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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present:    Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Elder
Argued at Salem, Virginia
ROBERT LYNN SINK
OPINION BY
v.                                                                  Record No.  0225-98-3   JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
DECEMBER  15,  1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
Clifford R. Weckstein, Judge
Randy V. Cargill  (Magee, Foster, Goldstein &
Sayers, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney
General  (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Robert L. Sink was convicted in a bench trial of driving
after having been declared an habitual offender as a subsequent
offense in violation of Code  §  46.2-357.    Sink contends that
because he was a Florida resident and possessed a valid Florida
driver's license, the evidence was insufficient to convict him.
Because obtaining a Florida operator's license did not restore
Sink's privilege to drive in Virginia, we find the evidence
sufficient to sustain the conviction and affirm the trial court's
ruling.
BACKGROUND
On September  2,  1975, Sink was adjudicated an habitual
offender and was barred from operating a motor vehicle on the
highways of the Commonwealth for ten years and "until permitted
to do so by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction."    In




1978 and again in  1987, Sink was convicted of driving after
having been declared an habitual offender.
In December  1995, Sink moved to Florida, where he obtained a
driver's license.    According to Sink, he first obtained a
Virginia license but two days later the Virginia division of
motor vehicles informed him that it was invalid.    Sink testified
that he surrendered his Virginia license to the Florida division
of motor vehicles, attended an alcohol safety program, and
satisfactorily completed a psychiatric evaluation that indicated
he was capable of driving.    Sink testified that after he obtained
a Florida license he believed he was authorized to drive in
Virginia.    He explained that, after completing all licensing
requirements imposed by Florida, he understood that the Florida
division of motor vehicles had informed Virginia of his status as
a licensed driver.    He concedes that his privilege to drive had
not been restored by a Virginia court pursuant to Code
§  46.2-356.
In  1997, when Sink traveled to Roanoke, a Roanoke city
police officer stopped Sink and charged him with driving after
having been declared an habitual offender.    Sink was convicted of
a second or subsequent offense of driving after having been
declared an habitual offender and appeals that conviction.
The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to convict
Sink of driving after having been adjudged an habitual offender
where the undisputed evidence proved that Sink was a Florida
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resident, had obtained a valid Florida operator's license, and
more than ten years had elapsed since Sink had been adjudged an
habitual offender.
ANALYSIS
Whether Sink was guilty of violating the order declaring him
an habitual offender and prohibiting him from driving requires
reconciliation of the habitual offender statutes and the statute
exempting nonresidents from the requirement of obtaining a
Virginia license to drive in Virginia.    Resolution of this issue
depends upon the interpretation of Code  §§  46.2-356,  46.2-357 and
46.2-307.    Although the trial court's findings of historical fact
are binding on appeal unless plainly wrong, we review the trial
court's statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.
See Timbers v. Commonwealth,  28 Va. App.  187,  193,  503 S.E.2d
233,  235-36  (1998).
Code  §  46.2-357 defines the felony of driving after having
been adjudicated an habitual offender:    "It shall be unlawful for
any person to drive any motor vehicle  .  .  . on the highways of
this Commonwealth while the revocation of the person's driving
privilege remains in effect."    Code  §  46.2-356 provides the
period during which an habitual offender may not be relicensed:
"No license to drive  .  .  . shall be issued to an habitual
offender  (i) for a period of ten years from the date of any final
order  .  .  . finding the person to be an habitual offender and
(ii) until the privilege of the person to drive  .  .  . has been
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restored by an order of a court entered in a proceeding as
provided in this article."
Code  §  46.2-307 states:    "A nonresident over the age of
sixteen years who has been duly licensed as a driver under a law
requiring the licensing of drivers in his home state or country
.  .  . shall be permitted, without a Virginia license, to drive a
motor vehicle on the highways of the Commonwealth."    Sink argues
that while Code  §§  46.2-356 and  46.2-357 appear to forbid him
from driving, Code  §  46.2-307 specifically authorizes him to
drive in Virginia.
Sink argues that the statute authorizing a nonresident
licensee to drive in Virginia is clear and admits of no
exception.    He contends the two statutes are not in conflict and
that the habitual offender statute does not apply to a
nonresident licensee authorized to drive pursuant to Code
§  46.2-307.    The principles governing statutory interpretation
are well established:
"`[T]he primary objective of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect
to legislative intent.'"    In interpreting
statutes, "courts should give the fullest
possible effect to the legislative intent
embodied in the entire statutory enactment."
To do so, "[t]wo statutes which are closely
interrelated must be read and construed
together and effect given to all their
provisions."    Potentially conflicting
statutes should be harmonized to give force
and effect to each.
Zamani v. Commonwealth,  26 Va. App.  59,  63,  492 S.E.2d  854,  856
(1997)  (citations omitted).    Applying these principles of
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statutory construction, we hold that Code  §  46.2-307 does not
authorize a nonresident licensee to drive in Virginia in direct
violation of an habitual offender order.
The habitual offender statutes, particularly the statute
defining the felony of driving after having been declared an
habitual offender, Code  §  46.2-357, and the statute authorizing a
nonresident licensee to drive in Virginia, Code  §  46.2-307, are
not in conflict.    They address different areas of concern.    The
latter applies to licensure; the former applies to revoking a
person's privilege to drive in Virginia regardless of licensure
and irrespective of whether the person is a resident or
nonresident.    The habitual offender statute expressly applies to
both "resident[s] or nonresident[s]."    Code  §  46.2-351.    Code
§  46.2-300 prohibits driving without a license.    A resident or
nonresident who possesses a valid license is not in violation of
Code  §  46.2-300.    However, if the person's privilege to drive in
Virginia has been revoked upon having been declared an habitual
offender, the privilege can be restored only by a court of
competent jurisdiction pursuant to Code  §§  46.2-358 through
46.2-361.    Obtaining or possessing a valid out-of-state
operator's license does not restore an habitual offender's
privilege to drive in Virginia.    Thus, although Florida may
legitimately issue Sink a Florida driver's license, its action
does not affect Sink's status as an habitual offender in Virginia
because Florida has no authority to declare that Sink is not an
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habitual offender in Virginia.    In accordance with the plain
language of Code  §  46.2-361, only a Virginia court may restore an
habitual offender's privilege to drive, and neither the Virginia
nor the Florida division of motor vehicles has authority to do
so.
Code  §  46.2-307, which concerns a nonresident's license to
drive, has no bearing on habitual offenders or on the definition
of the felony of driving after having been declared an habitual
offender.    Code  §  46.2-307 does not address the privilege of an
habitual offender to drive in Virginia.    Neither the explicit
language nor the logical implications of the statute authorizes
other states to restore an habitual offender's privilege to drive
after a Virginia court has revoked it.
Therefore, because Sink had not had his privilege to drive
in Virginia restored, he continued to be an habitual offender and
the fact that he possessed a valid Florida operator's license did
not restore his privilege to drive in Virginia.    Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court's conviction.
Affirmed.
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