Martinez, John Michael v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 338th District Court of Harris County

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 14th District Court of Appeals » 2002 » Martinez, John Michael v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 338th District Court of Harris County

State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 14-01-01092-CR

Case Date: 12/31/2002

Plaintiff: Martinez, John Michael

Defendant: The State of Texas--Appeal from 338th District Court of Harris County

Preview:Wischnewsky, James Alan v. The State of Texas-Appeal from 179th District Court of Harris County
Opinion issued May 9, 2002

In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas

NO. 01-01-01094-CR ____________

JAMES ALLAN WISCHNEWSKY, Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 179th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 873504

O P I N I O N A jury found appellant, James Allan Wischnewsky, guilty of the second degree felony offense of possession of cocaine weighing more than four grams but less than 200 grams. After appellant pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs, the trial court assessed his punishment at 30 years in prison. In his sole point of error, appellant contends the evidence was factually insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm. Background Harris County Sheriff's Deputy Lewis testified that, at approximately 2:20 a.m. on April 4, 2001, while on patrol, he saw appellant driving a sport utility vehicle (SUV) in the second inner-most lane of traffic of Interstate 45 in Houston. He saw the SUV abruptly leave this lane, cross over to the far right lane, cutting off the path of another car, and exit

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the freeway. After exiting, the SUV traveled to the right, across two lanes of the service road, and entered a parking lot in front of a bar. The SUV briefly stopped, and a woman standing in front of the bar approached the SUV and got in on the passenger side. Deputy Lewis activated his emergency lights after appellant drove the SUV from the front of the bar to a more open location in the parking lot. Appellant stopped and immediately got out of the SUV. Lewis quickly got out of his patrol car and, for safety reasons, took appellant to the back of his patrol car and conducted a pat-down search. Lewis felt a bulge in the right front pocket of appellant's pants and, fearing that it might be a weapon, removed the object. The object was a knife, contained in a dark gray bag. The dark gray bag also held several clear plastic bags and a chunky white substance, which Lewis believed to be cocaine. Lewis removed the knife from the bag and placed both the bag and the knife on the trunk of his patrol car. As Lewis handcuffed appellant, he heard a door open and close on the far side of the SUV. Lewis secured appellant in the backseat of his patrol car, and a woman, later identified as Melissa White, came around the back of the SUV. Lewis brought White to the rear of the patrol car and conducted a pat-down search. While searching White, Lewis heard another door of the SUV open and close. Lewis left White at the rear of the patrol car to meet the third person exiting the SUV. As Lewis detained the third person, later identified as "Farmer" Thompson, White began running through the parking lot. Lewis then noticed that the items he had seized from appellant were missing from the trunk of the patrol car. Lewis chased White, caught her, and handcuffed her. The gray bag containing the white substance was found in her possession; however, the knife was missing. Carolyn Declouette, a forensic chemist with the Harris County Medical Examiner's Office, testified that she determined the white substance found in the gray bag was 6.7 grams of cocaine. White testified that she had known appellant for approximately four months at the time of the incident. She stated that she, appellant and Farmer Thompson were together at the bar, and she "did not see drugs on [appellant] that night." She saw Thompson with the bag and suspected it contained drugs because he frequently excused himself to go to the restroom. White further testified that she walked directly from the bar to the patrol car without entering the SUV. She stated that appellant was already in the back seat of the patrol car when she approached Deputy Lewis. She said she gave Lewis her driver's license, told him she was the owner of the SUV, and saw Lewis place her license on top of the gray bag on the trunk. White conceded that when Lewis began walking back towards the SUV, she grabbed the items sitting on the trunk of the patrol car and began running. White said she held her driver's license, her wallet and the gray bag in her hand when she ran. White claimed she lost her wallet while running and dropped the gray bag when Deputy Lewis "tackled" her. White said the cocaine in the bag was not hers. Appellant did not testify. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his sole issue, appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, appellant asserts his cooperative behavior and White's furtive behavior are inconsistent with his knowingly possessing the cocaine. Appellant claims he did not know the bag contained cocaine and the evidence presented undermines the accuracy of the jury's finding. Under the factual sufficiency standard, we ask "whether a neutral review of all of the evidence both for and against the finding, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof." King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Howley v. State, 943 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). We will reverse the fact finder's determination only if a manifest injustice has occurred. King, 29 S.W.3d at 562. In conducting this analysis, we may disagree with the jury's determination, even if probative evidence supports the verdict, but must also avoid substituting our judgment for that of the fact finder. Id. Appellant contends his behavior was inconsistent with a person possessing cocaine. He contends that he was
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cooperative and there is no evidence he made any furtive gestures. He claims the actions of White and Farmer Thompson are more consistent with knowingly possessing cocaine. He contends that "White behaved like somebody whose drugs were about to get somebody else, and eventually her, into trouble." Deputy Lewis testified that, while conducting a pat-down search of appellant, he felt an object in the right front pocket of appellant's pants. Fearing it might be a weapon, Lewis removed the object and placed it on the trunk of the patrol car. The object was a knife, which was inside a dark gray bag along with several clear plastic bags and a white chalky substance, later determined to be 6.7 grams of cocaine. To establish unlawful possession of cocaine, the evidence must be sufficient to show the accused knowingly exercised care, control, or management over the controlled substance, was conscious of his connection with it, and knew what it was. Tex. Health & Safety Code 481.002(38), 481.115 (Vernon 1992 & Vernon Supp. 2002); Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 6.01(b) (Vernon 1994). Evidence which affirmatively links the accused to the controlled substance suffices for proof that he possessed it knowingly. Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 748. The evidence used to satisfy these elements can be direct or circumstantial. Id. Whether direct or circumstantial evidence is used, the State must establish that the accused's connection with the substance was more than just fortuitous. Id. If the contraband is not found on the accused's person or the accused was not in exclusive control over the place where the drugs were found, the State must show affirmative links between the accused and the drugs. McMillon v. State, 940 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd). The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and the fact finder may believe or disbelieve any or all of the testimony of the witnesses. Williams v. State, 692 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Here, the State presented direct evidence that the cocaine was found on appellant's person and under his exclusive control. No testimony was presented to rebut this evidence. The jury was free to infer from this evidence that appellant knowingly possessed the cocaine. Thus, the jury's finding was not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. King, 29 S.W.3d at 563. We hold the evidence was factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for possession of cocaine. We overrule appellant's sole issue. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Terry Jennings Justice

Panel consists of Justices Mirabal, Hedges, and Jennings. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.

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