Maria Isabel Martinez v. Daniel Ruel Martinez--Appeal from 328th District Court of Fort Bend County

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 14th District Court of Appeals » 2004 » Maria Isabel Martinez v. Daniel Ruel Martinez--Appeal from 328th District Court of Fort Bend County

State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 14-03-01447-CV

Case Date: 11/30/2004

Plaintiff: Maria Isabel Martinez

Defendant: Daniel Ruel Martinez--Appeal from 328th District Court of Fort Bend County

Preview:Minh Thu Tran, Norman L. Roser & Washington
Mutual Bank v. William Macha & Nita Macha--Appeal
from 164th District Court of Harris County
Opinion issued April 1, 2004
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-03-00126-CV
MINH THU TRAN, NORMAN L. ROSER, AND WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA, Appellants
V.
WILLIAM MACHA AND NITA MACHA, Appellees
On Appeal from the 164th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2001-43727
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal of a jury s finding that a 20-foot strip of property belongs to plaintiffs/appellees William and Nita
Macha because they were in privity with the property s previous owner who had acquired that strip of land via adverse
possession.
In two points of error, defendants/appellants Minh Thu Tran, Norman L. Roser, and Washington Mutual Bank, FA
contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding of adverse possession. We affirm.
Factual & Procedural Background
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The disputed property is part of a West University subdivision originally developed and platted in the late 1920s. The
lots on the block in question were all intended to be 50 to 55 feet wide. When the lots were staked, however, they
were staked so that the intended houses themselves would be located 50 feet apart from one another. This mistake
ultimately led to lot 5 s being 70 feet wide instead of 50 feet wide. The extra 20 feet of land were thought to lie on the
east side of the house that was eventually built on lot 5 and were thought to belong to lot 5 s owner. Actually, the extra
20 feet lay on the west side of the house built on lot 5. At some point in the 1940s, the original owners of lot 5 built a
home and a garage, inadvertently locating the garage and driveway on part of lot 6, as well as on lot 5.
In 1970, the Halliburton family bought lot 5 (4136 Case street). At that time, the Budde family, which was related to
the Halliburton family, had been living in the home on lot 6 (4132 Case street) for about 15 years. The Buddes and the
Halliburtons both treated the garage and driveway as belonging to the Halliburtons. The Halliburtons used this
driveway and garage for their cars for over 20 years, until Lillian Halliburton stopped driving. At that point, she moved
her washer and dryer into the garage. Pictures of the adjacent lots show that the Buddes built their own garage and
driveway on the east side of their lot, just a few feet away from the Halliburtons driveway. Relations between the two
families and their neighbors were always cordial through the years. //
In 1989, the Machas bought the house on lot 4 and have lived there ever since. In 1995, Tran and her husband, Roser,
bought the Budde family home on lot 6. They lived there for several years, then moved into a nearby house. They
intended to tear down the house on lot 6 and build a new house there. In the interim, they rented the house to tenants.
The Machas and Tran and Roser were friends, as well as neighbors, and discussed jointly buying lot 5 from the
Halliburtons and splitting the property so that they would own contiguous extra-large lots. For reasons that are not
clear from the record, Roser and Tran apparently withdrew from the deal and the Machas purchased lot 5 from Lillian
Halliburton in May 2001 without Roser s and Tran s participation. The property disclosure form prepared in
anticipation of the sale of lot 5 from the Halliburtons to the Machas indicates that the lot included a free-standing
garage in tear-down condition.
When the Machas obtained a survey before buying lot 5, they discovered that lot 5 did not conform to the official
platted boundary lines. Therefore, in addition to securing a general warranty deed conveying all of lot 5 from Lillian
Halliburton, the Machas secured a quitclaim deed conveying any interest in the western 20-foot portion of lot 6 that
Halliburton might have acquired by adverse possession.
Soon thereafter, the Machas put lot 5 on the market. Because of the additional width of the property, its value
increased by half, from roughly $200,000 to $300,000. At about the same time, Roser received a letter from the City of
West University informing him that the garage serving the house built on lot 5 was a hazard and, as the owner/taxpayer
of lot 6, he needed to demolish or repair the garage. When they discovered that the garage and driveway everyone had
thought was part of lot 5 was actually part of their lot lot 6 Roser and Tran laid claim to it, obtained a fence permit
from West University, and fenced it off.
The Machas filed a trespass to try title suit; they sought a temporary restraining order to prevent Roser and Tran from
tearing down the garage, and they sought to remove the new fence. Pending a legal resolution of the dispute, the
Machas took lot 5 off the market. Roser and Tran counterclaimed, seeking declaratory relief and removal of cloud on
their title.
The jury was asked only one question:
Have WILLIAM MACHA and NITA MACHA and their predecessors in privity of estate under whom they claim held
the Property in question in peaceable and adverse possession and cultivated, used or enjoyed the Property in question
for any period of at least ten years prior to August 24, 2001?
PRIVITY OF ESTATE means a transfer and delivery of possession from one possessor to the next.
PROPERTY means the westerly twenty feet of Lot 6, Block 26, Colonial Terrace, Section C, an Addition in Harris
County, Texas.
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PEACEABLE POSSESSION means possession of real property that is continuous and not interrupted by a lawsuit to
recover the property.
ADVERSE POSSESSION means an actual and visible appropriation of real property, commenced and continued
under a claim of right that is inconsistent with and is hostile to the claim of another person.
The jury unanimously answered, Yes. The trial court awarded full title and possession to the Machas, and the parties
bore their own attorney s fees. Roser and Tran filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial
court denied, and a motion for new trial that was overruled by operation of law.
Analysis
In two related points of error, Roser and Tran contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support
the jury s finding that the Machas adversely possessed part of lot 6. //
Standard of Review
In a no-evidence, legal sufficiency review, we must consider only the evidence and inferences from evidence that
support the trial court s findings and must disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Heldenfels Bros. Inc.
v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992). In a factual sufficiency review, we will set aside the verdict
only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain,
709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
Adverse Possession
Adverse possession is defined as an actual and visible appropriation of real property, commenced and continued under
a claim of right that is inconsistent with and is hostile to the claim of another person. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. 16.021(1) (Vernon 2002); Rhodes v. Cahill, 802 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. 1990). A person must bring suit no later
than 10 years after the day the cause of action accrues to recover real property held in peaceable and adverse
possession by another who cultivates, uses, or enjoys the property. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 16.026 (Vernon
2002). In other words, if the Halliburtons adversely possessed the disputed strip of property, then the Machas possess
it because they are in privity with the Halliburtons.
It is simply not disputed that everyone believed the Halliburtons owned the garage and driveway that were built in part
on lot 6, which they did not own and on which they did not pay taxes, and used the garage and driveway continuously
for at least 15 years. This fact alone constitutes legally and factually sufficient evidence to sustain the jury s finding.
The crux of Roser and Tran s challenge, both at trial and on appeal, rests on a fundamentally incorrect interpretation of
the law of adverse possession. As they define adverse possession, the possession here could not have been adverse
because it was not hostile, i.e., the possession of the 20-foot strip was accidental, not intentional, and relations between
the Halliburtons and the Buddes at the time the land was being adversely possessed were harmonious and cordial.
The true meaning of hostile in the context of adverse possession refers to whether the claim is inconsistent with the
rights of the true owner, not to whether the parties themselves are hostile to one another personally. See Taub v.
Houston Pipeline Co., 75 S.W.3d 606, 625 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (noting that claim is hostile when
acts performed by claimant and use made of land are of nature and character that would reasonably notify true owner
of adverse claim). There is no authority to suggest a meaning other than this, nor is there any legal requirement that
personal animosity be present.
The law is also well settled that adverse possession need not be intentional, so long as it is visible, open, and notorious.
See Calfee v. Duke, 544 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. 1976) (holding that claim of adverse possession not defeated by
claimant s lack of knowledge that there could be other claimants for the land); accord King v. Inwood N. Assocs., 563
S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ) (noting fact that adverse possessors mistaken belief that
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they owned land in controversy did not defeat claim). Both the garage and the driveway constituted an entirely visible
use of lot 6 from the time they were mistakenly built on part of 6, and were used continually for more than 10 years.
However unintentional, this open and continuous use of 20 feet of lot 6 for more than 10 years by the owners of lot 5
in ways inconsistent with the use and enjoyment of the 20-foot strip by the true owners, as if that portion of lot 6
belonged to the owners of lot 5, satisfies the definition of adverse possession. Accordingly, we overrule both points of
error.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Jennings, and Keyes.
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