The State of Texas v. Eliseo Santos Acuna--Appeal from County Court at Law of Webb County

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State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 04-00-00331-CR

Case Date: 12/20/2000

Plaintiff: QUINCY ANDERSON

Defendant: THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from 24th District Court of Jackson County

Preview:The State of Texas v. Eliseo Santos Acuna--Appeal from
County Court at Law of Webb County
No
No. 04-00-00331-CR
The STATE of Texas,
Appellant
v.
Eliseo Santos ACUNA,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. One, Webb County, Texas
Trial Court No. K95-CRB-000259-L1
Honorable Alvino Morales, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Tom Rickhoff, Justice
Sitting: Tom Rickhoff, Justice
Alma L. L pez, Justice
Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 20, 2000
REVERSED AND REMANDED
This is an appeal from the trial court=s grant of appellee=s motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial.
We conclude the appellee=s right to a speedy trial was not violated; therefore, we reverse and remand.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following chart shows the events leading to appellee=s motion to dismiss:
DATE
EVENT
December 4, 1994
Appellee arrested for driving while intoxicated (ADWI@).
May 16, 1995
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Complaint and information charging appellee with offense filed by Webb County District Attorney.
May 24, 1995
Notice of arraignment mailed, indicating hearing to be held on June 5, 1995.
June 5, 1995
Case called for arraignment; appellee failed to appear.
June 6, 1995
Arrest warrant issued.
July 17, 1995
Case called for arraignment; appellee not present, bondsman not present.
October 21, 1996
Case set for docket call.
October 25, 1996
Case reset for another docket call.
December 19, 1996
Case reset for another docket call.
February 20, 1997
Case called; appellee not present.
December 9, 1999
Notice of hearing mailed, indicating case reset for December 20, 1999.
February 10, 2000
Capias returned executed.
March 14, 2000
Appellee filed motion to dismiss.
April 3, 2000
Case called for hearing; appellee=s attorney asked for reset; hearing rescheduled.
April 10, 2000
Hearing on motion to dismiss held; motion granted.
DISCUSSION
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Standard of Review
A bifurcated standard of review is applied in reviewing a trial court=s decision on a speedy trial claim. State v. Munoz,
991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We review the trial court=s determination of the historical facts under
an abuse of discretion standard, while we review the trial court=s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id.
Analysis
In determining whether a defendant=s right to a speedy trial has been violated, we balance four factors: (1) length of
the delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972); Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 821. The conduct of both the
prosecutor and the defendant must be weighed in balancing the four factors, and no single factor is a necessary or
sufficient condition to the finding of a speedy trial violation. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2192-93;
Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 821.
1. Length of the Delay
The length of the delay is the triggering mechanism for analysis of the other Barker factors. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at
821. Further analysis is required if the length of the delay is Apresumptively prejudicial.@ State v. Rangel, 980 S.W.2d
840, 843 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 1998, no pet.). The length of the delay is measured from the time the defendant is
arrested or formally accused. Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Generally, a delay of eight
months or longer is considered Apresumptively prejudicial@ and triggers speedy trial analysis. Rangel, 980 S.W.2d at
843.
Here, the State concedes that a more than five-year delay triggers consideration of the remaining three Baker factors.
We agree.
2. Reasons for the Delay
The State has the burden of justifying a lengthy delay. Rangel, 980 S.W.2d at 843. Different weights are assigned to
different reasons for a delay. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 822. A deliberate attempt to delay a trial is weighed heavily
against the state, while more neutral reasons, such as negligence or overcrowded dockets, are weighed less heavily. Id.
If the record is silent regarding the reason for the delay, we presume that no valid reason for the delay existed. Turner
v. State, 545 S.W.2d 133, 137 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Rangel, 980 S.W.2d at 844.
In this case, the docket sheet lists approximately six resets between June 5, 1995 and April 10, 2000, the date of the
hearing on appellee=s motion to dismiss. Appellee argues the State was negligent and did not exercise diligence in
trying to locate him.
The State argues the delay was caused by appellee=s failure to appear before the trial court on at least four occasions.
Other than this contention, the State did not introduce any evidence to justify the delay. Because the record is silent
regarding the reason for delay, we must presume that no valid reason for the delay existed. However, because no
evidence exists that the State deliberately attempted to delay the trial, this factor is weighed less heavily against the
State.
3. Assertion of the Right
The third factor that a trial court must consider is the defendant=s assertion of his right to a speedy trial. Munoz, 991
S.W.2d at 825; Haney v. State, 977 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 1998, pet. ref=d). A defendant is
responsible for asserting or demanding his right to a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 528 29, 92 S. Ct. at 2191
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(rejection of Ademand waiver@ rule does not mean defendant has no responsibility to assert his right to a speedy
trial). A lengthy delay or lack of persistence in asserting the right attenuates a speedy trial claim. Haney, 977 S.W.2d at
642. However, a defendant=s failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is not necessarily dispositive of his speedy trial
claim with this being weighed and balanced with the other Barker factors. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 825. A defendant=s
failure to assert his right simply makes it more difficult for him to prove he was denied a speedy trial. Id.
On appeal, the appellee asserts he did not request a speedy trial because he did not know a criminal complaint had
been filed against him. He claims that once he realized there was a complaint against him, he filed his motion to
dismiss. The record does not support these contentions.
On December 4, 1994, the appellee signed a ANotice,@ attesting to the fact that he knew his DWI misdemeanor case
would be called for hearing and/or trial by the County Court at Law at its next regular term of court; he would take
responsibility for inquiring of the Webb County Clerk=s Office, the Webb County District Attorney=s Office, or the
County Court at Law as to the exact date, hour, and place that his case would be heard; and his address was 307 West
Bagdhad, Austin, Texas, 78664. Also on December 4, appellee obtained a bail bond. The May 24, 1995 notice of
arraignment was mailed to the Bagdhad address.
Appellee=s failure to assert his right to a speedy trial weighs against him. Grayless v. State, 567 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978) (one year and two month delay held to be untimely assertion of right); Haney, 977 S.W.2d at 642
(eighteen month delay held to be untimely).
4. Prejudice Caused by the Delay
The prejudice to the defendant is assessed in light of the interests the speedy trial right is designed to protect. Munoz,
991 S.W.2d at 826. These interests are: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Id. Of these subfactors, the
most serious is the last, because a defendant=s inability to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. Id. The defendant has the burden to make some showing of prejudice, although a showing of actual prejudice
is not required. Id.
Appellee was on bail pending his trial; therefore, he was not prejudiced by Aoppressive pretrial incarceration.@ Nor
did appellee make a showing that his defense was impaired. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, appellee=s
attorney argued the defense was impaired because he did not know if the breathalyzer used on appellee was still in
existence, and the memory of appellee and the arresting officer had degraded over time.
Appellee=s bare assertion of Adegraded memories@ does not constitute Asome showing@ of an impairment to his
defense. A defendant must show that Alapses of memory@ are in some way Asignificant to the outcome@ of the case.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 534, 92 S. Ct. at 2194 (prejudice was Aminimal@ because, among other things, the record
indicated Aonly two very minor lapses of memory@ that Awere in no way significant to the outcome@); see also
Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 829 (holding that prejudice to appellee was minimal based on his bare Aassertion of dimming
memories@). Appellee=s mere assertions of prejudice do not meet his burden of showing prejudice.
5. Balancing
Balancing the Barker factors, we conclude the State did not violate appellee=s right to a speedy trial. Although the
record is silent as to the reason for the delay, appellee did not assert his right to a speedy trial, and any prejudice to
appellee was minimal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court=s judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
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Tom Rickhoff, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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