Shannon Ann Turner Trinidad a/k/a Shannon Ann Turner v. Alexander John Trinidad--Appeal from 166th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 4th District Court of Appeals » 2005 » Shannon Ann Turner Trinidad a/k/a Shannon Ann Turner v. Alexander John Trinidad--Appeal from 166th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

State: Texas

Court: Criminal Court of Appeals

Docket No: 04-05-00062-CV

Case Date: 11/23/2005

Plaintiff: Shannon Ann Turner Trinidad a/k/a Shannon Ann Turner

Defendant: Alexander John Trinidad--Appeal from 166th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

Preview:Shannon Ann Turner Trinidad a/k/a Shannon Ann
Turner v. Alexander John Trinidad--Appeal from 166th
Judicial District Court of Bexar County
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-05-00062-CV
Shannon Ann Turner TRINIDAD, a/k/a Shannon Ann Turner,
Appellant
v.
Alexander John TRINIDAD,
Appellee
From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2004-CI-04001
Honorable Pat Boone, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice
Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice
Catherine Stone, Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Delivered and Filed: November 23, 2005
AFFIRMED
Shannon Ann Turner Trinidad appeals the trial court s judgment designating Alexander John Trinidad as joint
managing conservator with the right to designate the primary residence of their children. On appeal, Shannon asserts
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that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine custody, visitation, and support; and (2) the trial court abused its
discretion in designating Alexander as joint managing conservator with the right to designate the primary residence of
the children. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Background
On June 21, 2001, Shannon obtained a child support order from the 45th Judicial District Court of Bexar County that
ordered Alexander to provide child support for the parties two eldest children, born out of wedlock, and awarded
managing conservatorship to Shannon. At the time the support order was signed, the parties were not married.
Alexander and Shannon married on September 8, 2001, and resided together until their separation in March 2004.
During that time, their third child was born. On March 12, 2004, Alexander filed an original petition for divorce and
application for temporary restraining order in the 166th Judicial District Court of Bexar County.
Shannon asserts that because a child support order was signed in 2001 by the 45th Judicial District Court, the 45th
Judicial District Court has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over matters affecting the parties children; therefore, the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree. Alexander contends that his marriage to Shannon terminated
the 2001 support order; therefore, the 166th Judicial District Court had jurisdiction to consider the petition filed in
2004.
Discussion
In her first issue, Shannon argues that another district court first acquired dominant jurisdiction over the interests of the
children by signing the child support order, and, as such, it retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. As
a general rule, the court that first acquires jurisdiction in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship retains
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. // See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 155.001(a) (Vernon 2002); In re Garza, 981
S.W.2d 438, 440 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). However, in some instances, exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction can end. Texas Family Code section 154.006(b) states unless a nonparent or agency has been appointed
conservator of the child under Chapter 153, the order for current child support, and any provision relating to
conservatorship, possession, or access, terminates on the marriage or remarriage of the obligor and obligee to each
other. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 154.006(b) (Vernon 2002). Here, it is clear that when Shannon and Alexander married on
September 8, 2001, the June 21, 2001 child support order naming Alexander as obligor and Shannon as obligee was no
longer enforceable and thus terminated. Not only did the order for child support terminate, but the provision naming
Shannon managing conservator of the parties two eldest children also terminated.
While we find no Texas case speaking directly on a court s continuing, exclusive jurisdiction where the parents of a
child marry for the first time after a child support order is entered, the situation is similar to a remarriage of the parents
after a divorce. Upon the remarriage of the parents, the order for child support and any provision relating to
conservatorship terminates pursuant to section 154.006(b), just as the child support order entered by the 45th Judicial
District Court in the instant case terminated upon the marriage of Shannon and Alexander. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
154.006(b) (Vernon 2002). In the context of a remarriage, section 155.004(a)(3) of the Texas Family Code provides
that the court that entered the order dissolving the previous marriage loses its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, and the
suit for the dissolution of the subsequent marriage combined with a suit affecting the parent-child relationship is to be
filed as if there had not been a prior court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
155.004(a)(3) (Vernon 2002); see also Osteen v. Osteen, 999 S.W.2d 28, 29-30 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1999,
no pet.). Thus, the Family Code treats the termination of the order of child support and the termination of the
provisions relating to conservatorship on remarriage pursuant to section 154.006(b) as ending the continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction of the court in which the first divorce was obtained. We can find no logic for treating the remarriage after a
divorce decree is entered differently from a marriage after a child support order is entered. Both the divorce decree and
the child support order are terminated, and since no action or order is pending subject to modification, the continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction of the court that entered the divorce decree or child support order ends. This ensures that the
district court that handles the divorce acquires dominant jurisdiction. See Osteen, 999 S.W.2d at 29.
We find support for our position in section 6.407 of the Family Code. Section 6.407 provides for the mandatory
transfer of a pending suit affecting the parent-child relationship to the court in which a subsequent suit for dissolution
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is filed. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 6.407 (Vernon 1998). In this case, if a suit had been pending in the 45th Judicial District
Court, section 6.407 would have required its transfer to the 166th Judicial District Court, where Alexander filed the
suit for dissolution. However, because the order entered by the 45th Judicial District Court terminated upon the
marriage of the parties, no suit remained pending in the 45th Judicial District Court that was subject to such a transfer.
The court s continuing, exclusive jurisdiction ended upon the termination of the prior order by the subsequent
marriage. Accordingly, the 166th Judicial District Court properly exercised jurisdiction in the underlying divorce
proceeding. Shannon s first issue is overruled.
Shannon complains in her second issue that the trial court abused its discretion in designating Alexander as joint
managing conservator with the right to designate the primary residence of their children. In determining the issues of
conservatorship, possession, and access, the primary consideration is always the best interest of the child. See Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. 153.002 (Vernon 2002); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 293 (Tex. 2002). The trial court has broad
discretion in determining the best interest of the child. See In the Interest of M.R., 975 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. App. San
Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Villase or v. Villase or, 911 S.W.2d 411, 419 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1995, no writ). An
appellate court will not reverse the trial court s decision regarding custody absent a clear abuse of discretion. See In
the Interest of M.R., 975 S.W.2d at 53;Villase or, 911 S.W.2d at 419. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in
an arbitrary and unreasonable manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles. See Downer v. Aquamarine
Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985).
The party complaining of abuse of discretion has the burden to bring forth a record showing such abuse. See Simon v.
York Crane & Rigging Co., Inc., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex 1987). Without a record, the appellate court must presume
that the evidence before the trial judge was adequate to support the decision. Id. This court has not been presented with
a complete record of the trial proceedings. The record consists of the clerk s record and the reporter s record of a
temporary orders hearing held June 3, 2004. Absent a record of the divorce proceedings, we will presume that the trial
court considered the best interest of the children. Shannon specifically complains that Alexander should not have been
designated joint managing conservator with the right to designate the primary residence of their children because he
pled guilty to an assault charge. The reporter s record from the June 3, 2004 hearing reflects that the trial court was
aware of the assault charge and was able to consider it, along with the other testimony presented, in determining the
best interest of the Trinidad children. // We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in designating
Alexander as joint managing conservator with the right to designate the primary residence of the Trinidad children.
Shannon s second issue is overruled.
ConclusionThe judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice
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