Lloyd Mark Sutton (a/k/a Mark Sutton) v. Lloyd P. Sutton, Daniel C. Sutton, Paula L. White, and Bob Day--Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 of Wichita County

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 2nd District Court of Appeals » 2005 » Lloyd Mark Sutton (a/k/a Mark Sutton) v. Lloyd P. Sutton, Daniel C. Sutton, Paula L. White, and Bob Day--Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 of Wichita County

State: Texas

Court: Criminal Court of Appeals

Docket No: 02-05-00052-CV

Case Date: 08/18/2005

Plaintiff: ROBERT GAVLIK

Defendant: RAYMOND BYRD--Appeal from 214th District Court of Nueces County

Preview:Ex Parte Arturo Solis--Appeal from County Court at Law No 1 of Bexar County
MEMORANDUM OPINION Nos. 04-03-00410-CR, 04-03-00411-CR, and 04-03-00412-CR EX PARTE Arturo SOLIS From the County Court at Law No. 1, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 387220/2360-W, 359466/2361-W, and 388056/2362-W Honorable Al Alonso, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice Sitting: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice Delivered and Filed: February 4, 2004 AFFIRMED Arturo Solis pled guilty to and was convicted of three misdemeanor offenses. He later filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in each case, alleging that no information or valid complaint had been filed with the county clerk before the prosecutions commenced; consequently, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction. The trial court took judicial notice of its own files in the misdemeanor cases, found that each contains a timely-filed complaint and information, and denied relief. Solis appeals. We affirm. 1. Solis first complains he was denied due process because the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing before denying relief. Solis contends a hearing was "required by law under the verified averments made in [his] application for a writ of habeas corpus and [his] claim that the 'information[s]' were forged and fraudulent." We disagree. Solis did not allege in his applications for writs of habeas corpus the informations contained in the court's files were "forged and fraudulent"; in fact Solis did not urge this contention until after the trial court denied relief. The issue was therefore not before the court when it determined no evidentiary hearing was necessary and ruled on the merits of the applications. The only allegations in Solis's applications were that no informations were filed and that the complaints were facially insufficient. Because these claims were determinable by reference to the trial court's records alone, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the applications without an evidentiary hearing. See Ex parte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 573-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (evidentiary hearing is required in habeas proceeding only if necessary to decide material, controverted, previously unresolved issues of fact); see also Reyes v. State, 849 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that "hearing is not required when the matters raised in the motion for new trial are subject to being determined from the record"); Cravin v. State, 95 S.W.3d 506, 510-11 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that trial court may rule on post-conviction motion for DNA testing based solely on motion and State's response; due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require either defendant's presence before the court or evidentiary hearing). 2. Solis next contends the trial judge could not take judicial notice of the documents in the court's records because he did not hear the underlying cases. We disagree. A court may take notice of its own records rendered in cases involving the same parties and subject matter. Baumert v. State, 709 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Hokr v. State, 545 S.W.2d 463, 465-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ex parte Terwillinger, 231 S.W.2d 447, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950). Solis' applications for writs of habeas corpus were filed as ancillary proceedings in the same court and under the same cause numbers as the underlying criminal cases. And, although the presiding judge of the court changed after Solis was convicted, the applications were ruled on by the presiding judge of that court.
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/opinions/PDFs1/16856.html[8/20/2013 7:43:35 PM]

3. Solis next contends that the complaints are insufficient to support the informations. His theory appears to be that the complaint affidavit supporting the information must, as a matter of law, be a different document than the affidavit filed in support of an arrest warrant. We again disagree. "[I]f the affidavit [for warrant of arrest] meets the statutory requirements of a complaint, ... the law has been fulfilled." Green v. State, 736 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.). Moreover, Solis was required to object to any formal or substantive defect in the complaints before trial commenced; the objection may not be raised in a post-conviction proceeding. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 1.14(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003); Nam Hoai Le v. State, 963 S.W.2d 838, 843 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. ref'd). Although labeled "Affidavit for Warrant of Arrest," each complaint complies with the requirements of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure for a complaint in support of an information; each was filed with the corresponding information; and each is valid on its face. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 15.04, 15.05 (Vernon 1977); art. 21.22 (Vernon 1989); Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663, 664-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Naff v. State, 946 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no pet.). 4. Finally, Solis contends the informations on file are "forged and fabricated" and did not vest the trial court with jurisdiction. Because Solis did not raise this issue in his applications for writs of habeas corpus and it was not addressed by the trial court, it has not been preserved for review. See Ex parte Tucker, 977 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998), pet. dismissed, 3 S.W.3d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (per curiam); Ex parte Torres, 941 S.W.2d 219, 220 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, pet. ref'd.). Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the order denying relief. See Ex parte Nagle, 48 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.). Sarah B. Duncan, Justice Do not publish

file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/opinions/PDFs1/16856.html[8/20/2013 7:43:35 PM]

Download 16856.pdf