, 893 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding); GAF Corp. v.
Caldwell, 839 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding). The subject matter of the
information communicated is irrelevant when determining whether the privilege applies. Marathon Oil, 893 S.W.2d at
589; Keene Corp. v. Caldwell, 840 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding). The
privilege attaches to legal advice and factual information included in completed communications between attorney and
client. Marathon Oil, 893 S.W.2d at 589.
Relators also asserted the joint defense privilege found in Texas Rule of Evidence 503(b)(1)(C). This privilege is
sometimes called the common interest or community of interest rule. In re Lexington Ins. Co., No. 14-03-01236-CV,
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2004 WL 210576 at *2 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] February 2, 2004, orig. proceeding)(not reported in S.W.3d).
It does not exist just for co-defendants. In re Skiles, 102 S.W.3d 323, 326 n.2 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 2003, orig.
proceeding); see Tex.R. Evid. 503(b)(1)(C). Instead, the rule, as one of its objectives, creates a privilege for a client to
prevent the disclosure of confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendering of
professional legal services, when such communications are made by the client s lawyer to a lawyer representing
another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest. In re Skiles, 102 S.W.3d at 326-27. It is
not an independent privilege, but an exception to the general rule that no attorney-client privilege attaches to
communications that are made in the presence of or disclosed to a third party. Id. at 326 n.2.
Rule 192.5 generally precludes discovery of an attorney s work product. Tex.R.Civ.P. 192.5. Work product is defined
as:
(1) material prepared or mental impressions developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or a
party s representatives, including the party s attorneys, consultants, sureties, indemnitors, insurers, employees, or
agents; or
(2) a communication made in anticipation of litigation or for trial between a party and the party s representatives or
among a party s representatives, including the party s attorneys, consultants, sureties, indemnitors, insurers, employees,
or agents.
Tex.R.Civ.P. 192.5(a). Rule 192.5 provides different levels of protection for two types of work product. Core work
product is defined as the work product of an attorney or an attorney s representative that contains the attorney s or the
attorney s representative s mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, or legal theories. Tex.R.Civ.P. 192.5(b)(1). Core
work product is not discoverable. Id. Any other work product is discoverable only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party s case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material by other means. Tex.R.Civ.P.
192.5(b)(2).
Relators Burden
A party resisting discovery bears the burden of proving any applicable privilege. In re Exxon Mobil Corp., 97 S.W.3d
353, 357 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)(orig.proceeding), citing Huie, 922 S.W.2d at 922. Rule 193.3
prescribes the procedure for asserting a privilege. Tex.R.Civ.P. 193.3. A party who claims that material or information
responsive to written discovery is privileged may withhold the privileged material or information from the response.
Id. The party must state in the response or in a separate document that information or material responsive to the
request has been withheld, the request to which the information or material relates, and the privilege(s) asserted. Id. At
the request of the party seeking discovery, the withholding party must describe the information or material withheld
and assert a specific privilege for each item or group of items withheld. Id. At a hearing on a claim of privilege
asserted under Rule 193.3, the party asserting the privilege must present any evidence necessary to support the
privilege. Tex.R.Civ.P. 193.4(a). The evidence may be in the form of testimony or affidavits. Id. If the court
determines that an in camera review is necessary, the material must be produced to the court for its review. Id. Metso
does not contend that Relators failed to satisfy the requirements of Rules 193.3 and 193.4 or that they did not carry
their burden of proving the applicability of the privileges.
Burden Shifted to Metso
Once a party demonstrates the privilege applies, the burden shifts to the party seeking production to prove an exception
exists. See Marathon Oil, 893 S.W.2d at 589-90. Metso relies on the crime-fraud exception found in Texas Rule of
Evidence 503(d)(1) which provides that there is no privilege under Rule 503 if the services of the lawyer were sought
or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have
known to be a crime or fraud. Tex.R.Evid. 503(d)(1). The crime/fraud exception applies only if (1) the party asserting
it establishes a prima facie case of contemplated fraud and (2) there is a relationship between the document for which
the privilege is challenged and the prima facie proof offered. Granada Corp. v. First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d
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223, 227 (Tex. 1992); Warrantech Corp. v. Computer Adapters Servs., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 516, 527 (Tex.App.--Fort
Worth 2004, no pet.). Theprima facie case requirement is met when the proponent offers evidence establishing the
elements of fraud and that the fraud was ongoing or about to be committed when the document was prepared. In re
AEP Texas Central Co., 128 S.W.3d 687, 692 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding); Cigna Corp. v. Spears,
838 S.W.2d 561, 569 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1992, orig. proceeding). Mere allegations of fraud are insufficient.
Cigna Corp., 838 S.W.2d at 569; see also In re Monsanto Co., 998 S.W.2d 917, 933-34 (Tex.App.--Waco 1999, orig.
proceeding). The fact that the plaintiff s cause of action involves fraudulent conduct is insufficient. Cigna Corp., 838
S.W.2d at 569. The fraud alleged to have occurred must have occurred at or during the time the document was
prepared and in order to perpetrate the fraud. Id. In addition to a finding that the discovery proponent has satisfied a
prima facie case of fraud, the trial court must also make a finding that a nexus exists between the privileged documents
and the alleged fraud. Granada Corp., 844 S.W.2d at 227; Freeman v. Bianchi, 820 S.W.2d 853, 861-62 (Tex.App.--
Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding). This nexus must be established for each privileged document. Freeman,
820 S.W.2d at 861.
Prima Facie Case of Contemplated Fraud
In its suit against Relators, Metso alleged that Relators entered into a civil conspiracy with Ortega to conceal the
existence of the May 30, 2003 letter agreement and that the failure to disclose the letter agreement fraudulently induced
Metso to settle with Sandvik and Ortega. Metso claimed that Relators committed fraud by failing to disclose the letter
agreement in supplemental discovery responses and in response to Jarvinen s false deposition testimony. These same
allegations are included in the motion to compel discovery of the attorney-client communications related to the May
30, 2003 letter agreement.
To prevail on a fraud claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant made a material representation that was false;
(2) it knew the representation was false or made it recklessly as a positive assertion without any knowledge of its truth;
(3) it intended to induce the plaintiff to act upon the representation; (4) the plaintiff actually and justifiably relied upon
the representation; and (5) thereby suffered injury. Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573,
577 (Tex. 2001); Wil-Roye Inv. Co. II v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 142 S.W.3d 393, 407-08 (Tex.App.--El Paso
2004, no pet.). As a general rule, the failure to disclose information does not constitute fraud unless there is a duty to
disclose the information. Insurance Company of North America v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998); Marshall
v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2002, pet. denied). Thus, silence may be equivalent to a false
representation only when the particular circumstances impose a duty on the party to speak and he deliberately remains
silent. Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. 2001); Marshall, 84 S.W.3d at 786. Whether such a duty exists is
a question of law. Id.
No Duty to Supplement Discovery
We will first consider whether Relators had a duty to disclose the letter agreement in supplemental discovery
responses. The Rules of Civil Procedure impose a duty to supplement written discovery responses. Tex.R.Civ.P. 193.5.
Metso relies on evidence that they served discovery requests on Ortega which required disclosure of all settlement
agreements as well as the disclosure of experts. But Metso did not serve discovery requests on Sandvik or Marakon.
Therefore, Relators did not owe Metso a duty to supplement. See Austin Ranch Enterprises, Inc. v. Wells, 760 S.W.2d
703, 710 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
No Duty to Disclose During Deposition
The crux of Metso s argument is that Jarvinen changed his testimony between his first and second depositions as a
result of Sandvik s settlement with Ortega. It complains that the Relators conspired to commit perjury in order to
fraudulently induce Metso to dismiss its cross claim against Sandvik and to settle the underlying suit with Ortega.
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The First Deposition
As we have noted, Jarvinen was first deposed in March 2003.
Q: I was asking the way your company expected the -- the hammer and boom to be transported on the -- once it was
installed on the equipment. Was it expected to be transported in a 90-degree angle, upright?
A: All booms are delivered in the vertical position.
Q: Why is that?
A: The structure of the boom is such that it cannot be delivered in any other way.
Q: Did you -- Did Nordberg provide your company with any type of specifications or design standards to indicate that
they expected the boom to be transported on its side in a horizontal position?
A: No.
Q: Did -- Was your company ever advised in any way that Nordberg -- that Nordberg was intending to incorporate
your rammer and boom so it would be transported on Nordberg equipment in a horizontal position?
A: I was at no point made aware of this.
Q: Okay. At all times did you expect the boom and hammer that you sold Nordberg to be transported upright in a 90-
degree angle?
A: Yes, because a boom is exactly planned to be upright by its structure.
Q: What would be the usual assumption for usual design for usual transport of a boom?
A: It will be vertical.
Q: Did Nordberg give you anything to cause you to disregard the standard practice that the boom would be transported
at all times in a horizontal position?
A: No.
Q: Had -- All right. If Nordberg had disclosed to you that they intended to have your boom and rammer transported on
-- horizontally, on the side, would your company have done it -- have designed it or manufactured it differently?
[Objection as to form]
A: As I said, this boom is designed to be used and transported vertical. If the boom is handled horizontally in the
course of transportation, this necessitates changes in design. We were not aware of anything like this.
Q: If Nordberg had asked you and disclosed to you that they were going to transport it -- or they wanted it to be
transported horizontally on its side, would your company have addressed that design concern?
A: This would have been a matter of a separate negotiation. There is no such specification in this particular boom
order.
Q: Okay. Would your company have the capability to design the -- the boom for transport horizontally had you been
asked to do so?
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A: We certainly would have been able to [do] so, but as I said, this would have necessitated modifications in design.
Q: What modifications in design would have been needed in your opinion to safely transport the boom on its side?
[Objection as to form]
A: It would have been necessary to design a separate leaning device for the boom. . . . It would have been necessary to
have an extra tilting design. . . . And this would have made it safe to lower the boom. . . . But this was not done.
Q: In terms of safety for the boom and the hammer does your company incorporate special safety features in the boom
and hammer so that it can be safely transported vertically?
A: Vertically, yes.
Q: Was there any safety precautions designed into this boom and hammer so that it could be transported safely on its
side horizontally?
[Objection as to form]
A: No, this was not done because we were not aware that this was going to be transported on its side.
The Letter Agreement
We have already detailed the contents of the letter agreement that was executed. There were, however, drafts
circulated between the parties before the deal was consummated. The first draft appears to have been sent by Jim
Scherr to Frank Seigel on April 17, 2003. Paragraph 4 of this draft provided:
4. Your clients and their employees will be made available for Plaintiffs for depositions, for trial, for factual and
technical advice, for records, documents, statistics and other tangible evidence, for assistance, and for evidence to show
the design on this Nordberg model for horizontal storage for transport was not safe and that there was a safer
alternative (as defined by Texas law). At our request, your company will designate by name, address and phone
number the person or persons who we can rely upon as factual and expert witnesses and your clients will provide the
information required to designate them as experts. There will be no compensation paid, however we will pay for the
reasonable costs for transportation, room and board, fax, mail, copying, translation and reasonable and necessary
related expenses.
Seigel responded to Scherr on April 29:
Paragraph 4 should be revised to provide that Sandvik Tamrock OY, through one of its employees, will be reasonably
available to provide Plaintiffs (1) a deposition for use at trial or in-person trial testimony; (2) reasonably requested
factual and technical advice; (3) reasonably requested technical records, documents, statistics and other tangible
evidence as available; and if such evidence exists, to state why the Nordberg design for horizontal storage for transport
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was unsafe and that a safe alternative design could have been used. I do not believe our people will say that it was a
bad design. I do think our people will be able to testify truthfully respecting some of the other issues.
Seigel sent Scherr another draft on May 29 which he had signed in his capacity as counsel for Sandvik. Paragraph 4
stated:
4. Sandvik Tamrock OY, through one of its employees, will be reasonably available to provide Plaintiffs (1) a
deposition for use at trial or in-person trial testimony; (2) reasonably requested factual and technical advice; (3)
reasonably requested technical records, documents, statistics and other tangible evidence as available; and if such
evidence exists, to state why the Nordbert design for horizontal storage was unsafe and that a safe alternative design
could have been used. (Specified Defendants are, at this time, unaware of such evidence.) At Plaintiff s request, and if
such information exists, the Sandvik designated witness will provide information necessary to qualify the witnesses as
an expert. There will be no compensation paid. However, Plaintiffs will pay for the reasonable costs for transportation,
room and board, fax, mail, copying and reasonable and necessary related expenses.
The next day, Seigel faxed the following to all of the attorneys involved with the negotiation:
URGENT!
PLEASE RUSH!
Gentlemen:
Attached please find yet another version of the agreement letter regarding the Ortega case. This version contains the
following changes per Jim Scherr s request:
" (Specified Defendants are, at this time, unaware of such evidence.) deleted from Paragraph 4.
With those changes, the settlement was completed.
The Second Deposition: Testimony in Exchange for Dismissal
At Jarvinen s deposition in February 2004, Metso s attorney asked about the existence of an agreement which would
require Jarvinen to testify in exchange for the dismissal of his company from the suit:
Q: Is there any agreement between the plaintiffs, that is Mrs. Ortega, or her counsel, Mr. Scherr, that you would
provide testimony in this case in the exchange for the dismissal or nonsuit of Sandvik Tamrock from the case?
[The Interpreter]: Question is complicated. I ll do my best.
A: The witness says no.
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Later in the deposition, counsel asked Jarvinen whether he was aware that his company was dismissed from the case
by Scherr. Jarvinen answered:
A: I am aware that the company was dismissed from the case, but I am unable to give any names. I am not aware if
this case is with Mr. Scherr.
Counsel then asked:
Q: Do you have any information from any source that, as part of the dismissal agreement, your company was to
provide a witness to testify in this case?
A: I am not aware of this, but I ve been asked to appear as a witness, and I have answered in the affirmative.
Jarvinen was also cross-examined by Ortega s attorney:
[Mr. Scherr]: Mr. Jarvinen, your company, Sandvik Tamrock, was originally sued in this lawsuit by Mrs. Ortega. You
know that, don t you?
[Jarvinen]: Yes.
Q: Shortly after your deposition was given in this case last year, Mrs. Ortega dropped your company from this lawsuit.
You understand that.
A: I am aware of this.
Q: And no -- you understand that no moneys or -- no money was ever paid to Ms. Ortega in order for your company to
be dropped; Ms. Ortega voluntarily dropped your company, relying upon your testimony, you understand?
[Objection as to form]
A: It is my conception that nothing was paid.
Q: In other words, Ms. Ortega dropped your company based on the honesty and forthrightness of yourself in
explaining how this came to pass.
[Objection as to form]
A: I am not familiar with all details, as I am not familiar with Mrs. Ortega s reason for dropping, dismissing our firm
from the case, but it is my understanding that there s [sic] no money was paid.
Q: From Ms. Ortega s standpoint, do you recognize the only consideration she has today for you is to say thank you for
your honesty?
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[Objection as to form]
A: If that s how things are, then I must, indeed, be satisfied.
Metso contends that Relators owed a duty to disclose the letter agreement in order to correct Jarvinen s false
testimony. An attorney may reveal confidential information when the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do
so in order to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act. Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct
1.05(c)(7)(1989), reprinted in Tex.Gov t Code Ann. Tit. 2, Subt. G, App. A (Vernon 2005)(State Bar Rules art. 10, 9).
An attorney may also reveal confidential information to the extent revelation reasonably appears necessary to rectify
the consequences of a client s criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the attorney s services had been
used. Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct 1.05(c)(8)(1989), reprinted in Tex.Gov t Code Ann. Tit. 2, Subt. G, App. A
(State Bar Rules art. 10, 9). Rule 3.03 prohibits an attorney from knowingly failing to disclose a fact to a tribunal when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act. Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct
3.03(a)(2)(1989), reprinted in Tex.Gov t Code Ann. Tit. 2, Subt. G, App. A (State Bar Rules art. 10, 9). Metso
contends that Jarvinen s testimony about the dismissal agreement was perjurious and that counsel had a duty to correct
it by disclosing the existence of the letter agreement. Jarvinen initially testified that there was no agreement that he
would testify in exchange for the dismissal of his company from the Ortega lawsuit. Later in the same deposition, he
testified that he knew his company had been dismissed and he had been asked to testify but he did not have any
knowledge of an agreement whereby he would testify in exchange for the dismissal.
A person commits perjury if, with intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement s meaning, he makes a false
statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or
authorized by law to be made under oath. Tex.Penal Code Ann. 37.02 (Vernon 2003). Aggravated perjury occurs
where the false statement is made in connection with an official proceeding and is material. Tex.Penal Code Ann.
37.03. A statement is material, regardless of the admissibility of the statement under the rules of evidence, if it could
have affected the course or outcome of the official proceeding. Tex.Penal Code Ann. 37.04.
The record contains no evidence that Jarvinen s testimony about the dismissal agreement was false. The letter
agreement provided that a Sandvik employee would be available to testify but it did not specifically provide that
Jarvinen would testify. More importantly, Jarvinen made it clear that he was unaware of the details surrounding the
dismissal of Sandvik or any agreement pertinent to the dismissal of Sandvik. Consequently, there was no duty to
disclose the dismissal agreement for this reason.
The Second Deposition: Perjury in Exchange for Dismissal?
Metso also contends that there was a duty to disclose because Jarvinen falsely testified that the Nordberg design was
unsafe and there were safer alternatives. We understand it to argue that this false testimony was provided as
consideration for the letter agreement. As we have detailed, Jarvinen testified at his first deposition that the boom was
designed only for vertical transport, Sandvik had no knowledge that Metso intended to transport the boom horizontally,
safety precautions were not designed to cover horizontal transport, and a safe alternative design could have been
developed if Sandvik had known of Metso s intent to transport the boom horizontally. We turn now to his second
deposition in February 2004:
Q: Did Nordberg, in any way, to your knowledge, ever advise your company that Nordberg was intending to
incorporate your hammer and boom so that it could be transported on Nordberg equipment in a horizontal position?
[Jarvinen]: No such information came.
Q: As manager of design and production of this very boom, from your company s standpoint, at all times did you
expect that the boom and hammer that was sold to Nordberg would be transported upright, in a 90-degree angle?
A: That was our conception.
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Q: If Nordberg had ordered, from your company, a boom and hammer to be transported horizontally, what would your
company have done?
A: We would, in that case, have designed something different from the standard boom. And then on the basis of that,
we should ve offered them such a boom.
Q: What modifications would have been necessary, in your opinion as the manager of the design and production for
Sandvik Tamrock, who designs and manufactures these very boom -- this very boom and hammer, to accommodate
transport in a horizontal position?
A: It would ve been necessary to design a tilting or leaning device underneath the pedestal so that it would ve been
safe to manipulate the boom in such a way that it could be transported in this sideways position.
Q: What about fasteners? Are there -- had your company been advised or requested to design and manufacture a boom
for horizontal transport, would there have been modifications necessary in the fasteners to hold it in place?
A: Fasteners would have been part of the tilting device.
Q: Based on your education at the Helsinki University of Technology, your degree in this field in 1965, and 24 years
of experience leading up to you becoming manager of the production and design for Sandvik Tamrock, do you have an
opinion as to whether there was a safer alternative to be used for the folding of the boom into a horizontal position?
A: In my estimation, there are safer options in existence.
Q: Would you please describe what safer options in existence at the time this piece of equipment was sold were
available that would have prevented this incident?
[Objection as to form]
A: In the pictures that I have, underneath our boom, underneath the pedestal, a certain hinged base plate has been
installed. My understanding is that the intention has been that, with the help of this plate, the boom could be leaned
over into a horizontal position. But there is no sign of what kind of device for raising and lowering would be there. It s
my understanding that, for this purpose, an excavator was used. And it s my understanding that onto this excavator
boom, some kind of -- . . . Some kind of raising chain was attached. And I find this type of lifting very questionable. It
involves a lot of risk. This, in my estimation, is the weak point in this. This could ve been a lift, for example, a
hydraulic lift had been installed there.
Q: Based on your background, experience and qualifications, looking at the photographs and the design that Nordberg
Metso did on the platform, what do you see is the reasonably foreseeable risk inherent in that design.
[Objection]
A: As I said, this is in the device for lifting and lowering, the hinged plate is there. The weakness is in the lifting and
lowering mechanism.
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Q: Upon pulling the pin on this design by Metso, is it reasonably foreseeable that the -- that there will be instability in
the platform, and the boom and hammer could reasonably cause an accident?
[Objection as to form]
A: My -- my understanding is that the intention was that, using an excavator and a chain, the boom would be tied to
the excavator before the pin was pulled out. And this demands extreme caution and care. This method would surely
work if it were performed very carefully. But there are risks.
Q: In your opinion, based on your background, experience and qualifications, is the design of this folding platform that
Metso Nordberg was using dangerous?
[Objection as to form]
A: As I said, the actual hinged plate is okay in its own right. But in addition to that, it requires a reliable lifting and
lowering device. I would not say that the solution used by Metso was impossible, but it involves certain risks. . . . As I
said, the lifting device should be such that it functions reliably and is easy to use. A chain fixed to the far end of the
boom of an excavator is not such a safe device.
We have exhaustively reviewed the record and considered Sandvik s contention that by deleting the portion of
Paragraph 4 in the letter agreement that (Specified Defendants are, at this time, unaware of such evidence.), Jarvinen s
later testimony was perjurious and had been planned while the truth had been concealed. However, given the
consistency of Jarvinen s testimony, the first of which occurred before the negotiations began between Ortega and
Sandvik, we cannot conclude that the second deposition was perjurious. We also note one other development which
occurred between the two depositions. There is no apparent reference in Jarvinen s first deposition to any drawings or
photographs of Metso s design for the horizontal boom. We look again to the agreement between Sandvik and Ortega,
highlighting for clarity:
Sandvik Tamrock OY, through one of its employees, will be reasonably available to provide Plaintiffs (1) a deposition
for use at trial or in-person trial testimony; (2) reasonably requested factual and technical advice; (3) reasonably
requested technical records, documents, statistics and other tangible evidence as available; and if such evidence exists,
to state why the Nordbert design for horizontal storage was unsafe and that a safe alternative design could have been
used. (Specified Defendants are, at this time, unaware of such evidence.) At Plaintiff s request, and if such evidence
exists, the Sandvik designated witness will provide information necessary to qualify the witnesses as an expert.
This passage does not suggest that Sandvik was unaware that the design for horizontal transport was unsafe. In fact, a
Sandvik employee had already testified to exactly that. The passage specifies thatif technical records, documents,
statistics or other tangible evidence were found to exist, Sandvik would provide it to Ortega. However, at the time of
the agreement, the defendants were unaware of such evidence. By the time of the second deposition, Jarvinen had
reviewed a drawing by Metso demonstrating the process for lowering the boom for horizontal transport. He had
reviewed the hinged plate and chain. His testimony about the weakness in the Metso design was premised directly
upon the drawing he had only received the day of his deposition. While he had said all along that transporting the
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boom in a horizontal position was unsafe, he was able to pinpoint precisely the weakness in the Metso design once he
reviewed their drawing. Because there is no evidence that Jarvinen s expert testimony in this regard is false, we
perceive no duty under Rules 1.05 or 3.03 to correct the testimony or disclose the letter agreement on this basis.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that Metso did not establish a prima facie case of contemplated fraud and that the crime-fraud exception
is inapplicable. The trial court clearly abused its discretion by overruling Relators objections to discovery and by
granting the motion to compel discovery of the privileged materials. Because Relators have no adequate remedy at
law, we conditionally grant relief. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply with this opinion.
February 16, 2006
ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Justice
Before Panel No. 5
Barajas, C.J., McClure, and Larsen, JJ.
Larsen, J. (sitting by assignment)(not participating)
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