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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present:    Judges Willis, Bray and Annunziata
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
GREGORY WILLIAM SULLIVAN
                                                                      OPINION BY
v.    Record No.  0017-02-4                                           JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
AUGUST  27,  2002
KAREN ANN KNICK, N/K/A
KAREN KNICK JONES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Kathleen H. MacKay, Judge
Lawrence D. Diehl  (Richard M. Wexell; Richard
M. Wexell & Associates, on brief), for
appellant.
Alan B. Plevy  (Anna B. Marshall; Smolen
Plevy, on brief), for appellee.
Gregory William Sullivan  (father) appeals an order of the
trial court permitting his former wife, Karen Ann Knick, n/k/a
Karen Knick Jones  (mother), to relocate the parties' minor child
from Virginia to South Carolina.    On appeal, father contends the
court erroneously  (1) found a material change in circumstances had
occurred since a recently preceding custody/visitation order, and
(2) concluded the proposed move was in the child's best interests,
without proper consideration of the attendant statutory factors
and related evidence.    Finding the decision of the trial court
plainly wrong and without the requisite support in the evidence,
we reverse the disputed order and remand the proceedings.




I.    BACKGROUND
The pertinent facts are substantially uncontroverted.    Father
and mother were married July  23,  1994, and one child, Kylie, was
born to the union on July  13,  1998, following final separation of
the parties.    By subsequent "Property Settlement Agreement,"
mother and father agreed to share "joint custody" of Kylie, with
"primary physical custody" in mother, subject to extensive
specified visitation in father and "consult[ation] with father on
major issues involving Kylie's  .  .  . welfare."1    The agreement was
later "affirmed, ratified and incorporated" into the final decree
of divorce between the parties, entered by the trial court on May
24,  1999.
On January  9,  2001, father lodged a "Petition to Modify
Parenting Time, and to Clarify Joint Custody Arrangement" with the
trial court, praying the court, inter alia, to "expand" his time
with Kylie as a result of "a number of changed circumstances,"
including his remarriage and new residence situated only several
miles from Kylie's home, and the child's age and "expressed
interest" "in spending more time with her father."    A related
hearing was conducted June  20,  2001, and, by order entered June
1 The parties further agreed that "the welfare and best
interests of  [Kylie] are their paramount consideration," and
both covenanted to "make every effort to promote the
relationship between Kylie and the other party."
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29,  2001, the court granted the requested relief, significantly
increasing father's visitation.2
On September  16,  2001, within three months of the order
enlarging father's visitation, mother advised father of her
impending marriage to Steven Jones and intention to accompany him,
with Kylie, to the situs of Jones' recent employment in
Summerville, South Carolina, approximately five hundred miles
distant.    In anticipation of related issues pertaining to father's
visitation with Kylie, mother proposed a revised schedule, which
provided father extended but less frequent contacts with the
child.
Father objected to mother's plans and immediately petitioned
the trial court to enjoin the move and award him custody of Kylie
or, should the court allow the relocation, order "substantial
monthly, holiday and vacation visitation" with father.    The court
awarded father a "Temporary Restraining Order" pending a hearing
on the matter.
The court subsequently conducted ore tenus hearings
addressing father's petition as well as the merits of mother's
relocation plans.    Testifying at the proceedings, mother described
Kylie as "a very happy, well-adjusted child," and acknowledged
the "importan[ce] for  [her] to maintain her relationship with
2 The expanded visitation included alternating weekends,
alternating Thursday evenings, extended periods during holidays
and each summer, and an additional "uninterrupted week" each
year.
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.  .  . father."    Mother emphasized her role as Kylie's "primary
caregiver" since birth and, as a result of recent unemployment,
her plans to be a "stay-at-home mother."    She described
Summerville as "a nice suburb[,] kind of like Alexandria only
not built up," with "wonderful amenities," including "a
recreation center," "pools," "tennis courts," "bike trails,"
"walking trails" and "a  [nearby] YMCA."    Although the adequacy
of mother's present home and furnishings is not in issue, the
proposed residence is more spacious and located adjacent to a
"playground  .  .  . for  [the] community."    Mother's proposed
visitation schedule between father and Kylie included an offer
to share a portion of the related transportion costs.    However,
mother expressed a willingness to "do whatever is in Kylie's
best interest," including "staying  .  .  . in Northern Virginia,"
"[i]f  [she] has to."
Steven Jones, mother's husband at the time of the hearings,
had recently accepted civilian employment in South Carolina with
the Navy, performing "landscape architecture" and "base facility
planning."    Jones acknowledged his "prime motivation" for
pursuing the move was to locate nearer the South Carolina
residence of his eight-year-old son from a prior marriage,
thereby affording him "more involve[ment]" in the child's life.
Jones could "transfer" his job site after April  2002, and had
already inquired into "positions in  [the northern Virginia]
area."    A "Rehabilitation Counselor" conversant with Jones'
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"background,  .  .  . experience and salary" researched the
employment in the Washington, D.C. market and found comparable
job opportunities available to him in the area.    Asked if he
planned a return to Virginia should the court not permit
relocation of Kylie, Jones answered he and mother "would work it
out" and "do what was necessary  .  .  . to remain a blended
family."
Mother presented the testimony of Dr. Joseph Hawley, a
licensed clinical psychologist.    Dr. Hawley testified "it would be
optimum to have more frequent visitation" between Kylie and her
father, but noted "a longer period of time" during each visit
"could offset that some."    He cautioned that changes in the
visitation schedule "could have a negative effect on the child"
because "children like to have predictability," "stability" and
"consistency."    However, "adaptation" to the "use  [of] the
telephone" or "video conferencing" would allow Kylie to "stay in
touch with her father."    While he "would want more frequent
contact" between the father and daughter, Dr. Hawley opined, "life
isn't always the best of all possible worlds."
Father described his relationship with Kylie following the
increased visitation resulting from the prior order as "better"
"in so many ways," "more relaxed," "not as hurried."    He testified
that Kylie had "respond[ed] to the routine" and "has an
expectation of normalcy."    Exercising "[e]ntirely" the increased
access to the child afforded by the June order, father and Kylie
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had visited "international children's festivals," "the
Children's Museum in Baltimore," "the Children's Museum in
D.C.," "the Museum of Natural History," "puppet performances,"
the "zoo," and "the circus," "a wide range of things."    Father
was concerned that removing Kylie from her lifetime residence in
Virginia to South Carolina would exclude him from "ballet
lessons," "sports," "Gymboree," "school plays," and "[a]ll of
that," and deprive her of significant "cultural" opportunities
available in the Washington, D.C. area.
Father presented the expert testimony of Dr. William
Zuckerman, also a licensed clinical psychologist familiar with the
instant circumstances.    Dr. Zuckerman described mother's
visitation proposal as "not optimal."    Noting the child had
developed "secure attachments" "with both of her parents," a
relationship "related to the amount of time a child spends with a
parent," Dr. Zuckerman opined that relocation would "occur at the
expense of the attachment  [she] has with the father," creating "a
loss in terms of security and attachment."    He concluded the child
was better served by existing "regular[]" and "frequen[t]"
contacts with father, than infrequent contacts of longer duration.
Cheryl Weitz, a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, interviewed
father and Kylie and prepared a "parent/child assessment."    Weitz
described father as a "highly motivated" parent, "available" to
Kylie "emotionally  .  .  .  [and] for the whole range of parenting
activities."    Weitz testified that the June order, increasing the
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frequency of contact between father and Kylie, had brought a
"definite[] improvement in the relationship," an "attachment
relationship," between the two.    Kylie "was initiating more" with
father, "leaning on him," sharing increased "eye contact" and
"much more relaxed" and "comfortable" with him.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court,
acknowledging the "burden of proof" on mother "to prove  .  .  . the
move  .  .  . in the best interest of the child," commented that
mother must follow her husband or suffer an "unnatural"
separation, with attendant costs and inconvenience.    Thus, the
court found mother without an "option[]" and reasoned either
custody must change or Kylie relocate with mother to South
Carolina.    Addressing those factors enumerated in Code  §  20-124.3,
the court observed:
[T]here is no question  .  .  . that both
parents are fit,  .  .  . have an attachment to
the child,  [and]  .  .  . are prepared to cope
with their child's changing needs.
What the mother has offered  .  .  . is
generous and considerate, and it shows  .  .  .
she appreciated the bond that already
existed between  [the father] and the child.
*                                                                        *   *   *   *   *   *
I believe that her plan along with modern
technology, to some extent, will in fact
preserve the relationship between the father
and the child in this case.  .  .
*                                                                        *   *   *   *   *   *
[T]here will be benefits from her going to
South Carolina.    The benefits being that she
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is going to be a stay at home mother.    I
think there is a certain tranquility of
family life that she is describing that will
take place in South Carolina that might not
be here, by virtue of the frantic pace that
we all lead our lives here.
*                                                                    *   *   *   *   *   *
So at this stage I am accepting, allowing
the mother to move provided that she follows
through on the plan that she has put forth
for maintaining the relationship between the
child and the father.
The court memorialized the ruling by order entered November  30,
2001, which included a substantially revised visitation
schedule,3  and father appeals to this Court.
II.    RELOCATION
A trial court may, "from time to time  .  .  .  , revise and
alter  [a] decree concerning the care, custody and maintenance of
.  .  . children and make a new decree concerning the same, as the
circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children may
require."    Code  §  20-108; Bostick v. Bostick-Bennett,  23
Va. App.  527,  534-35,  478 S.E.2d  319,  323  (1996).    In
determining whether "to modify a decree denying a custodial
parent permission to remove the child from the state, the court
must find  (1) a material change of circumstance since the
3 Post-relocation visitation with father included one
weekend each month and an optional additional weekend,
conditioned upon transportation at his expense and advance
notice to mother, extended holiday and summer visits, together
with an additional week annually and a further week, with three
months notice to mother and payment of transportation costs by
father.
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[prior] decree; and  (2) that relocation would be in the child's
best interests.    In accordance with our prior decisions, the
moving party bears the burden of proof."    Id. at  535,  478 S.E.2d
at  323.
A.    CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
Father first contends the trial court erroneously found "a
material change in circumstances" between the court's prior
visitation order, entered June  29,  2001, and the instant
proceedings.
"'Changed circumstances' is a broad concept and
incorporates a broad range of positive and negative developments
in the lives of the children."    Parish v. Spaulding,  26 Va. App.
566,  573,  496 S.E.2d  91,  94  (1998), aff'd,  257 Va.  357,  513
S.E.2d  391  (1999).    "Whether a change in circumstances exists is
a factual finding that will not be disturbed on appeal if the
finding is supported by credible evidence."    Ohlen v. Shively,
16 Va. App.  419,  423,  430 S.E.2d  559,  561  (1993)  (citation
omitted).    "In the absence of a material change in
circumstances, reconsideration  .  .  . would be barred by
principles of res judicata."    Hiner v. Hadeed,  15 Va. App.  575,
580,  425 S.E.2d  811,  814  (1993).
Here, the evidence established that, following the June  29,
2001 order, mother, the parent in physical custody of Kylie, had
become engaged, anticipated marriage within a month and planned
to relocate with her husband to South Carolina.    Accordingly,
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the record supports the finding of a material change in
circumstances sufficient to warrant further consideration and
determination of the child's best interests with respect to the
proposed relocation and companion issues of custody and
visitation.4
B.    BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Father next contends the trial court erroneously concluded
that the proposed relocation to South Carolina would promote the
best interests of Kylie.    We agree.
"A court may forbid a custodial parent from removing a
child from the state without the court's permission, or it may
permit the child to be removed from the state."    Scinaldi v.
Scinaldi,  2 Va. App.  571,  573,  347 S.E.2d  149,  150  (1986)
(citations omitted).    "[I]n a court's decision as to the
propriety of relocating the children  .  .  .  , 'the welfare of the
children is of primary and paramount importance.'"    Parish,  26
Va. App. at  572,  496 S.E.2d at  94  (citation omitted).
"The court may consider a benefit to the
parent from relocation only if the move
independently benefits the  [child]."
Accordingly, "[i]f the trial court finds
that relocation is not in the 'best
interests of the child,' the trial court
must deny the relocation request.    If
maintaining the status quo is in the 'best
interests of the child,' the court shall
4 Moreover, "whenever the evidence suggests  .  .  . that the
relocation of the custodial parent may not be in the child's
best interests, the relocation of the custodial parent
constitutes a material change in circumstances."    Hughes v.
Gentry,  18 Va. App.  318,  322,  443 S.E.2d  448,  451  (1994).
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deny any requests to change custody and
order that the status quo be maintained."
Goodhand v. Kildoo,  37 Va. App.  591,  599-600,  560 S.E.2d  463,
466-67  (2002)  (citations omitted).
We have previously recognized that "[t]he added difficulty
in maintaining the parental relationship is not unique" but
"common to all parents whose children live some distance away."
Scinaldi,  2 Va. App. at  574,  347 S.E.2d at  151.    Thus, such
circumstance "should not be the sole basis for restricting a
custodial parent's residence except where the benefits of the
relationship cannot be substantially maintained if the child is
moved away from the non-custodial parent."    Id.  (emphasis
added).    The "beneficial relationship between the child and
[parent]" must not be "placed at risk" to disadvantage the
child.    Bostick,  23 Va. App. at  534,  478 S.E.2d at  322.
"In reaching a decision on the 'best interests of the
child,' the court is guided by Code  §  20-124.3," which specifies
a myriad of factors appropriate to the issues of custody and
visitation.    Cloutier v. Queen,  35 Va. App.  413,  427,  545 S.E.2d
574,  581  (2001).    However, "[a]s long as the trial court
examines the factors, it is not 'required to quantify or
elaborate exactly what weight or consideration it has given to
each of the statutory factors.'"    Sargent v. Sargent,  20
Va. App.  694,  702,  460 S.E.2d  596,  599  (1995)  (citation
omitted).    The trial court's determination of the child's best
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interests "is a matter of discretion  .  .  .  , and, unless plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it, the court's decree must
be affirmed."    Bostick,  23 Va. App. at  533,  478 S.E.2d at  322.
Here, although mother enjoys physical custody and care of
Kylie, father, an exceptionally committed and attentive
non-custodial parent, has established and maintained an
"attachment" or "bond" with Kylie, which has demonstrably
benefited the child.    The value of such relationship was
recognized and enhanced by the trial court through expanded
visitation between the two within months of the instant
proceedings, clearly promoting the child's interests.
Accordingly, the expert witnesses agreed that more frequent
visitation between father and Kylie was preferable to reduced
contacts, albeit for longer periods of time.    While Dr. Hawley
suggested father might compensate for the loss of "face-to-face
contact" with Kylie through technological "adaptation," he
acknowledged such options are "not as optimal as personal
contact."    Similarly, Dr. Zuckerman testified "phone contact"
and "video cameras" may "make a positive contribution" to the
father-daughter relationship, but are "not quite the same" and
do not "take the place of  .  .  . having somebody  .  .  . feed you,"
"hold you," "put you to bed," "play with you," and "make faces
at you."
Significantly, the proposed relocation was prompted solely
by mother's marriage to Jones and his desire to pursue
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employment and residence in South Carolina to be nearer his
child by a prior marriage, not the unavailability of like
economic opportunity in northern Virginia.    Similarly, mother's
decision to remain unemployed and "stay-at-home" with Kylie is
not precluded by continued residency in Virginia.    Thus, both
mother and Jones indicated that the relocation plans would yield
to an adverse decision by the trial court, thereby preserving
the status quo.
Accordingly, the evidence clearly established that the
proposed relocation reflected the preferences of mother and
Jones, not necessitous or other compelling circumstances.    While
advantages accruing to a custodial parent from relocation
oftentimes inure to the benefit of a child and merit
consideration by the court, such advantages must be weighed
against any deleterious effects, including an adverse impact
upon the relationship between the child and non-custodial
parent.    The instant record demonstrates few, if any, benefits
to Kylie, a very young child, from relocation hundreds of miles
from her father.    To the contrary, the evidence clearly
establishes that the move would disrupt the positive involvement
and influence of father in Kylie's life, a result at odds with
her best interests.    Thus, under the circumstances of this case,
the decision to disturb the "status quo" was plainly wrong and
unsupported by the evidence.
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III.    ATTORNEY FEES
Both parties requested an award of those costs and
attorneys' fees incident to appeal.    See O'Loughlin v.
O'Loughlin,  23 Va. App.  690,  695,  479 S.E.2d  98,  100  (1996).
Upon a review of the record, we find the litigation addressed
appropriate and substantial issues and neither mother nor father
generated unnecessary delay or expense in pursuit of their
respective interests.    We, therefore, deny each award of
attorney's fees from the other.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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