Michael Warner v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 299th District Court of Travis County

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 3rd District Court of Appeals » 1997 » Michael Warner v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 299th District Court of Travis County

State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 03-95-00371-CR

Case Date: 05/08/1997

Plaintiff: Mr. and Mrs. Danny Morse, Individually and as Next Friend of April Diane Morse, a Minor

Defendant: Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A., Yamaha Motor Company, LTD., and Texas Yamaha, Inc.--Appeal from 1

Preview:Mr. and Mrs. Danny Morse, Individually and as Next
Friend of April Diane Morse, a Minor v. Yamaha Motor
Corporation, U.S.A., Yamaha Motor Company, LTD.,
and Texas Yamaha, Inc.--Appeal from 151st District
Court of Harris County
Morse v. Yamaha /**/
IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-93-119-CV
MR. AND MRS. DANNY MORSE, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS NEXT FRIEND OF APRIL DIANE MORSE, A MINOR,
Appellants
v.
YAMAHA MOTOR CORPORATION, U.S.A., YAMAHA MOTOR
COMPANY, LTD., AND TEXAS YAMAHA, INC.,
Appellees
From the 151st District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court # 91-55822
O P I N I O N
Mr. and Mrs. Danny Morse and their daughter, April, are appealing a take-nothing judgment in favor of Yamaha
Motor Corporation, U.S.A., Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd, and Texas Yamaha, Inc. ("Yamaha"). The Morses sued
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Yamaha after April broke her back when a Yamaha WaveRunner exploded while she was attempting to restart it. They
allege that Yamaha defectively designed the watercraft because it did not provide for powered ventilation of the engine
compartment. The court admitted evidence of ten other incidents in which WaveRunners exploded. However, it
admitted the evidence with a limiting instruction that allowed the jury to consider the other occurrences only as
evidence of notice to Yamaha of a defect but not as evidence of a design defect in this case. We hold that the court
improperly limited the evidence just to notice, and reverse and remand.
THE EXPLOSION
April Morse and her friend, Angel Leger, were riding a WaveRunner at a lake. They fell off the watercraft twice when
it capsized but were able to restart it. However, when it capsized a third time, they were unable to restart it as
previously. April pressed the starter button several times. At first, Angel could hear the engine turning over, but the
engine sound stopped. When April pushed the starter button again, the WaveRunner exploded. April, age sixteen,
suffered compression fractures of several vertebrae in her back. She was hospitalized for a week and had to wear a
back brace for two and a half months.
OTHER OCCURRENCES
In product-liability cases, evidence of other incidents involving the same product can be admissible on a number of
determinative issues, if the prior incidents occurred under reasonably similar but not necessarily identical
circumstances to that involving the plaintiff. John Deere Co. v. May, 773 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Tex. App. Waco 1989, writ
denied); McInnes v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 659 S.W.2d 704, 710 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi, 1983), aff'd on
other grounds, 673 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. 1984). The requisite degree of similarity is not high. McInnes, 659 S.W.2d at
710. Extraneous incidents can be relevant to notice, producing cause, and defective design. See John Deere Co., 773
S.W.2d at 372 (collected authorities). The other occurrences were admissible not only as evidence of notice to Yamaha
but as relevant evidence of a design defect in this particular watercraft.
PRETRIAL RULINGS
During a pretrial hearing, the court considered Yamaha's objections to the admissibility of the other incidents.
Yamaha's objections were that the facts of the other occurrences were not substantially similar to the facts in this case.
As already noted, the court ruled during pretrial that exhibits relating to ten extraneous occurrences were admissible
and informed counsel that the evidence would be admitted with the following limiting instruction:
Counsel has introduced into evidence certain documents that reflect Yamaha customer information about WaveRunners
which may have exploded. You are instructed that this evidence may be considered for the limited purpose of the issue
of notice of any claimed defect and is not evidence of a defect in this case.
At the pretrial hearing the Morses objected to the court's limiting instruction and requested the following instruction:
Counsel has introduced into evidence certain documents that reflect Yamaha customer information about WaveRunners
which may have exploded. You are instructed that this evidence may be considered only for the limited purposes of
notice of any claimed defect and as some evidence of the existence of a defect in this case. You are the sole judges of
the weight to be given to this or any other evidence.
(Emphasis added). At the end of the pretrial hearing the court denied the Morses' requested instruction.
During the trial before the jury, the Morses offered into evidence exhibits relating to the ten other incidents. The court
admitted the evidence but, as indicated during pretrial, instructed the jury that "this evidence may be considered for the
limited purpose of the issue of notice of any claimed defect and is not evidence of a defect in this case." Yamaha did
not restate its objection to the evidence, and the Morses did not re-urge their objection to the limiting instruction or re-
request their own limiting instruction.
The jury failed to find a design defect and answered all of the liability questions against the Morses. Yamaha does not
complain on appeal that the extraneous incidents were improperly admitted or contend that the other occurrences are
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not admissible as relevant evidence of a design defect. Moreover, the Morses do not contend that the court improperly
excluded fourteen other incidents. The question on appeal is whether the court improperly limited the jury's
consideration of the ten other incidents just to notice and, if so, whether the error was reasonably calculated to result in
an improper judgment.
PRESERVING THE COMPLAINT
The Morses preserved their complaint for appellate review by timely objecting to the court's limiting instruction,
requesting a limiting instruction that, if given, would have properly allowed the jury to consider the evidence on notice
and design defect, and obtaining an adverse ruling on their requested instruction. See Tex. R. App. P. 52(a). Because
the court heard and ruled on Yamaha's objections to the admissibility of the extraneous occurrences in a hearing out of
the jury's presence, Yamaha was not required to object when the evidence was later offered and admitted at trial. See
id. 52(b). Nor, for that reason, did the Morses have to re-state their objection to the limiting instruction or re-request
and obtain an adverse ruling on their own limiting instruction.
Yamaha contends, however, that the Morses waived any complaint about the limiting instruction by representing to the
court at the pretrial hearing that the extraneous incidents were being offered only as evidence of notice of a defect.
According to Yamaha, the Morses could not make that representation and then attack the limiting instruction on the
ground that it limited the jury's consideration of the evidence to notice.
The Morses never represented to the court during the pretrial hearing that the other occurrences were admissible only
on notice, although notice was mentioned as a basis for their admission. Moreover, they clearly presented their
contention to the court at the pretrial hearing that the evidence was also admissible as evidence of a design defect.
They did so by a pretrial brief, an objection to the limiting instruction proposed by the court, and their own proposed
limiting instruction. The court acknowledged their argument in the pretrial brief by denying in writing the Morses'
requested limiting instruction. Thus, under the facts presented, we do not believe that equity now precludes the Morses
from asserting that the court's limiting instruction improperly limited the jury's consideration of the evidence.
ERROR AND HARM
The court erred when it limited the jury's consideration of the evidence to just notice. See John Deere Co., 773 S.W.2d
at 372. The liability issues were hard-fought between the parties, with credible evidence on both sides of each issue.
By unduly restricting the jury's consideration of the other occurrences to just notice, the court's error was reasonably
calculated to result, and probably did result, in an improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 81(b)(1).
We sustain points one through four, reverse the judgment, and remand the cause for a new trial. Point five was waived.
BOB L. THOMAS
Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Thomas,
Justice Cummings, and
Justice Vance
Reversed and remanded
Opinion delivered and filed March 23, 1994
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