IN THE INTEREST OF S. Q., C. Q., F. Q., M. Q., AND A. Q., CHILDREN--Appeal from County Court at Law No. 5 of Nueces County

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 13th District Court of Appeals » 2001 » IN THE INTEREST OF S. Q., C. Q., F. Q., M. Q., AND A. Q., CHILDREN--Appeal from County Court at Law No. 5 of Nueces County

State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 13-01-00156-CV

Case Date: 12/06/2001

Plaintiff: Roy Brent Campbell

Defendant: The State of Texas--Appeal from 181st District Court of Randall County

Preview:IN THE INTEREST OF S. Q., C. Q., F. Q., M. Q., AND
A. Q., CHILDREN--Appeal from County Court at Law
No. 5 of Nueces County
NUMBER 13-01-156-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI
IN THE INTEREST OF S.Q., C.Q.,
F.Q., M.Q., AND A.Q., CHILDREN
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
of Nueces County, Texas.
O P I N I O N
Before Justices Dorsey, Ya ez, and Rodriguez
Opinion by Justice Dorsey
Laura Quitugua appeals from a judgment which terminated her parental rights to her five minor children. The issues
raised on appeal are whether the evidence is sufficient to support termination of her parental rights, and whether the
trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial. We affirm.
I. Background
Laura Quitugua is the biological mother of five minor children. Their biological father (1) lives in Guam and has not
seen the children for seven years. The Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services ("TDPRS") took
custody of the children because they were living on the streets, and two of the older boys had allegedly sexually
abused their two sisters. On May 13, 1999, the TDPRS filed suit to terminate Quitugua's parental rights to her children,
S.Q., C.Q., F.Q., M.Q., and A.Q. TDPRS was named as the children's temporary managing conservator.
On July 21, 1999, the court held a status hearing at which time TDPRS announced a family-service plan. TDPRS
wanted Quitugua and her boyfriend, Gill Jackson, (2) to (1) locate and maintain appropriate housing suitable for the
family, (2) maintain employment, (3) obtain psychological and psychiatric evaluation, (4) obtain drug and alcohol
assessment, (5) attend and complete parenting classes, and (6) cooperate with TDPRS. According to TDPRS neither
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Quitugua nor Jackson completed the family-service plan.
On October 31, 2000, the parties tried the termination suit to the bench. Two TDPRS case workers, Lois Castillo and
Debra Arismendez, testified about the abuse and neglect the children had suffered. Castillo started a case on Quitugua
and her children in April, 1998. At that time the children lived on the streets without supervision. Two of the girls
complained that their brothers had sexually abused them, one child complained that Quitugua's boyfriend, Gill Jackson,
had beaten him with a belt, and another child was hospitalized because of a suicide threat. Castillo said that TDPRS
removed the children from Quitugua's custody because of the sexual abuse and because Quitugua was not protecting
the children from further sexual abuse.
Arismendez testified that Quitugua worked part time, sporadically took part in individual therapy, completed eleven
parenting classes over a one and one-half year period, gave urine samples, which were negative, and had a
psychological evaluation. However she stressed that Quitugua did not consistently comply with the family-service
plan; i.e., she (1) had not completed her parenting classes, (2) had made only one child-support payment, (3) failed to
obtain appropriate housing for her children, and (4) had not made effectual progress regarding the sexual abuse of her
children, their protection, and the environment to which the children were subjected. Arismendez had given Quitugua
a list of public housing and referred her to County Welfare and Catholic Social Services. County Welfare approved her
for public housing, but she never obtained appropriate housing for her children.
Arismendez testified that Jackson was a major part of all the issues regarding Quitugua's children and the home.
Jackson agreed to take part in the services which TDPRS offered, but he did not finish. He drank and abused Quitugua
and the children. Because of the abuse Arismendez asked Quitugua to leave him in order to help the children,
Quitugua refused to leave him.
Racheka Garza, Director of Social Services at the Salvation Army shelter, testified that on Jackson's advice, Quitugua
would refuse food and shelter for her children. The first time Jackson, Quitugua, and the children came to the shelter,
Garza told Jackson that he could not stay there. Because he could not stay he would not let Quitugua and the children
stay there. The children became upset because they wanted food and a place to sleep. Quitugua and her children
returned to live in the shelter a couple of weeks later. After moving into the shelter the children made great progress
with report cards. Garza described the children as having behavioral problems. She said that Quitugua attended several
parenting classes but never finished them. Garza saw Jackson hit one of the children on the back and said that the
children told her that Jackson hit them and their mother. Garza said that the children loved their mother and had a
close relationship with her.
Dr. Diana Bill was a therapist for two of Quitugua's children, A.Q. and M.Q. A.Q. had oppositional defiant disorder
and attention deficit disorder as well as problems with bed-wetting. Dr. Bill testified that these problems stemmed
from "his background of either not being supervised by his mother, being homeless, watching his mother's boyfriend
be violent either toward his brother or his mother, and the constant moving around." M.Q. had the same disorders as
A.Q. Her foster parents planned to take her to Disney World; however, when she learned that her siblings could not go
too, she became severely depressed and required hospitalization. The children were not ready to stop therapy and
needed a permanent home. Dr. Bill stated that the children loved their mother, were loyal to her, and that they spoke
positively of her boyfriend. When asked if she thought that the children should remain in the custody of TDPRS, she
said, "it's definitely a viable option. My concerns about that is that these children need some permanency. . .           ."
Rosaicela Villarreal, a counselor, met with Quitugua and all her five children once, and with Quitugua and four of the
children approximately eight to ten times. One of the children told her he wanted to stay with his mother and siblings
but would run away if Jackson was still there. The other children are willing to live with their mother if changes are
made. She said that the smaller child wanted to return to Quitugua but had no comfort level with the older siblings.
When asked if the children should be returned to their mother, Villarreal stated that it would be a big gamble. She was
worried about housing and about Quitugua staying with a man who beat her, is an alcoholic, and did not help her
therapeutically. Quitugua had the potential to become more protective of her children, but emotionally, she was not
ready to protect them. Villarreal stated, "From a therapeutic prospective, yes, progress has been made, but not at a
level where it would probably be considered appropriate . . . for the safety of the kids. . .                             ."
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Quitugua's Testimony
Quitugua believed her main obstacle was housing, and she did not want her parental rights terminated. She and
Jackson pay $35 per night for a hotel room. She testified that she could not keep a job because of her diabetic
problems. She had done everything Debra Arismendez had asked of her and said that Arismendez told her that she had
finished her parenting classes and not to worry about paying child support. She and Jackson participated in the
substance intervention counseling, and she attended individual counseling. She believed that TDPRS did not like
Jackson because he was black and stated she would only leave him under court order. She said that the children never
saw Jackson hit her; rather, they only saw the results of the beatings. When asked why she did not find a place to live
after the government had granted her money, she stated that she could only find two-bedroom homes, which were too
small. According to her a three-bedroom home was too expensive. She admitted that she had not raised the children by
herself for the past five years.
After hearing the evidence the trial court found the evidence clear and convincing that Quitugua had knowingly placed
or allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical and emotional well-
being and that it was in the best interest of the children that the court terminate Quitugua's parental rights to all the
children. The trial court signed the termination order on November 1, 2000.
Quitugua did not request findings of facts or conclusions of law. When findings of facts and conclusions of law are
not requested, and none are filed we must affirm the judgment if we can uphold it on any legal theory that finds
support in the evidence. In the Interest of W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam) (citingLassiter v.
Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex. 1977)). This is so regardless of whether the trial court articulates the correct legal
reason for the judgment. J.M.R. v. A.M., 683 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
II. Analysis
1. Sufficiency Of The Evidence.
By issue one Quitugua asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support termination. Section 161.001 of the Texas
Family Code governs the involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship. Under that section a court may order
termination of the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence one or more of the statutory
grounds set out in section 161.001(1) and determines that termination is in the best interest of the child as required by
section 161.001(2). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2001). Relevant to this case section
161.001(1) provides that the court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence the parent has "(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or
surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]" Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
161.001(1)                                                                                                                    (D) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2001). "Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof
that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations sought to
be established. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 101.007 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2001). In a clear and convincing evidence case
an appellate court may sustain an insufficient evidence point when: (1) the evidence is factually insufficient to support
a finding by clear and convincing evidence; or (2) a finding is so contrary to the weight of contradicting evidence that
no trier of fact could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and convincing. In the Interest of W.C., No. 14-00-
01280- CV, 2001 WL 1013581, at *21-22 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.). See Leal v. Texas Dep't
of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 25 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.); In the Interest of L.R.M., 763
S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ). Because the involuntary termination of parental rights interferes
with fundamental constitutional rights, see Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d
846, 846 (Tex. 1980), we must strictly scrutinize involuntary termination proceedings in favor of preserving the
relationship. See Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20.
The record reflects that Quitugua, although approved for public housing, failed to obtain public housing or any suitable
housing for her children. Instead, she and Jackson paid $35 per night for hotel rooms which were not big enough to
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house the five children. Her failure to obtain suitable housing denied the children a stable environment where they
could sleep, do their school work, and function as a normal family. Quitugua failed to properly supervise and take care
of her children. This allowed for the older children to sexually abuse their two younger sisters. Quitugua knew of this
problem, but failed to address it. The children had behavioral problems; two of them had sexually abused their younger
sisters, two of them suffered from oppositional defiant disorder and attention deficit disorder, and another child
suffered from depression. Quitugua had diabetes and was not able to keep a steady job. Further, she remained in the
company of her boyfriend, Gill Jackson, thus exposing the children to a man who drank and had abused Quitugua and
one of the children. Jackson was subject to the family-service plan, but did not complete it.
Therefore we find there was sufficient evidence to enable the trial court as the fact-finder to determine by clear and
convincing evidence that Quitugua knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or
surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001(1)(D) (Vernon
1996 & Supp. 2001).
Best Interest Of The Children
In deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to support the court's ruling that termination would be in the children's
best interest we apply the non-exclusive factors found in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976). Some of
those factors, pertinent to the evidence presented in this case are: (1) the emotional and physical needs of the children
now and in the future; (2) the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future; (3) the parental
abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (4) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best
interest of the children; (5) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (6) the acts or omissions of the parent
which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (7) any excuse for the acts or
omissions of the parent. Id. at 371-72.
Here the evidence showed that: (1) Quitugua failed to provide suitable housing for her children; (2) failed to supervise
her children; (3) that the older siblings had sexually abused their younger sisters; (4) that the children had behavioral
problems; (5) that due to Quitugua's failure to leave her boyfriend the children were exposed to a violent relationship;
(6) Quitugua's boyfriend abused one of the children, and (7) TDPRS offered services to Quitugua, but she failed to
complete the family service plan. There was nothing to show that Quitugua's behavior or her conditions were likely to
improve to the point where she could adequately care for five children with behavioral problems. Applying the Holley
factors to these facts there was sufficient evidence under the clear and convincing standard for the trial court to
conclude that termination was in the children's best interest. Accordingly we overrule issue one.
2. Motion For New Trial.
By her second issue Quitugua complains that the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial. A trial court's
decision to deny a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Director, State Employees Workers'
Compensation Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 270-71 (Tex. 1994). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court
acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, when the trial court's act was arbitrary or
unreasonable. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990).
Quitugua filed a motion for new trial, alleging that (1) trial counsel failed to call a witness who was present at the time
of trial, and (2) failed to issue subpoenas for other witnesses. She did not attach any affidavits to the motion. She was
the only witness to testify at the new-trial hearing and stated that one month before trial she gave trial counsel the
names and addresses of three persons whom she wanted subpoenaed. These persons were a librarian, a manager of a
local soup kitchen, and Gill Jackson, her boyfriend. According to Quitugua these witnesses would have testified about
the circumstances surrounding her children. However she did not testify about what these witnesses would have
specifically testified to, which would have had some effect on the trial court's decision to terminate her parental rights.
She merely stated that these witnesses knew about the situation with her children. These witnesses did not testify at the
new-trial hearing. Jackson was present for the trial, but had to be removed because he appeared intoxicated. There is
no new evidence that became available after the trial. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion for new trial. We overrule issue two.
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We AFFIRM the trial court's judgment.
J. BONNER DORSEY,
Justice
Do not publish .
Tex. R. App. P. 47.3(b).
Opinion delivered and filed
this 6th day of December, 2001.
1. The trial court has previously terminated the father's parental rights to all five children.
2. TDPRS offered services to Jackson because he and Quitugua were a couple and had been together for several years.
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