In the Interest of F.P., III, et al., Children--Appeal from 288th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

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State: Texas

Court: Criminal Court of Appeals

Docket No: 04-03-00918-CV

Case Date: 07/21/2004

Plaintiff: MAYOR PAT AHUMADA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EX-OFFICIO PUB BOARD MEMBER, ET AL.

Defendant: EMMANUEL VASQUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A DIRECTOR OF THE BROWNSVILLE PUB--A

Preview:In the Interest of F.P., III, et al., Children--Appeal from
288th Judicial District Court of Bexar County
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-03-00918-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF F.P, A.P., A.P., and M.L., Minor Children
From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2002-PA-00977
Honorable Janet P. Littlejohn, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice
Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 21, 2004
AFFIRMED
After the trial court terminated Appellant's parental rights to her four minor children, Appellant moved for a new trial
and filed a statement of her appellate points, all of which challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial
court's findings. The trial court found all the appellate points are frivolous. See Tex. Family Code Ann. 263.405(d)(3)
(Vernon 2002). We agree and therefore affirm the trial court's order.
In paragraph 6.1 of its termination order, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the
parent-child relationship between Appellant and her four minor children is in the children's best interest. This finding
is supported by the testimony of the children's court-appointed advocate, who testified that she believed termination of
Appellant's parental rights was in the children's best interests because: Appellant has behaved inconsistently toward the
children following the placement of the three oldest children with foster parents and the placement of the youngest
child with the child's paternal grandmother; each of these homes provided the children with a sense of stability that
Appellant either cannot or will not provide; the foster parents of the three oldest children want to adopt them, while the
paternal grandmother wants to adopt the youngest child; and Appellant's past criminal history. This evidence
constitutes legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination is in the
children's best interest, especially in light of the evidence detailed below regarding Appellant's failure to comply with
her court-ordered Family Service Plan.
In paragraph 6.2.3 of its termination order, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant "failed
to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the mother to
obtain the return of the children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the
Department of Protective and Regulatory Services for not less than nine months as a result of the children's removal
from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the children." One goal set forth in Appellant's Family
Service Plan provides that Appellant "will demonstrate an ability to stay away from a drug/alcohol lifestyle." However,
the evidence establishes that, after the three oldest children were first taken from Appellant, she began, but did not
complete, a court-ordered in-patient drug treatment because, in her view, the people at the facility were "rude" and she
did not need the program. Later, after the youngest child was born, Appellant completed a court-ordered out-patient
drug treatment program at a different facility; however, soon after she completed the program, she was arrested for
public intoxication and, during her arrest, kicked out a window in the police car.
Another goal stated in Appellant's Family Service Plan was for Appellant to "assume a responsible parenting role."
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However, after Appellant's three oldest children were voluntarily placed with family members, Appellant had no
contact with the children from October 24, 2002 to December 4, 2002; and, after the youngest child was removed from
Appellant's care following a December 4 hearing, Appellant had no contact with any of her children from December
2002 through approximately February 2003. While Appellant attended each of the scheduled visits with her children in
June and July 2003, she failed to attend any of the four scheduled visits in August 2003. In September 2003, Appellant
missed two of the four scheduled visits. Appellant testified that she was unable to make the scheduled visits with her
children because of her job. However, she held this job for only one month; and the foster mother testified that the
visits were scheduled for Thursdays, when Appellant did not work. Appellant also testified that CPS prevented her
from seeing her children; however, this contention was denied by not one but two CPS representatives. Yet another
goal stated in Appellant's Family Service Plan was for Appellant to provide shelter for her children. However, in
January 2003, Appellant was evicted from her apartment. This evidence is legally and factually sufficient to establish
that Appellant did not comply with her court-ordered Family Service Plan.
Because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding of one of the statutory
grounds for termination and its finding that termination is in the children's best interest, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
161.001 (Vernon 2002) (statutory grounds for termination), and "[o]nly one predicate finding under section 161.001(1)
is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best
interest," In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003), we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that Appellant's appellate issues are frivolous, i.e., fail to "present[] a substantial question for appellate review."See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 13.003(b) (Vernon 2002); see also De La Vega v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 974 S.W.2d
152, 154 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (en banc) (holding that appeal is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis
in law or in fact). We therefore affirm the trial court's order.
Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
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