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Present:    All the Justices
AAA DISPOSAL SERVICES, INC., ET AL.
v. Record No.  030465      OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER
March  5,  2004
JAMES R. ECKERT
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Stanley P. Klein, Judge
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a
confession of judgment for the amount specified in an ad
damnum clause is valid and binding in the absence of a
plaintiff’s willingness to accept that amount of principal
and interest.    We conclude that such a confession of
judgment is not valid in light of the plain terms of Code
§  8.01-431 requiring that a plaintiff be willing to accept
a judgment for the principal and interest contained in a
confession of judgment.    Therefore, the circuit court did
not err in granting the plaintiff’s motion to nonsuit this
action.
James R. Eckert filed a motion for judgment against
AAA Disposal Services, Inc., and Miguel A. Aragon-Campos
(collectively,  “the defendants”), alleging personal injury
as a result of an automobile accident and seeking damages




in the amount of  $60,000.1    More than two months before a
scheduled trial date, Eckert moved the court for leave to
increase the ad damnum in his motion for judgment to
$350,000.    Eckert claimed that, instead of sustaining
merely soft tissue injuries, he had suffered a herniated
disc as a result of the accident and would require surgery
to correct that condition.    A few days later, the
defendants moved the court for leave to amend their
responsive pleadings by admitting liability.    At a
subsequent hearing, the circuit court denied Eckert’s
motion to increase the ad damnum because the motion came
too close to the trial date, but the court granted the
defendants’ motion to admit liability.
The defendants then filed a confession of judgment,
stating that they,  “jointly and severally,  [are] justly
indebted to and do hereby confess judgment in favor of
JAMES R. ECKERT in the total sum of Sixty Thousand Dollars
($60,000.00), which is the amount sued for in the ad damnum
of the plaintiff’s motion for judgment, as well as the
plaintiff’s costs and interest as allowed by law as pled in
the original motion for judgment.”    Aragon-Campos executed
the confession of judgment in his own behalf, and Steven A.
1 Several automobiles were involved in the accident,
one of which was a truck owned by AAA Disposal Services and
driven by its employee, Aragon-Campos.
2




Smith, Assistant General Manager, signed the document on
behalf of Republic Services of Virginia, L.L.C., the
successor in interest to AAA Disposal Services.    However,
the acknowledgement by the notary public stated that Tim
Hayes executed the confession of judgment for AAA Disposal
Services.
The circuit court clerk’s office accepted the
confession of judgment for filing on December  4,  2002.    The
next day, Eckert filed a motion to nonsuit his case.    At
that time, no entry of judgment had been docketed, nor had
a final order been entered in the case.    Eckert had not
consented to entry of a judgment by confession for the
amount for which he had sued.
The circuit court subsequently heard oral argument on
Eckert’s motion for a nonsuit.    Eckert asserted that a
confession of judgment was not a submission to the court
for a decision within the meaning of Code  §  8.01-380 and
that, therefore, he was entitled to a nonsuit as a matter
of right.    The defendants argued that a confession of
judgment for the amount requested by Eckert in the ad
damnum clause of his motion for judgment effectively ended
the case and that a nonsuit could not be taken after a case
is concluded.
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In a letter opinion, the circuit court first reasoned
that the confession of judgment was  “ineffective” because
the person recited as confessing judgment for AAA Disposal
Services was not the person who actually did so.    The court
further explained that, pursuant to the provisions of Code
§  8.01-432, judgment may be confessed  “for only such
principal and interest as  [the] creditor may be willing to
accept a judgment for.”    This language, in the court’s
view, implied that a creditor must be willing to accept the
confessed judgment before it is final and that Eckert had
not done so.2    For these reasons, the circuit court
concluded that the case had not been submitted to the court
for a decision within the meaning of Code  §  8.01-380(A) and
that Eckert therefore was entitled to a nonsuit.    The court
entered an order nonsuiting the case without prejudice.
The defendants appeal from that judgment, and Eckert
assigns cross-error to the circuit court’s refusal to allow
him to amend the motion for judgment by increasing the
amount of the ad damnum.
The dispositive inquiry in this appeal is whether the
confession of judgment was valid and binding on Eckert in
2 The circuit court cited Code  §  8.01-432, but the
defendants confessed judgment pursuant to the provisions of
Code  §  8.01-431.    However, Code  §  8.01-431 contains
language similar to that quoted by the court.
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the absence of his willingness to accept the amount of
principal and interest specified in that judgment.    We
conclude that it was not.
As previously noted, the defendants confessed judgment
in this case pursuant to Code  §  8.01-431.    In relevant
part, that statute allows a defendant in any suit to
“confess a judgment in the clerk’s office for so much
principal and interest as the plaintiff may be willing to
accept a judgment or decree for.”                                   (Emphasis added.)    The
underscored language is clear and unambiguous.    Hence, we
construe such language according to its plain meaning
without resort to rules of statutory interpretation.
Holsapple v. Commonwealth,  266 Va.  593,  598,  587 S.E.2d
561,  564  (2003); Brown v. Lukhard,  229 Va.  316,  321,  330
S.E.2d  84,  87  (1985); see also Industrial Dev. Auth. v.
Board of Supervisors,  263 Va.  349,  353,  559 S.E.2d  621,  623
(2002).
The plain terms of Code  §  8.01-431 require that a
plaintiff be willing to accept the amount of principal and
interest for which a defendant is confessing judgment.    See
Beazley v. Sims,  81 Va.  644,  647  (1886)  (“[i]f a creditor
accepts and ratifies a confession of judgment in his favor,
it becomes, from the moment of its acceptance, valid”).
Such acceptance is absent in this case.    The written
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statement of facts filed pursuant to Rule  5:11(c) specifies
that Eckert  “had not consented to entry of a judgment by
confession for the amount sued for.”    Furthermore, the
defendants confessed judgment for  “interest as allowed by
law as pled in the original motion for judgment.”    The
record on this appeal is silent as to whether the amount of
interest confessed included pre-judgment interest under
Code  §  8.01-382, and if it did not, whether Eckert would
have accepted a judgment that did not include such
interest.
Relying on the principle that a plaintiff cannot
recover more than the amount sued for, see Town & Country
Properties, Inc. v. Riggins,  249 Va.  387,  400,  457 S.E.2d
356,  365  (1995), the defendants, nevertheless, assert that
Eckert’s acceptance in this case was implied because they
confessed judgment for the full amount of the ad damnum
requested in the motion for judgment.    The defendants argue
that, upon confessing judgment for that amount, the case
was ended and could not thereafter be nonsuited.
We agree that a plaintiff cannot recover more than the
amount sued for, but that principle does not allow this
Court to ignore the plain words of Code  §  8.01-431
requiring a plaintiff’s acceptance of the amount of a
confessed judgment.    Notably, a prior version of this
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statute provided that a defendant  “may confess a judgment
in the clerk’s office  .                                          . for the whole amount of the
plaintiff’s demand in his writ or declaration set forth,
and costs, or such part thereof as the plaintiff may be
willing to accept a judgment for.”                                2 Virginia Revised Code
app. VI c.  1, p.  585  (1819).    The General Assembly deleted
the reference to the  “whole amount of the plaintiff’s
demand” in the  1849 version of the statute, Code  (1849)
tit.  51 c.  171,  §  41, and has not included that language in
the current statute, Code  §  8.01-431.    Thus, the General
Assembly obviously knows how to allow a defendant to
confess judgment for the amount sued for without a
plaintiff’s consent when it wishes to do so.    We assume
that the General Assembly’s change in a statute is
“purposeful and not unnecessary or vain.”    Cape Henry
Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co.,  229 Va.  596,  600,  331
S.E.2d  476,  479  (1985); accord Virginia-American Water Co.
v. Prince William County Serv. Auth.,  246 Va.  509,  517,  436
S.E.2d  618,  623  (1993).
In the absence of Eckert’s willingness to accept the
amount of the principal and interest contained in the
confession of judgment, we conclude that it was not valid
and binding on him.    See Beazley’s Adm’r,  81 Va. at  647.
Thus, this action had not ended, nor had anything been
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submitted to the circuit court for decision.    Under the
provisions of Code  §  8.01-380, Eckert was therefore
entitled to take a nonsuit.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.3
Affirmed.
3 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to
address Eckert’s assignment of cross-error.
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