William Larry Aston v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 174th District Court of Harris County

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State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 01-07-00427-CR

Case Date: 12/17/2009

Plaintiff: Vernon M. Scott

Defendant: The State of Texas--Appeal from 262nd District Court of Harris County

Preview:Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 31, 2010

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-09-00348-CR VERNON MICHAEL SCOTT, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 262nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1133007

MEMORANDUM

OPINION

Vernon Michael Scott appeals his conviction for capital murder. He contends (1) the evidence is factually insufficient to support a conviction for capital murder; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an allegedly unlawful arrest. We affirm. I. Factual and Procedural Background

On September 7, 2007, two men entered complainant Jane Lemoine's residence and robbed and murdered her while Priscilla Thorne watched. Thorne met the

complainant that morning for a job interview. The complainant worked at the Eastex

storage facility. As a residential manager, the complainant was required to live on site in a trailer that had both residential and office sections. The complainant conducted the interview in the residential area of the building. During the interview, while Thorne sat in a chair near the residence door, a man walked in holding a gun. He demanded, all your money, and the keys to Thorne's van. Thorne immediately gave the man the keys to her van. Thorne identified Charles Scott (hereinafter Charles), appellant's brother, as the gunman from a photo spread she viewed three days after the crime. Thorne identified Charles again in court. During the robbery, Thorne gave Charles the keys to her van, and was preparing to get on the floor as instructed when a second man entered the residence. The second man immediately turned and locked the dead bolt on the door locking them in the residence. As the second man entered, Thorne laid down on the floor. The second man was much shorter than Charles and wore a reddish-orange baseball shirt. Thorne later identified appellant in a live line-up as the man in the orange shirt, and she identified him in court as the second man to enter the room. Charles appeared concerned when appellant locked the door. In response,

appellant said, Chill out, we're going out the front. Charles continued to point the gun at the complainant while he demanded that she tell him where she kept the safe. The complainant gave the men cash from a purple folder in which she kept petty cash, and told them they already had all the money. Thorne testified that appellant appeared more familiar with the area and more in control than Charles. Appellant directed the robbery and reassured Charles when he locked the door, which led Thorne to believe he was in charge. Thorne believed the men were workers at the facility based on their

appearances. Thorne testified that, immediately prior to the shooting, the room became very quiet, and she believed the intruders intended to shoot someone. She heard a gunshot, and the intruders left, but she did not see who fired the gun. She testified that although Charles walked in the room holding the gun, she could not be certain that he fired the gun. Thorne based this belief on the men's demeanor. She stated that Charles
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was never forceful or aggressive with her. At trial, however, Thorne identified Charles as the gunman. Appellant and Charles appeared to act according to an organized plan, and they left the building together through the office door. After the men left in her van, Thorne went into the office to call for help, but the telephone had been removed. She went outside and used a bystander's mobile phone to call police and paramedics. When the police arrived to investigate, Thorne told them that the intruders left in her van. She provided them with the make, model, and license plate number. Investigators realized that Thorne's description of the intruders matched the storage facility employees' descriptions of two employees who had not returned to work that morning. Jeffrey Bottoms worked as a regional manager for the Eastex storage facility and knew the complainant. At the time of the murder, the company employed numerous day laborers to clean up after a recent fire at the facility. The complainant hired some day laborers as permanent employees in which case she had them file tax information, but others filled out timecards and were paid from petty cash. appellant to help clean up and refurbish the burned building. The complainant hired At the scene, police

recovered a W-4 tax form and two timecards for appellant showing he worked at the facility as an employee. Around the middle of August 2007, after appellant appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs at work, Bottoms told the complainant to dismiss appellant. Charles had earlier been terminated for a similar reason. After appellant was terminated, the complainant permitted him to remain on the premises doing odd jobs. He occasionally washed dishes and prepared food in the complainant's residence. Appellant had open access to the residence where the

complainant lived. Marcel James, who also worked at the storage facility, testified that he knew that appellant took the gun from the complainant's home because only James, appellant, and the complainant had open access to the residence. Appellant's girlfriend testified that approximately two weeks before the shooting she had seen appellant in
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possession of a weapon similar to the one used in the shooting. After his arrest, appellant participated in a live line-up for purposes of identification. Thorne immediately identified appellant as the shorter man at the scene of the robbery and murder. Prior to the line-up appellant asked the officer conducting the line-up to tell him the results. After Thorne identified appellant, the officer informed appellant that he had been identified by the witness. Appellant responded, Not as the shooter, was I? A crime lab investigator obtained DNA from a glove found at the scene of the shooting and was able to determine that appellant was a possible contributor of the DNA inside the glove. Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. II. Analysis and Discussion A. Is the evidence factually sufficient to support the conviction? In his first issue appellant admits he participated as a party to the robbery, but asserts the evidence is factually insufficient to show that he either encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid the shooter in the murder, or that he participated in a conspiracy to commit murder. In a factual-sufficiency review, we examine the evidence in a neutral light. Grotti v. State, 273 S.W.3d 273, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Only one question is to be answered in a factual-sufficiency review: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? See id. Evidence can be factually insufficient in one of two ways: (1) when the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust; and (2) when the supporting evidence is outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the contrary evidence so as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See id. A reversal for factual insufficiency cannot occur when the greater weight and preponderance of the evidence actually favors conviction. See id. Although an appellate court has the ability to second-guess the jury to a limited
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degree, the factual-sufficiency review should still be deferential to the jury's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to any witness's testimony, with a high level of skepticism about the jury's verdict required before a reversal can occur. See id. A person commits capital murder if he intentionally or knowingly commits murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. Tex. Pen. Code

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