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Present:    All the Justices
DAVID M. BATES
OPINION BY
v.    Record Nos.  042228 &  042639      JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER
June  9,  2005
JOHN B. McQUEEN, D/B/A
CYPRESS SPRINGS LOGGING
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SURRY COUNTY
Samuel E. Campbell, Judge
The primary issue in these appeals concerns the
failure of arbitrators to conduct a hearing.    The
appellant, David M. Bates, challenges both the circuit
court’s judgment affirming an arbitration award in favor of
the appellee, John B. McQueen, d/b/a Cypress Springs
Logging, and the circuit court’s award of attorney’s fees
to McQueen.    Because we conclude that a hearing is required
by the terms of Code  §§  8.01-581.04 and  -581.010(4), and
because the issue of attorney’s fees must be decided by
arbitrators, we will reverse the judgments of the circuit
court.
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Bates and McQueen entered into a written  “TIMBER SALE
AGREEMENT”  (the Agreement) dated September  6,  2001, in
which McQueen agreed to purchase certain trees located on a
parcel of real estate situated in Surry County and owned by




Bates.1    As pertinent to the issue on appeal, the Agreement
contained the following provision regarding arbitration:
ARBITRATION:    Should any disagreement arise under or
by virtue of this contract concerning the cutting
operation contemplated herein, each of the parties
hereto, his or its heirs, executors, administrators,
successors or assigns agree to arbitrate the
controversy and submit the controversy to two
disinterested arbitrators, one to be chosen by each of
the parties, and, in case they disagree, the two shall
choose a third disinterested arbitrator, and the
decision of two of the arbitrators shall be final and
binding upon all the parties after it has been
rendered in writing.
Soon after McQueen commenced the timber harvest, a
dispute arose between the parties about the  “cutting
operation.”    Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, each
party selected an arbitrator.    The two arbitrators, who
were both familiar with timber harvesting operations, were
unable to agree upon a resolution of the dispute, and each
therefore submitted a written report outlining their
respective determinations.    While one report showed no
date, the other report was dated December  10,  2001.    At
some point thereafter, the two arbitrators appointed a
third arbitrator as required by the terms of the Agreement.
Before the third arbitrator, a registered forester,
1 The name of the buyer listed in the Agreement is
Cypress Springs Logging, Inc., not John B. McQueen, d/b/a
Cypress Springs Logging.    There is no issue before us
concerning this discrepancy.    Thus, we will treat the
corporate entity and McQueen as one and the same, as do the
parties.
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submitted a written report, McQueen filed a motion for
judgment against Bates on January  30,  2002.    More than a
year later, the third arbitrator sent a report to the other
two arbitrators.    McQueen’s designated arbitrator
subsequently indicated in writing his agreement with the
third arbitrator’s recommendations.
In McQueen’s motion for judgment, he alleged that
Bates had breached the Agreement by blocking McQueen’s
access to the timber, thereby preventing McQueen from
completing the timber harvest and forcing him to expend
additional time to remove the timber that he had cut.    In
response, Bates filed a grounds of defense and a
counterclaim.    In the counterclaim, Bates alleged that
McQueen had breached the Agreement by clearing logging
decks in locations on the property that Bates had not
approved, by cutting timber that was not included in the
sale, and by damaging Bates’ property.
After the action was scheduled for trial, the circuit
court entered an order appointing a new third arbitrator.
According to the order, the two arbitrators originally
selected by the parties had agreed to the appointment of
Delmer D. Aylor as the new third arbitrator.    The order
also set forth the following relevant directives:
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Delmer Aylor shall advise the respective parties
of the hearing date of the arbitration, providing
the respective parties with a minimum of  10 days
prior notice of the hearing date, and that the
arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with
the provisions of Sections  8.01-581.01 through
8.01-581.016 of the Code of Virginia,  1950, as
amended.
Neither party objected to the order or its terms.    In fact,
the order reflects that both parties asked for its entry.
The parties do not dispute that, after Aylor’s
appointment, he met with Bates for approximately two hours
and viewed areas on Bates’ property allegedly affected by
McQueen’s timber cutting.    The parties further agree that
Bates also provided some information to the arbitrator whom
he had originally selected.
Approximately six months after Aylor’s appointment, he
and the arbitrator originally selected by McQueen issued a
joint letter setting forth their resolution of the dispute
between Bates and McQueen.    In relevant part, the letter
stated:
It has been determined by two forestry
consultants that there is approximately
$20,000.00 of timber remaining under the above
mentioned agreement.    We have agreed that Mr.
David M. Bates shall pay Mr. John B. McQueen
$14,000.00 for the uncut portion of the timber
covered under the above noted agreement.    Mr.
David M. Bates may retain  $6,000.00 of this
remaining settlement to repair the damaged game
trails and any other damage that he may want to
repair.    Mr. Bates will also retain ownership of
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the remaining timber covered under this agreement
after the  $14,000.00 payment has been made.
Bates subsequently filed a motion to vacate the
arbitrators’ award and to appoint a new arbitrator or
arbitrators to hear and decide the dispute between the
parties.    In his motion, Bates asserted that the
arbitrators had not conducted the arbitration in accordance
with the circuit court’s order and Virginia’s Uniform
Arbitration Act, Code  §§  8.01-581.01 through  -581.016,  (the
Act) because the arbitrators did not conduct a hearing; did
not give any notice of a hearing to Bates or his counsel;
and did not afford Bates an opportunity to be heard, to
present evidence, or to cross-examine witnesses.
At a hearing on Bates’ motion, the parties stipulated
that  “there was no hearing, no opportunity to present
witnesses, no opportunity to cross-examin[e] witnesses or
be represented by counsel.”    The circuit court denied the
motion and entered an order confirming the arbitrators’
award and directing Bates to pay McQueen the sum of
$14,000.    The court also granted McQueen  60 days in which
to file a motion for his costs and attorney’s fees.
Despite Bates’ subsequent objection that only the
arbitrators could award attorney’s fees and did not do so,
the circuit court concluded McQueen was entitled to an
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award of attorney’s fees in the amount of  $10,000 and
certain costs.    The circuit court questioned whether the
Act  “would permit  [it] to go beyond the contract[]
[b]ecause it looks like the arbitrators could have done it
all” but nevertheless decided that the  “contract was broad
enough for attorney’s fees.”    These appeals ensued.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Bates raises two issues:  (1) whether the
circuit court erred in affirming the arbitrators’ award
that resulted from an arbitration proceeding that did not
comply with the provisions of the Act; and  (2) whether the
circuit court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to McQueen.
We will address the issues in that order.    In doing so, we
are mindful that the party attacking an arbitration award
“bears the burden of proving the invalidity of the award.”
Trustees of Asbury United Methodist Church v. Taylor &
Parrish, Inc.,  249 Va.  144,  153,  452 S.E.2d  847,  852  (1995)
(citing Howerin Residential Sales Corp. v. Century Realty
of Tidewater, Inc.,  235 Va.  174,  179,  365 S.E.2d  767,  770
(1988)).
As an initial matter, McQueen argues that, while the
Agreement required a dispute about the  “cutting operation”
to be resolved by arbitration, it did not specify any
procedures for conducting the arbitration proceeding, such
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as a formal hearing.    Thus, according to McQueen, the
circuit court had no authority to impose the requirement of
a hearing and the failure to conduct one was harmless
error.    That argument has no merit in light of the terms of
the circuit court’s order appointing Aylor as the third
arbitrator and directing that the arbitration be conducted
in accordance with the provisions of the Act.    Both parties
requested entry of that order.    Thus, the arbitration of
the present dispute concerning the  “cutting operation,”
irrespective of the terms of the Agreement, had to comply
with the provisions of the Act.2    See Code  §  8.01-581.04
(setting out certain procedural requirements for an
arbitration proceeding  “[u]nless otherwise provided by the
agreement”).
In pertinent part, the Act requires arbitrators,
unless otherwise provided by an agreement, to  “appoint a
time and place for the hearing and cause notification to
the parties to be served personally or by registered mail
2 As a preliminary matter, McQueen also contends that
Bates’ motion to vacate the arbitrators’ award did not
comply with the procedural requirements of Code  §  8.01-
581.010 because Bates styled his pleading as a  “motion”
rather than as a  “petition” and because he did not cite or
otherwise address any of the statutory criteria set forth
in that provision.    This argument has no merit.    Bates
stated in his motion that the arbitrators failed to follow
the provisions of the Act because there was no hearing; no
notice of a hearing; and no opportunity to be heard, to
present evidence, or to cross-examine witnesses.
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not less than five days before the hearing.”    Code  §8.01-
581.04(1).    Continuing,  “[t]he parties are entitled to be
heard, to present evidence material to the controversy and
to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.”    Code
§  8.01-581.04(2).    A party also has the right to be
represented by an attorney at any hearing conducted under
the Act.    Code  §  8.01-581.05.
Despite these statutorily-mandated requirements, the
terms of the circuit court’s order, and the parties’
stipulation before the circuit court that there was no
hearing; no notice of a hearing; and no opportunity to be
heard, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses,
McQueen contends that the circuit court did not err by
refusing to vacate the arbitrators’ award.    This is so,
according to McQueen, because Bates failed to show that he
suffered any prejudice as a result of the informal manner
in which the arbitrators in this case conducted the
arbitration proceeding.    McQueen also argues that Bates
“waived and/or is estopped” from complaining about the
arbitrators’ failure to conduct a formal hearing because
Bates participated in the informal process by meeting with
and/or supplying information to two of the three
arbitrators and by failing to request a formal hearing
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before the arbitrators.    We do not agree with McQueen’s
arguments.
The provisions of Code  §  8.01-581.010 provide the
exclusive circumstances under which a circuit court can
vacate an arbitration award.    Lackman v. Long & Foster Real
Estate, Inc.,  266 Va.  20,  26,  580 S.E.2d  818,  822  (2003);
see also Signal Corp. v. Keane Fed. Sys., Inc.,  265 Va.  38,
45,  574 S.E.2d  253,  256  (2003)  (“circuit court’s review of
an arbitration award is limited to the specific statutory
criteria contained in Virginia’s Uniform Arbitration Act”);
Trustees of Asbury United Methodist Church,  249 Va. at  153,
452 S.E.2d at  852  (same).    As relevant to this case, a
circuit court shall vacate an arbitration award when  “[t]he
arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence
material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the
hearing, contrary to the provisions of  §  8.01-581.04, in
such a way as to substantially prejudice the rights of a
party[.]”    Code  §  8.01-581.010(4).
The repeated use of the term  “the hearing” in Code
§  8.01-581.010(4) presupposes that the arbitrators
conducted a hearing.    However, as the parties stipulated,
there was no hearing before the arbitrators in this case.
Without  “the hearing” having taken place, it was not
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necessary for Bates to prove that his rights were
“substantially prejudice[d]” or that evidence he would have
presented was  “material to the controversy” in order to
have the arbitration award vacated under Code  §  8.01-
581.010(4).    Nor did Bates waive his objection to the lack
of a hearing.    He raised the issue in his motion to vacate
the arbitration award, which was the first opportunity to
do so after the arbitrators decided the dispute without
conducting a hearing.    Thus, we conclude that the circuit
court erred by failing to vacate the arbitration award.
Cf. Cargill v. Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co.,  462 A.2d  833,
834-35  (Pa.  1983)  (at common law, the denial of a hearing
is sufficient basis to vacate an arbitration award).    In
short, the failure to conduct  “the hearing” clearly
intended by the terms of Code  §  8.01-581.04, unless
otherwise provided by an agreement, and by the provisions
of Code  §  8.01-581.010(4) was tantamount to no arbitration.
Unless parties agree otherwise, a hearing is a fundamental
part of the arbitration process because  “[t]he arbitrators
are the final judges of both law and fact, their award not
being subject to reversal for a mistake of either.”    Id.;
see Signal Corp.,  265 Va. at  46,  574 S.E.2d at  257
(refusing to adopt  “manifest disregard of the law” as basis
to vacate arbitration award).
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Turning now to Bates’ challenge to the circuit court’s
award of attorney’s fees to McQueen, we conclude that the
question whether McQueen is entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees under the terms of the Agreement, and if
so, the amount of that award, is a matter to be determined
by arbitration.    Cf. Lee v. Mulford,  269 Va.  562,  567-68,
611 S.E.2d  349,  352  (2005)  (“Absent agreement of the
parties with the concurrence of the court, or pursuant to
contract or statute with specific provisions, a litigant is
not entitled to bifurcate the issues and have the matter of
attorney’s fees decided by the trial court in post-verdict
proceedings.”).    The parties agreed to arbitrate any
disagreement  “concerning the cutting operation” under the
Agreement.    The dispute between the parties entailed, in
part, the question of McQueen’s access to the property.
Among other things, Bates’  “representations and warranties”
to McQueen in the Agreement included  “adequate vehicular
access from the sale area to a public road,” the breach of
which subjected Bates to payment of attorney’s fees
incurred by McQueen in connection with the default.    We
note, however, that the provisions of Code  §  8.01-581.012
provide that the  “[c]osts of the application  [to confirm,
modify, or correct an arbitration award] and of the
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proceedings subsequent thereto, and disbursements may be
awarded by the court.”
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgments
of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.    Since the arbitration award
will be vacated on the grounds set forth in Code  §  8.01-
581.010(4), the circuit court may order a hearing before
the original arbitrators or  “their successors appointed in
accordance with  §  8.01-581.03.”    Code  §  8.01-581.010(5).
Reversed and remanded.
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