Reyes, Manuel v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 337th District Court of Harris County

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State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 01-01-00937-CR

Case Date: 12/19/2002

Plaintiff: Reed, Courtney Scott

Defendant: The State of Texas--Appeal from 178th District Court of Harris County

Preview:Reyes, Manuel v. The State of Texas--Appeal from
337th District Court of Harris County
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-01-00937-CR
MANUEL REYES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 337th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 878354
O P I N I O N
Manuel Reyes, appellant, was charged by indictment with the felony offense of failing to comply with the sex offender
registration requirements from August 7, 2000 through October 8, 2000. Appellant pled not guilty, and a trial was held
before a jury, which found him guilty. The trial judge assessed punishment, enhanced by two prior felony convictions,
at confinement for 60 years. Appellant challenges the trial court s decision on three issues: (1) legal and (2) factual
insufficiency to support the jury s verdict, and (3) imposition of an illegal sentence because the punishment under the
sex offender registration laws is not subject to enhancement as a habitual offender under article 12.42(d) of the Texas
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Code of Criminal Procedure. We affirm.
Background
On June 25, 1993, appellant was convicted of indecency with a child, and sentenced to five years in prison. Appellant
was released from prison on February 25, 1998. Appellant was required to register with the local law enforcement
agency not later than the seventh day after the date on which he was released, pursuant to the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure article 62.03. On March 13, 1998, Dalia Hester, a Houston Police Officer assigned to the Sex Offender
Registration Unit of the juvenile division, met with appellant to fill out the sex offender registration form. The sex
offender registration form, which was signed by appellant, indicated that he understood all the requirements. The form
stated that verification was required annually. In 2000, the registration requirements were changed, making the
anniversary date for registration the person s date of birth. Act of May 26, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 444, section 6,
1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2827. Appellant did not register at all during 2000.
Discussion
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first two points of error, appellant argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to prove that he
was guilty of failing to register as a sex offender.
In reviewing the evidence on legal sufficiency grounds, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In reviewing the evidence on factual
sufficiency grounds, we ask whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding,
demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury s determination, or the
proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. Id. at 563. We must avoid
substituting our judgment for that of the fact finder. Id.
In this case, Officer Hester testified that she met with appellant to fill out the registration form as required by article
62.03. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Ann. art. 62.03 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Hester also testified that she notified
appellant that he was required to register once a year. Hester s testimony was supported by the information contained
in the sex offender registration form, which she filled out in appellant s presence on March 13, 1998. Appellant signed
this form, indicating that he had thoroughly reviewed the information provided prior to signing this form. The same
information and notification of annual registration was contained in the adult sex offender registration pre-release
notification form, which was also initialed by appellant.
Appellant argues that there was no evidence presented which showed appellant actually knew of the requirement to
report during the period alleged in the indictment and consequently no evidence that appellant s alleged failure to
register during that period was intentional or knowing. Appellant bases his argument on the fact that the registration
requirements changed in 2000, from the date on which the person first registered to the person s date of birth. See Act
of May 26, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 444, section 6, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2827. It is well settled that ignorance of the
law is not a defense to its violation. See Almanza v. State, 365 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963). The record
shows that appellant did not register at all during the year 2000 and that appellant did not comply with the statute
whether the registration was based on his first registration date or on his birth date.
We find, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, that a rational trier of fact could have
found that appellant did not intend to comply with the registration requirements under article 62.06(b). // Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.06(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Furthermore, we find that the evidence on this point was not so
weak as to undermine confidence in the jury s determination nor was it greatly outweighed by contrary proof. See
King, 29 S.W.3d at 563. We overrule appellant s first two points of error.
Punishment Enhancement
In his third point of error, appellant claims his sentence was illegal because the sex offender registration offense is not
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subject to enhancement under the habitual offender statute. Appellant was charged with a third degree felony under
article 62.10(a)(2). See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.10(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000). His punishment was
enhanced under the Texas Penal Code section 12.42(a)(3) by his prior felony convictions for burglary and aggravated
assault. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 12.42(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
Relying on State v. Mancuso, appellant claims that paragraph (c) of article 62.10 functions as an enhancement
provision, which precludes the application of any other enhancement provision to the offense. See State v. Mancuso,
919 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Mancuso dealt with a conflict between the general enhancement statute for state jail felonies and the general
enhancement for habitual felony offenders. In clearing up the conflict, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a non-
aggravated state jail felony could not be enhanced under the habitual offender enhancement statute. Id. at 89-90.
Paragraph (c) of article 62.10 is not a general punishment enhancement statute of the type addressed in Mancuso.
Rather, it is a specific provision that raises the punishment level of an article 62.10 offense when the defendant has
been previously convicted of an article 62.10 offense. As such, article 62.10(c) provides a very specific exception to
the general enhancement statute, but does not otherwise preclude the application of section 12.42. //
We hold that the enhancement of appellant s punishment under section 12.42 of the Texas Penal Code did not result in
an illegal sentence. We overrule appellant s third point of error.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sam Nuchia
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Jennings, and Radack.
Publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
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