SOUTH TEXAS GMAC REAL ESTATE v. COHYCO, INC.--Appeal from 138th District Court of Cameron County

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State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 13-03-00093-CV

Case Date: 12/12/2003

Plaintiff: SOUTH TEXAS GMAC REAL ESTATE

Defendant: COHYCO, INC.--Appeal from 138th District Court of Cameron County

Preview:John Sharp and Coradine Sharp v. Stanley J. Bronder,
Jr.--Appeal from 225th Judicial District Court of Bexar
County
No. 04-99-00631-CV
John SHARP and Coradine Sharp,
Appellants
v.
Stanley J. BRONDER, Jr.,
Appellee
From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 96-CI-10007
Honorable David Berchelman, Jr. Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice
Paul W. Green, Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 31, 2000
AFFIRMED
John Sharp and Coradine Sharp appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of Stanley J. Bronder, Jr. Because
the dispositive issue in this case involves well-settled law, we overrule the Sharps' points of error and affirm the trial
court's order in this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.
The Sharps sued Bronder for breach of an oral contract regarding the winding up of the parties' partnership. The Sharps
alleged that, as part of the winding up of their partnership, Bronder orally agreed to reconvey his undivided one-half
interest in certain real property owned by the partnership to them. Bronder moved for summary judgment on three
independent grounds: (1) the parties never entered into such a winding-up agreement; (2) if such an agreement existed,
the subject property would not be included in the terms of the agreement because it was not owned by the partnership;
and (3) if such an agreement existed, it is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The trial court granted Bronder's
motion without specifying a ground as a basis for the judgment.
When, as in the instant case, the trial court enters a general summary judgment order, the nonmoving party on appeal
must negate each ground on which the trial court could have granted summary judgment. Malooly Brothers, Inc. v.
Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970). On appeal, the Sharps contest only the third stated ground - that the statute
of frauds bars enforcement of the alleged oral agreement for reconveyance of real property, and they have failed to
advance a broad point of error attacking the summary judgment in general. See id. (broad point of error complaining
that trial court erred in granting summary judgment sufficient to permit argument as to all possible grounds upon which
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judgment should have been denied). Because the Sharps neither rebutted by specific points of error the two other
arguments advanced by Bronder nor presented a Malooly point attacking the summary judgment in general, the
summary judgment must be affirmed. See id.; Basse Truck Line, Inc. v. First State Bank, 949 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Catherine Stone, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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