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Present: All the Justices
WEST LEWINSVILLE HEIGHTS
CITIZENS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.
v.    Record No.  042274
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
OF FAIRFAX COUNTY, ET AL.
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
September  16,  2005
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS
OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
v.    Record No.  042326
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
OF FAIRFAX COUNTY, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Dennis J. Smith, Judge
These appeals present two major issues.    The first issue,
which is procedural in nature, is whether a petition for a writ
of certiorari from a decision of a board of zoning appeals was
timely when it was filed within  30 days after a letter sent
from the board’s clerk stating the board’s final decision.    The
second issue, involving the merits of the case, is whether a
zoning ordinance permitted a county park authority to allow a
private institution regular use of a field in a public park
without altering the park’s public use classification.
Lewinsville Park  (the Park) is a public park of about  38
acres located in a residential zoning district  (the R-3
district) in Fairfax County.    The Park is owned and operated by




the Fairfax County Park Authority  (the Park Authority) and
provides a variety of recreational facilities.    Included among
these facilities is a lighted rectangular field, known as Field
#2.
The Park currently is classified as a  “public use.”    In the
R-3 district in which the Park is located,  “public uses” are
permitted by right.    See Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance  (Zoning
Ordinance)  §  3-302.    Certain other uses, such as  “[c]olleges
[or] universities,” and  “[s]ports arenas  [or] stadiums,” are
permitted in an R-3 district only by special exception.    Zoning
Ordinance  §  9-301.
In January  2003, the Park Authority entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement  (the Agreement) with McLean Youth
Soccer, Inc.  (MYS), a private, non-profit organization that
operates several youth soccer leagues in Fairfax County.    Under
the Agreement, MYS agreed to finance and install a synthetic
turf playing surface and other related improvements to Field  #2,
at a cost not to exceed  $800,000.    In exchange, the Park
Authority agreed to allocate to MYS approximately  3,187 hours
per year of reserved playing time on Field  #2.    The Agreement
had an initial term of five years, with an automatic renewal
provision for an additional five-year term.
In the Agreement, the Park Authority also authorized MYS to
assign to Marymount University  (Marymount), a private
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institution located in neighboring Arlington County, the right
to use Field  #2 for up to  300 hours of MYS’s total yearly
allocation.    Marymount, in turn, was required to contribute up
to one half the cost of the purchase and installation of the
synthetic turf.    Marymount uses the improved Field  #2 for
intercollegiate soccer and lacrosse matches and practices.
During the hours not allocated to MYS or Marymount, Field  #2 is
available for advance reservation or  “walk on” use by the
general public.
In April  2003, the West Lewinsville Heights Citizens
Association, and several nearby property owners  (collectively,
the residents), sent a letter by counsel to Jane W. Gwinn,
Fairfax County Zoning Administrator  (the Zoning Administrator),
requesting a written opinion whether Marymount’s proposed use of
the Park required a special use permit or special exception
under the Zoning Ordinance.    The Zoning Administrator issued a
decision stating that Marymount did not need a special use
permit or special exception for the activities Marymount is
allowed to conduct under the Agreement.
In May  2003, the residents appealed the Zoning
Administrator’s decision to the Board of Zoning Appeals of
Fairfax County  (the BZA).    The residents argued that Marymount’s
proposed use of Field  #2 would transform it into a  “college
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athletic facility,” which would require a special exception
under the Zoning Ordinance.
After a public hearing on September  16,  2003, the BZA
unanimously voted to overturn the Zoning Administrator’s
decision.    The BZA concluded that Marymount’s use of the Park
was not  “exclusively for public purposes” and required a special
exception for a college or university facility under Zoning
Ordinance  §  9-301(1).
On September  24,  2003, Kathleen A. Knoth, Deputy Clerk of
the BZA, stated in a letter to counsel for the residents:
At its September  16,  2003 meeting, the Board of Zoning
Appeals took action to OVERTURN the determination of
the Zoning Administrator for the above-referenced
appeal application.    The final decision date is
September  24,  2003.
On October  24,  2003, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax
County, the Park Authority, and William E. Shoup, Gwinn’s
successor as Zoning Administrator  (collectively, the County),
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court
seeking review of the BZA’s decision.    The County alleged that
the BZA was plainly wrong and applied erroneous principles of
law in overturning the Zoning Administrator’s determination.
The County asserted that the Park continues to be used
“exclusively for public purposes” under the Agreement because
the Park Authority continues to  “own, operate, and regulate all
of the activities of the public” at the Park.
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The residents and the BZA opposed the County’s petition for
a writ of certiorari.    The BZA also filed a plea in bar, arguing
that the County’s appeal should be dismissed because it was not
filed within  30 days of the BZA’s  “final decision,” as required
by Code  §  15.2-2314.    The BZA argued that the  “final decision,”
within the meaning of the statute, was the BZA’s unanimous vote
on September  16,  2003, overturning the Zoning Administrator’s
decision.    The BZA argued that, therefore, the County’s petition
was filed eight days after expiration of the  30-day appeal
period fixed by Code  §  15.2-2314.
The circuit court denied the BZA’s plea in bar, granted the
County’s petition for a writ of certiorari, and reversed the
BZA’s decision.    The court concluded that the BZA’s decision
became final on September  24,  2003, as stated in Knoth’s letter
to counsel and pursuant to the BZA’s by-laws.    Thus, the court
concluded that the County filed its petition within the  30-day
time limit required by Code  §  15.2-2314.
The circuit court further held that the BZA was plainly
wrong and applied erroneous principles of law in concluding that
Marymount’s use of Field  #2 changed the nature of the Park’s
public use and required a special exception under the Zoning
Ordinance.    The residents and the BZA  (the residents) appeal
from the circuit court’s judgment.
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The residents argue that the circuit court erred in
denying the BZA’s plea in bar, because the County’s
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed more than  30
days after the meeting at which the BZA voted to overturn
the Zoning Administrator’s decision.    The residents assert
that the BZA’s vote was the  “final decision” for purposes
of the  30-day appeal period set forth in Code  §  15.2-2314,
because the statute no longer requires the BZA to  “file”
its decision with the office of the board before the BZA’s
decision becomes final.
In response, the County argues that the circuit court
correctly held that the County’s petition was timely filed,
because Code  §  15.2-2314 does not specify when a decision
of a board of zoning appeals becomes final but only states
that the  30-day appeal period begins to run from the date
of the final decision.    The County contends that the BZA
may determine for itself when its decisions become final,
and that the BZA has done so by enacting Article VII,
paragraph  8, of its by-laws.    The County asserts that its
position is supported by the action of the BZA’s own deputy
clerk, who stated in writing to the parties that  “[t]he
final decision date is September  24,  2003,” rather than the
date of the BZA vote on September  16,  2003.    We disagree
with the County’s arguments.
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Established principles govern our interpretation of
the statutory, ordinance, and by-law provisions relevant to
this issue.    These principles also direct the order of
priority to be given the provisions of the different
enacting bodies.
We employ the plain and natural meaning of the words
contained in the enactments before us.    Capelle v. Orange
County,  269 Va.  60,  65,  607 S.E.2d  103,  105  (2005); Lee
County v. Town of St. Charles,  264 Va.  344,  348,  568 S.E.2d
680,  682  (2002); Donovan v. Board of Zoning Appeals of
Rockingham County,  251 Va.  271,  274,  467 S.E.2d  808,  810
(1996).    However, when current and prior versions of a
statute are at issue, there is a presumption that the
General Assembly, in amending a statute, intended to effect
a substantive change in the law.    Virginia-American Water
Co. v. Prince William County Serv. Auth.,  246 Va.  509,  517,
436 S.E.2d  618,  622-23  (1993); Dale v. City of Newport
News,  243 Va.  48,  51,  412 S.E.2d  701,  702  (1992).    Further,
we assume that the General Assembly’s amendments to a
statute are purposeful, rather than unnecessary.    AAA
Disposal Servs. v. Eckert,  267 Va.  442,  446,  593 S.E.2d
260,  263  (2004); Virginia-American Water Co.,  246 Va. at
517,  436 S.E.2d at  623; Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National
Gypsum Co.,  229 Va.  596,  600,  331 S.E.2d  476,  479  (1985).
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County and municipal ordinances must be consistent
with the laws of the Commonwealth.    Blanton v. Amelia
County,  261 Va.  55,  63,  540 S.E.2d  869,  873-74  (2001);
Klingbeil Mgmt. Group Co. v. Vito,  233 Va.  445,  449,  357
S.E.2d  200,  202  (1987); King v. County of Arlington,  195
Va.  1084,  1090,  81 S.E.2d  587,  591  (1954); see Code  §  1-
13.17.    Such ordinances are inconsistent with state law
when they cannot coexist with a statute.    Blanton,  261 Va.
at  64,  540 S.E.2d at  874; King,  195 Va. at  1091,  81 S.E.2d
at  591.
The fact that a county or municipal ordinance enlarges
on a statute’s provisions does not create a conflict with
the statute unless the statute limits the requirements for
all cases to its own terms.    Blanton,  261 Va. at  64,  540
S.E.2d at  874; Allen v. City of Norfolk,  196 Va.  177,  181,
83 S.E.2d  397,  400  (1954); King,  195 Va. at  1090,  81 S.E.2d
at  591.    Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can
be given effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them
together.    Blanton,  261 Va. at  64,  540 S.E.2d at  874;
Klingbeil,  233 Va. at  449,  357 S.E.2d at  202; King,  195 Va.
at  1091,  81 S.E. at  591.
By-laws adopted by a board of zoning appeals must be
“consistent with ordinances of the locality and general
laws of the Commonwealth.”    Code  §  15.2-2308; see also Code
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§  1-13.17.    Therefore, in examining the BZA by-law on which
the County relies, we review any statutes and local
ordinances that may affect the application of this by-law.
We consider the current and former versions of Code
§  15.2-2314, the Zoning Ordinance, and the BZA by-laws.
Code  §  15.2-2314, which governs appeals from a decision of
a board of zoning appeals, states in relevant part:
Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved
by any decision of the board of zoning appeals, or any
aggrieved taxpayer or any officer, department, board
or bureau of the locality, may file with the clerk of
the circuit court for the county or city a petition
specifying the grounds on which aggrieved within  30
days after the final decision of the board.
Id.    Before  2001, however, the prior version of this statute
stated that a petition must be filed  “within  [30] days after the
filing of the decision in the office of the board.”    Former Code
§  15.2-2314  (1997).
Pursuant to Code  §  15.2-2308, the BZA has enacted by-laws,
which govern its internal operating procedures.    Article VII,
paragraph  8  (the BZA by-law) states:
Within five  (5) days of the action of the Board, the
Clerk shall prepare and provide to the applicant the
Board’s decision or final resolution setting forth the
decision on the application.
No decision shall be officially filed in the Office of
the Board until the day following the next official
meeting day of the Board, but not less than eight  (8)
days, whichever is the latter, unless the Board waives
this requirement.    Within five  (5) days of the action
of the Board, the Clerk shall prepare and provide to
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the applicant the Board’s final resolution setting
forth the decision on the application.
Finally, Zoning Ordinance  §  19-211 provides, in relevant part,
that  “[a]ll decisions and findings of the BZA shall be final
decisions.”
The BZA by-law complemented the pre-amendment text of Code
§  15.2-2314.    The former statute identified the date of a
specific action, the filing of the BZA’s decision in the office
of its board, as the date from which the  30-day appeal period to
the circuit court began to run.    The BZA by-law, in turn, served
to specify when a decision was  “officially filed” in the office
of the board, namely, at least eight days following the BZA’s
decision.    Therefore, under those former provisions, the crucial
date from which an appeal period was measured was not the actual
date of the BZA’s vote but the date that the recorded decision
was filed in the office of the board.
In amending Code  §  15.2-2314, the General Assembly changed
the focal point for the commencement of the appeal period from
the date the BZA’s final decision was filed to the date of the
final decision itself.    This change was a substantive one,
reflecting a legislative determination to achieve uniformity
throughout the Commonwealth by measuring the appeal period from
the actual final decision date, rather than from the different
dates that various local boards had identified as their
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“official filing date.”    Therefore, we hold that the  “official
filing date” provisions of the BZA by-law are inconsistent with
the present text of Code  §  15.2-2314 and are no longer valid for
determining when the appeal period begins to run from a final
decision of the BZA.
Because Code  §  15.2-2314 uniformly measures the  30-day
appeal period from the date of the  “final decision” of a board
of zoning appeals, we must determine when the BZA reached its
“final decision” in the present case.    The BZA’s unanimous vote,
taken on September  16,  2003, was the action deciding the merits
of the residents’ appeal from the Zoning Administrator’s
decision.    The vote taken on that date was not changed in any
respect on a later date.
Under Zoning Ordinance  §  19-211, quoted above, every BZA
decision is a  “final decision.”    This provision plainly
addresses only those decisions and findings that resolve the
merits of an appeal or application before the BZA, or dismiss
such filings with prejudice on a procedural basis.    The term
“final decision” does not encompass other actions that may be
taken regarding such appeals and applications that do not decide
their merits or effect a dismissal of the case with prejudice.
Therefore, we conclude that this ordinance section is consistent
with the language of Code  §  15.2-2314, and the two enactments
may be harmonized and construed together as providing that a
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“final decision” of the BZA is the decision that resolves the
merits of the action pending before that body or effects a
dismissal of the case with prejudice.
Here, the decision ultimately resolving the merits of the
residents’ appeal was the vote taken by the BZA on September  16,
2003.    The BZA did not take any further action amending that
decision.    Therefore, the date of the BZA’s  “final decision,”
within the meaning of Code  §  15.2-2314, was September  16,  2003,
and the County was allowed  30 days from that date to file its
petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court.    Because
the County’s petition was not filed within this  30-day period,
the petition was untimely.
Our decision is not altered by the fact that the letter to
the parties from the BZA’s clerk stated that the final decision
date was September  24,  2003.    The date of a  “final decision” of
a board of zoning appeals, as we have stated above, is
determined by the nature of the action taken by that body, not
by the mistaken representation of its deputy clerk applying a
BZA by-law that is inconsistent with the governing statute.
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in
denying the BZA’s plea in bar.    Further, because the County’s
petition to the circuit court was untimely, we are obliged to
dismiss the County’s appeal and are unable to reach the merits
of the case considered by the circuit court.
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For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s
holding that the County’s petition was timely, vacate the
court’s holdings on the merits of the case, and enter final
judgment dismissing this appeal.
Reversed in part,
vacated in part,
and final judgment.
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