In the Interest of J.W. and N.W., Children--Appeal from 323rd District Court of Tarrant County

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State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 02-08-00145-CV

Case Date: 11/26/2008

Plaintiff: Becky White McWilliams, a/k/a Rebecca Lawson White, f/d/b/a White Food Group, Ltd., f/d/b/a Cheddars

Defendant: The State of Texas; The City of Lubbock, Texas; and The County of Lubbock, Texas--Appeal from 261st

Preview:In the Matter of A.J.J.--Appeal from 289th Judicial
District Court of Bexar County
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-06-00446-CV
IN THE MATTER OF A.J.J., A Juvenile
From the 289th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2006-JUV-00555
Honorable Carmen Kelsey, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Delivered and Filed: February 21, 2007
AFFIRMED
A.J.J., a juvenile, appeals the trial court's order of adjudication finding that he engaged in delinquent conduct by
committing the offense of assault. In his sole issue on appeal, A.J.J. contends the evidence is factually insufficient to
support the order of adjudication. We affirm.
Background
A.J.J. was charged with misdemeanor assault arising out of an after-school fight involving three young men. A.J.J.
pled "not true" to the charge and waived a jury trial. On April 27, 2006, the trial court found the charge of assault-
bodily injury to be "true," and adjudicated A.J.J. delinquent. A.J.J. was placed on nine months of probation in the
custody of his mother, under the supervision of the Bexar County Juvenile Probation Department. A.J.J. timely filed
notice of appeal.
Standard of Review
We review adjudications of juvenile delinquency by applying the standards applicable to sufficiency of the evidence
challenges in criminal cases. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 54.03(f) (Vernon Supp. 2006); In re T.K.E., 5 S.W.3d 782,
784-85 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.). In a factual sufficiency review, we examine all the evidence in a
neutral light to determine whether it is so weak as to make the verdict "clearly wrong and manifestly unjust," or
whether, considering the conflicting evidence, the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997) (in a factual sufficiency review, court views "all the evidence without the prism of 'in the light most
favorable to the prosecution' and sets aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the
evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust"); In re R.P., 37 S.W.3d. 76, 78 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
The appellate court must, however, avoid substituting its judgment for that of the fact-finder. Johnson v. State, 23
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S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Analysis
In its petition alleging delinquent conduct, the State asserted that A.J.J. assaulted D.S., the complainant, by striking him
with his hand. The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that A.J.J. intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly caused bodily injury to D.S. to support a finding that he committed the alleged misdemeanor assault. See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2006). "Bodily injury" is defined as "physical pain, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition." Tex. Penal Code Ann. 1.07(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2006). The definition of "bodily
injury" encompasses even relatively minor physical contact as long as it constitutes more than mere offensive touching.
Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
At the adjudication hearing, D.S. testified that while he was being hit by C.S., the other assailant, he turned his head
and "saw A.J.J. behind [me] and he started hitting [me]." On cross- examination, D.S. again stated that he "saw A.J.J.
hitting [me] in the back." Additionally, D.S. testified that he suffered physical pain and injuries from the altercation,
including a bruise to his head, scratches on his neck, and swelling underneath his eye. A.J.J. testified at the hearing
that he was standing several feet away and "didn't hit [D.S.] anywhere." A bystander, J.H., also testified that he saw the
fight from about a block away and never saw A.J.J. approach the complainant; however, J.H. admitted on cross-
examination that he did not witness the entire incident and it was possible that A.J.J. hit D.S. when he was not
watching.
As the trier of fact, the trial judge was the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and, as such, could
choose to believe D.S. and disbelieve A.J.J. See In re H.G., 993 S.W.2d. 211, 213 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no
pet.). Based on the record, we hold the evidence is factually sufficient to support the court's finding that A.J.J.
committed the offense of assault. Accordingly, we overrule A.J.J.'s sole issue on appeal, and affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
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