Roberta West v. Sherry Laree Hamilton Proctor, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Clifford Hamilton--Appeal from 237th District Court of Lubbock County (Majority)

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 7th District Court of Appeals » 2011 » Roberta West v. Sherry Laree Hamilton Proctor, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Clifford Hamilton--Appeal from 237th District Court of Lubbock County (Majority)

State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 07-10-00484-CV

Case Date: 10/24/2011

Plaintiff: Roberta West

Defendant: Sherry Laree Hamilton Proctor, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Clifford Hamilton--Ap

Preview:NO. 07-10-00484-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL C OCTOBER 24, 2011

ROBERTA WEST, APPELLANT v. SHERRY LAREE HAMILTON PROCTOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF CLIFFORD HAMILTON, APPELLEE

FROM THE 237TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 2006-534,940; HONORABLE LESLIE HATCH, JUDGE

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

OPINION We overrule appellant's September 23, 2011 motion for rehearing. However, we withdraw the opinion issued in this cause on September 8, 2011, and substitute the following in its place. Appellant, Roberta West, appeals a take nothing judgment on her claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and for reformation of contract

asserted against appellee, Sherry Laree Hamilton Proctor, individually and as executrix of the estate of Clifford Hamilton.1 We will affirm. Background Hamilton was married to West's sister, Dee, and he and West had a close relationship. Throughout the 57 years of this relationship, Hamilton helped West with various legal and business transactions. As an example, Hamilton helped West get her land into the federal CRP program and helped advise her through two divorces. In 1999, Panhandle Brine contacted Hamilton about the possibility of obtaining a lease to extract salt water from West's property. Hamilton contacted West regarding this offer indicating that he thought that West could make good money from the lease. West told Hamilton to go ahead with the deal, and that she trusted him to negotiate it for her. Hamilton informed West that he wanted a fee for negotiating the lease. While West and Hamilton agreed that Hamilton would receive a fee under the lease, there was a wide disparity between the two regarding the amount of that fee. West believed that Hamilton would receive a one-time payment of fifteen percent of the first royalty payment. Hamilton believed West had agreed to his receiving a third of all royalty payments paid under the lease. On November 17, 1999, Hamilton called West to inform her that a representative of Panhandle Brine was there with the lease contract. West, Hamilton, and the

Panhandle Brine representative then went to a notary and West signed the lease. Even For purposes of clarity, references to "Proctor" will refer to Sherry Laree Hamilton Proctor, both individually and as appellee in this appeal, while references to "Hamilton" will refer to Clifford Hamilton.
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though this was the first time that she had seen the contract, West did not read it because she did not want to take up too much of the notary's time, and because she trusted Hamilton. A month or two after West signed the lease, she read it. While she did not understand much of the contract, she did notice that the contract provided that Hamilton would receive one-third of the royalty payments which were due on the 25th of each month. This provision was in clear conflict with West's understanding that Hamilton would receive a one-time payment of fifteen percent of her first royalty payment. West had trusted Hamilton to "do what was right" by her, but she did not feel like this change to the terms of the agreement "was doing what was right." However, West did not confront Hamilton or take any other action to rectify this discrepancy because she did not want to cause a conflict within the family. Under the terms of the lease, West received two-thirds and Hamilton received one-third of each monthly royalty payment for years without any objection raised by West. Finally, in 2006, West met with an attorney regarding the terms of the lease contract. During this meeting, West discovered that the lease included terms such as modifications to the lease required Hamilton's approval, Hamilton's interest in the lease would run to his heirs and assigns, and the lease would continue indefinitely so long as there was production under it. West filed the instant suit against Hamilton in May of 2006. Hamilton filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that West's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. The trial court granted summary
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judgment in favor of Hamilton. However, this Court reversed the summary judgment on the bases that Hamilton failed to identify the date upon which West's claims accrued and negate application of the discovery rule. See West v. Hamilton, No. 07-07-0235CV, 2008 Tex.App. LEXIS 7694, at *7-*10 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Oct. 9, 2008, no pet.). While the case was awaiting trial, Hamilton died.2 As a result, West amended her pleadings to name Proctor as the defendant both individually and in her capacity as executrix of Hamilton's estate. The case was tried to a jury on August 16th and 17th of 2010. After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding Hamilton breached his agreement with West, breached the fiduciary duty he owed to West, and committed fraud. However, the jury also found that West, "in the exercise of reasonable diligence, [should] have discovered all of the false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices of Hamilton" on November 17, 1999, the date that the lease contract was signed. Before judgment was issued by the trial court, West filed a motion to disregard jury findings. This motion was heard and overruled by the trial court. On October 1, 2010, the trial court entered judgment that West take nothing by her suit. West appeals from this judgment. West presents two issues by her appeal. Her first issue contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to disregard jury findings, specifically Question Seven regarding the date that West should have discovered her claims against Hamilton. Her second issue contends that the trial court erred in its determination that Proctor was not liable in her individual capacity. Prior to Hamilton's death, his deposition was taken. Thus, all references to Hamilton's testimony refers to this deposition.
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Issue One: Limitations By her first issue, West contends that the trial court erred in failing to disregard the jury's finding that West, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered her claims against Hamilton on November 17, 1999, the date that the salt water lease contract was signed by the parties to that contract. The significance of this jury question is that the statute of limitations on each of West's claims had run long before she filed suit, so application of some legal principle that defers the accrual of West's causes of action was necessary for her claims to survive Proctor's claim that limitations barred the present suit. In support of this issue, West contends that

limitations was deferred due to Hamilton's fraudulent concealment of her claims, limitations was deferred by the discovery rule under the law of the case doctrine and under the applicable law, and the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's discovery rule finding. a. The Law of Limitations Generally Statutes of limitations are intended to compel plaintiffs to assert their claims within a reasonable period of time while the evidence is fresh in the minds of the parties and witnesses. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996). When the legislature has established a limitations period for a claim, a claimant must file his cause of action within the applicable limitations period or risk losing the claim. See City of Murphy v. City of Parker, 932 S.W.2d 479, 481-82 (Tex. 1996). An applicable limitations period begins to run when a cause of action accrues. See F.D. Stella Prods. Co. v. Scott, 875 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex.App.--Austin 1994, no writ).
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Generally, a cause of action accrues and the limitations period begins running when a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred. S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996); Advent Trust Co. v. Hyder, 12 S.W.3d 534, 538 (Tex.App.-- San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). This principle that a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes some legal injury is known as the "legal injury rule." See Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tex. 1997). However, there are two categories of cases where accrual is deferred. One of these exceptions applies when a cause of action is fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff. See Wright v. Greenberg, 2 S.W.3d 666, 675 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). The other exception,

known as the "discovery rule," is for certain categories of cases in which the nature of the injury is inherently undiscoverable and the evidence of injury is objectively verifiable. See S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 6; Advent Trust, 12 S.W.3d at 538. In the present case, the trial court submitted jury questions relating to West's claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. The applicable

limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud is four years. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

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