James R. Jackson, d/b/a Fossil Rim Ranch v. Charles L. Dooley and Lady Kathryn Dooley, d/b/a White Rock Ranch--Appeal from 18th District Court of Johnson County

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 10th District Court of Appeals » 1992 » James R. Jackson, d/b/a Fossil Rim Ranch v. Charles L. Dooley and Lady Kathryn Dooley, d/b/a White Rock Ranch--Appeal from 18th District Court of Johnson County

State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 10-91-00002-CV

Case Date: 06/17/1992

Plaintiff: James R. Jackson, d/b/a Fossil Rim Ranch

Defendant: Charles L. Dooley and Lady Kathryn Dooley, d/b/a White Rock Ranch--Appeal from 18th District Court

Preview:James R. Jackson, d/b/a Fossil Rim Ranch v. Charles L.
Dooley and Lady Kathryn Dooley, d/b/a White Rock
Ranch--Appeal from 18th District Court of Johnson
County
IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-91-002-CV
JAMES R. JACKSON, D/B/A FOSSIL RIM RANCH,
Appellant
v.
CHARLES L. DOOLEY AND LADY KATHRYN DOOLEY,
D/B/A WHITE ROCK RANCH,
Appellees
From the 18th District Court
Johnson County, Texas
Trial Court # 203-89
O P I N I O N
On July 15, 1988, James R. Jackson, doing business as Fossil Rim Ranch, contracted to sell his entire 1988 "hatch" of
ostrich chicks to Charles L. Dooley and Lady Kathryn Dooley, doing business as White Rock Ranch. The Dooleys
agreed to pay $1500 for each acceptable ostrich, and Jackson agreed to make the chicks available on a monthly basis
as they reached four months of age. On December 1, while taking delivery of twelve ostrich chicks, Charles Dooley
also purchased a twelve- to fifteen-month-old deformed ostrich, which Jackson's employees had sexed as a female, for
$2500.
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On June 6, 1989, Jackson sued the Dooleys for breach of contract, alleging that they had failed to pay a balance of
$31,000 due on the contract to purchase the 1988 hatch. On December 5, the Dooleys counterclaimed for fraud,
constructive fraud, negligence, and deceptive trade practices, alleging that they had suffered damages as a result of
Jackson's misrepresentation of the sex of the deformed ostrich sold to Charles Dooley in December 1988. On
December 13, the court entered an interlocutory summary judgment awarding Jackson $28,500 on his breach of
contract claim against the Dooleys. During the non-jury trial on the Dooleys' counterclaim, the Dooleys abandoned the
fraud causes of action. The court entered judgment awarding the Dooleys $29,000 on their counterclaim, offset by the
$28,500 previously awarded to Jackson. The trial court also awarded the Dooleys $1000 as additional damages // plus
attorney's fees. We reverse the judgment of the trial court on the Dooleys' counterclaim, render judgment that the
Dooleys take nothing, and render judgment in favor of Jackson for $28,500, plus his reasonable attorney's fees, as
stipulated by the parties, and the court costs paid by Jackson.
The trial court made a number of findings of fact that neither party challenges by point of error. These findings are,
therefore, binding on this court. // The trial court found that the Dooleys paid all sums due under the contract except for
$28,500. The court also found that on December 1, 1988, the Dooleys agreed to buy and Fossil Rim agreed to sell "one
certain female ostrich" for $2500; that Fossil Rim delivered to the Dooleys a male ostrich instead; that Fossil Rim
represented to the Dooleys that it had sexed the ostrich as a female; that Fossil Rim's representation regarding the sex
of the ostrich was false; that Fossil Rim's representation was negligently made; that the Dooleys relied upon Fossil
Rim's representation; and that the Dooleys learned the ostrich was a male in January 1989 and notified Fossil Rim in
February 1989. Finally, the court found that the value of a female ostrich at the time of purchase was $2500.
In points of error one, four, and five, Jackson complains that the court erred in concluding that the Dooleys were
damaged in the amount of $29,000 and that there is legally or, in the alternative, factually insufficient evidence to
support such a finding of fact. When a complete statement of facts appears in the appellate record, the trial court's fact
findings that are challenged on appeal are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence by the same
standards that are applied in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting jury findings. // In a no-evidence
point, only the evidence and inferences that support the challenged finding will be considered, and all contrary
evidence and inferences will be disregarded. // In a factual-sufficiency point, all of the evidence will be considered and
the finding will be set aside only if the evidence is so weak or the finding so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. //
Charles Dooley testified that Bruce Williams, the director of the wildlife center at Fossil Rim Ranch, did not want to
sell the deformed ostrich because it obviously had crooked toes. He also admitted that they still owed Jackson $31,000.
The Dooleys called Dale Cootey to testify as an expert ostrich producer and broker. Cootey testified, over Jackson's
objection, that at the time of trial a two- to two-and-a-half-year-old female, assuming the ostrich was fine, would be
worth $25,000 to $30,000. Cootey also testified that a two-and-a-half-year-old male ostrich that is normal, good, and
salable would be worth $10,000 to $12,000. Cootey, who examined the deformed ostrich three weeks before the trial,
attributed its extremely defective feet to genetic problems. According to Cootey, a male in that condition would be
worth absolutely nothing. Although he testified that, because of the implications, he would not want a female ostrich
with extremely defective feet, Cootey never provided any evidence on the value of a deformed female ostrich of any
age.
David Owen, a veterinarian, testified that he would not purchase a genetically defective ostrich for breeding. He also
testified that, although the common practice was to replace a missexed ostrich with a female of the same age, he would
not replace the deformed male ostrich with a normal female ostrich because the Dooleys purchased the deformed
ostrich at a discount. According to Owen, a one-year-old female ostrich that was in good shape in December 1988
would have been worth $8000 to $10,000, maybe $11,000.
Bruce Williams testified that he told Charles Dooley before December 1988 that they were not interested in selling the
deformed ostrich because they could not speculate how its foot problems might affect it in the future. Rodney Marsh,
the animal care specialist at Fossil Rim Ranch, also testified that, because of some problems with its feet, they did not
want to sell the deformed ostrich to Charles Dooley. According to Marsh, a twelve- to fifteen-month-old male ostrich
with deformed feet was worth $1500 to $3000 on December 1, 1988. He also testified that a twelve- to fifteen-month-
old female ostrich in the same condition was worth $2500 on December 1, 1988. Finally, Jackson testified that, if he
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had been informed in February 1989 that the bird had been missexed, he would have offered to refund the purchase
price or credit the Dooleys' account $2500.
The dispositive issue in this case is the correct measure of damages. In a DTPA case, the consumer is entitled to actual
damages. // The Supreme Court has defined actual damages as those recoverable at common law. // Under common
law, there are two measures of damages for misrepresentation: (1) the "benefit of the bargain" measure, which is the
difference between the value as represented and the value actually received; and (2) the "out of pocket" measure,
which is the difference between the value of that which was parted with and the value of that which was received. //
The Dooleys burden of proof in this case was to show either the difference between the value of the ostrich as it was
represented (deformed female) and the value of the ostrich as delivered (deformed male); or the difference in value
between that with which they parted ($2500 charged to their account) and that which they received (a deformed male
ostrich). // The DTPA permits a consumer to recover either "benefit of the bargain" or "out of pocket" damages,
whichever is greater. //
The evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding, under the "benefit of the bargain" measure of damages, that
the Dooleys were damaged in the amount of $29,000. The only evidence on the value of the ostrich as it was
represented was Marsh's testimony that a twelve- to fifteen-month-old female ostrich with deformed feet was worth
$2500 on December 1, 1988. The only evidence on the value of the ostrich as delivered was Marsh's testimony that a
twelve- to fifteen-month-old male ostrich with deformed feet was worth $1500 to $3000 on December 1, 1988, and
Cootey's testimony that, at the time of trial, a male ostrich with extremely defective feet would be worth absolutely
nothing. Considering only the evidence that supports the court's finding, we hold that there is no evidence to support
"benefit of the bargain" damages greater than $2500 (the difference between $2500 and $0).
Likewise, the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding, under the "out of pocket" measure of damages, that
the Dooleys were damaged in the amount of $29,000. The parties stipulated that the Dooleys purchased the ostrich
from Jackson for $2500. Therefore, the value of that with which they parted was $2500. Again, the only evidence on
the value of that which they received was Marsh's testimony that a twelve- to fifteen-month-old male ostrich with
deformed feet was worth $1500 to $3000 on December 1, 1988, and Cootey's testimony that, at the time of trial, a male
ostrich with extremely defective feet would be worth absolutely nothing. Considering only the evidence that supports
the court's finding, we hold that there is no evidence to support "out of pocket" damages greater than $2500 (the
difference between $2500 and $0). Because there is no evidence that the Dooleys were damaged in the amount of
$29,000, we sustain point of error four.
Because the court erred in concluding that the Dooleys were damaged in the amount of $29,000, we also sustain point
of error one. As a result, we reverse the court's judgment on the Dooleys' counterclaim and render judgment that the
Dooleys take nothing. However, the court's judgment awarding Jackson $28,500 in damages (the difference between
the $31,000 balance due on the contract and $2500 in damages awarded to the Dooleys) is supported by the evidence
under either measure of damages and is not challenged by either party on appeal. Therefore we affirm the court's award
of $28,500 in damages to Jackson for the Dooleys' breach of contract.
In points thirty-four through forty, Jackson complains that the court erred in failing to render judgment for his
reasonable attorney's fees, as stipulated by the parties, and the court costs paid by Jackson. Section 38.001 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that "[a] person may recover reasonable attorney's fees from an individual
or corporation, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for . . . an oral or written contract."
// The Dooleys argue that Jackson failed to satisfy the procedure for recovery of attorney's fees, as provided by section
38.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. // The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to plead and prove
that presentment of a contract claim was made to the defendants and that the defendants failed to pay within thirty
days after the claim was presented. // Jackson's petition specifically alleged that: "Plaintiff has demanded payment
from the Defendants, but despite such demand, Defendants continue to refuse to pay the amount due and owing." In
Nettles v. Del Lingco of Houston, the court held that the plaintiff's pleading, "that demand has been made therefore
and payment refused," was insufficient to sustain a claim for attorney's fees. // However, in Paramount Pipe & Supply
Co., Inc. v. Muhr, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that, although similar pleadings would have been subject to
attack by special exception, the petition gave the defendants notice that the plaintiff was seeking recovery of attorneys
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fees. // Therefore, we find that Jackson has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving his presentment of the contract
claim and the Dooleys' failure to pay within thirty days after presentment.
The award of reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff recovering on a valid claim founded on a written or oral contract,
preceded by proper presentment of the claim, is mandatory. // As in Caldwell, we hold that the court abused its
discretion in denying Jackson's attorney's fees entirely. // However, we need not remand the cause to the trial court for
determination of Jackson's reasonable attorney's fees because they were stipulated by the parties to be $10,189.69 for
trial, $5000 for appeal to this court, and $5000 for appeal to the Supreme Court. The transcript also reflects that $206
in court costs were paid by Jackson. Therefore, we sustain points thirty-four through forty and render judgment in
favor of Jackson for his reasonable attorney's fees, as stipulated by the parties, and the court costs paid by Jackson.
We do not reach Jackson's remaining points of error. We reverse the judgment of the trial court on the Dooleys'
counterclaim, render judgment that the Dooleys take nothing, and render judgment in favor of Jackson for $28,500,
plus reasonable attorney's fees of $10,189.69 for trial, $5000 for appeal to this court, and $5000 for appeal to the
Supreme Court, and court costs in the amount of $206.
BOBBY L. CUMMINGS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Thomas,
Justice Cummings, and
Justice Vance
Reversed and rendered
Opinion delivered and filed June 17, 1992
Do not publish
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