Willie John Bowie v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 188th District Court of Gregg County

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Texas » 6th District Court of Appeals » 2003 » Willie John Bowie v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 188th District Court of Gregg County

State: Texas

Court: Texas Northern District Court

Docket No: 06-03-00232-CR

Case Date: 11/04/2003

Plaintiff: Patrick Randall Poston

Defendant: The State of Texas--Appeal from 3rd District Court of Anderson County

Preview:Acme Brick Company, a Division of Justin Industries,
Inc. v. Temple Associates, Inc., et al--Appeal from
County Court at Law No 1 of Brazos County
MAJORITY | MAJORITY
Acme Brick v. Temple Assoc /**/
NO. 10-90-193-CV
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
TENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT WACO
*
ACME BRICK, A DIVISION OF
JUSTIN INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Appellant
v.
TEMPLE ASSOCIATES, INC., ET AL,
Appellees
*
From the County Court at Law Number One
Brazos County, Texas
Trial Court # 33,721-CCL1
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*
O P I N I O N
*
This appeal arises from the trial court's judgment granting Temple Associates' (Temple) and Federal Insurance
Company's (Federal) motion for summary judgment and denying Acme Brick's (Acme) motion for summary judgment.
The underlying suit is for recovery on a payment bond. We will reverse and render judgment for Acme.
The payment bond was acquired in order to comply with Article 5160 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, also known
as the McGregor Act. See Act of March 20, 1913, 33rd Leg., R.S., ch. 99, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 185, 186, amended by
Act of May 22, 1969, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 422, Tex. Gen. Laws 1390, 1392, amended by Act of May 28, 1989, 71st
Leg., R.S., ch. 1138, 38, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4704, 4707 (current version at Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art 5160
(Vernon Supp. 1991)). The McGregor Act requires prime contractors on governmental construction projects in excess
of $25,000 to execute performance and payment bonds. The payment bond ensures recovery for all who furnish labor
or materials on the project and have not been paid in full. The claimant can sue the principal and the surety on the
payment bond jointly or severally for the balance due. However, before filing suit the claimant must give written
notice to the prime contractor and surety, accompanied by a sworn statement of account.
Acme complains that the trial court erred in granting Temple's and Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment because
Acme had complied with the notice provisions of the McGregor Act and that the trial court erred in failing to grant its
own Motion for Summary Judgment because there were no genuine issues of material fact. The court found Acme was
not in substantial compliance with the notice provisions of the McGregor Act. The notice Acme sent to Temple and
the surety, Federal, on April 5, 1989 is attached as exhibit A. This notice was sent to Temple and Federal again on May
11. Temple and Federal argue that the notices were insufficient under article 5160. Their position is based upon the fact
that the Pamela E. Byas did not sign the document above the jurat on the blank line.
An affidavit is a "statement in writing of a fact or facts signed by the party making it, sworn to before an officer
authorized to administer oaths, and officially certified to by the officer under his seal of office." Tex. Gov't Code Ann.
312.011 (Vernon 1988); see also Perkins v. Crittenden, 462 S.W.2d 565, 567-68 (Tex. 1970). Typically, an affidavit
includes the caption or title, the venue, the signature of the affiant, the jurat and the body of the instrument. See 2 Tex.
Jur. 3d Affidavits (1979). The jurat of an affidavit is a "certificate by a competent officer that the writing was sworn to
by the person who signed it." Hill v. Floating Decks of America, 590 S.W.2d 723, 729 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio
1979, no writ). However, no particular terminology is required to render a document an affidavit because it is the
substance and not the form of an affidavit that is significant. Norcross v. Conoco, 720 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. App.--
San Antonio 1986, no writ).
Here, the document contained a notice of claim which was followed by a factual statement that the amounts shown in
the claim are just and correct and that all just offsets have been allowed. The document was signed by the person
named in the statement; however, the signature did not appear below the statement but above. The notary then signed
the document below the jurat certifying the sworn statement and the affiant's signature. The Texas Supreme Court in
Kohn v. Washer decided that an affiant's signature which was placed below the jurat for the purpose of subscribing to
the instrument meets fully the objects of the law. Kohn v. Washer, 69 Tex. 67, 6 S.W. 551, 552 (1887). Based on
Kohn, we believe that when Pamela Byas placed her signature on the document she did so for the purpose of
subscribing to the instrument. See id. The law does not direct or guide where the necessary signature is to be located.
Id. Accordingly, we find the document constituted a valid affidavit.
Moreover, even if the statement was not an affidavit, the McGregor Act requires only substantial compliance with its
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notice provisions. See Featherlite Bldg. v. Constructors Unlimited, 714 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.]
1986, ref'd n.r.e.). The statute is to be given the most comprehensive and liberal construction possible. Id. We find the
notices sent by Acme to Temple and Federal substantially complied with the notice provisions of the McGregor Act.
To be entitled to summary judgment the movant must conclusively prove all essential elements of his claim. MMP,
Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986). The burden is on the movant to show there are no genuine issues of
material fact and that as a matter of law movant is entitled to judgment. Id. All evidence favorable to the non-movant
will be taken as true. Id. Additionally, every reasonable inference must be indulged and any doubts resolved in the
non-movants favor. Id. Here the summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes each and every element of
Acme's claim. See Featherlite, 714 S.W.2d at 69-70. Therefore we reverse and render judgment in favor of Acme. See
Teledyne Isotopes, Inc. v. Bravenec, 640 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex.App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, ref'd n.r.e.).
BOBBY L. CUMMINGS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Thomas,
Justice Cummings and
Justice Vance
Reversed and rendered (Chief Justice Thomas dissenting)
Opinion delivered and filed May 16, 1991
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