Rolando Anaya and Margot Anaya, Individually and as Next Friend of Emily Nell Anaya, A Minor v. McAllen Hospitals, L.P.--Appeal from 275th District Court of Hidalgo County

State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 13-05-00398-CV

Case Date: 10/06/2005

Plaintiff: Rolando Anaya and Margot Anaya, Individually and as Next Friend of Emily Nell Anaya, A Minor

Defendant: McAllen Hospitals, L.P.--Appeal from 275th District Court of Hidalgo County

Preview:Jose DeLeon v. State of Texas--Appeal from 226th Judicial District Court of Bexar County
No. 04-01-00412-CR Jose DELEON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 1998-CR-5599 Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice Sitting: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice Delivered and Filed: February 27, 2002 AFFIRMED Jose DeLeon was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated and sentenced to nine years in prison. He appeals, contending the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his two prior DWI convictions because both are "presumptively void for failure to recite or demonstrate in any way that [he] voluntarily waived his right to avoid compulsory self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. Art. 1.05." We disagree. In a collateral attack, the burden is on the party attacking the validity of a prior conviction. West v. State, 720 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072 (1987); cf. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 34 (1992) (upholding similar burden-shifting in Kentucky's persistent felony offender sentencing statute). Therefore, once the State establishes a prima facie case by introducing a copy of the judgment and sentence and connecting it with the defendant, the judgment is presumed regular. Johnson v. State, 725 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Contrary to DeLeon's arguments, a presumption of irregularity is not mandated by either Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) or Burgett v. Texas , 389 U.S. 109 (1967). See Parke, 506 U.S. at 29 -31(distinguishing Boykin because it involved a direct rather than collateral attack and Burgett because it involved the purported waiver of the right to counsel at a time when that right had not yet been recognized). The judgment is affirmed. Sarah B. Duncan, Justice Do not publish

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