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PRESENT: All the Justices
PHILLIP MORRIS WASHINGTON
                                                                     OPINION BY
v.    Record No.  051875                                             JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE
                                                                     September  15,  2006
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Phillip Morris Washington was convicted in the Circuit
Court of Stafford County of one count of malicious wounding
"after having been twice convicted of a violent felony" and one
count of "stabbing, cutting or wounding another person in the
commission of a felony."    On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
Washington contended the trial court erred in allowing the
Commonwealth to present evidence of his two prior felony
convictions during the guilt phase of the trial.    A panel of the
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, but
upon a rehearing en banc, the judgment of the trial court was
affirmed.    For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I.    FACTS AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Washington was indicted for one count of malicious wounding
"after having been twice convicted of a violent felony" in
violation of Code  §  18.2-51 and  §  19.2-297.1, and one count of
violating Code  §  18.2-53, for an attack on his girlfriend,
Kathleen A. Monroe, on January  13,  2001.    Prior to trial, the
Commonwealth notified Washington that "should  [he] be convicted
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of a felony, the Commonwealth intends to introduce into evidence
at sentencing copies of the following convictions."    The list
included separate felony convictions for robbery in  1970 and
1976.
During his opening statement before the jury, the
Commonwealth's Attorney noted that the indictment "charged not
just  .  .  . a malicious wounding but a malicious wounding as a
recidivist."    He asserted that "[t]he evidence in this case and
one of the elements of this offense is that the defendant has
twice been convicted of a violent felony in the past."
Washington objected on the grounds that "the recidivist
issue is an issue for sentencing" and that "it's highly
prejudicial  .  .  . to mention it at this time."    Washington also
alleged that the Commonwealth did "not have sufficient
documentation  [of the  1976 robbery]" because one of the
documents purporting to be a conviction order was "not signed
.  .  . as an order by a judge."    Washington made an oral motion
in limine to prevent the Commonwealth from introducing evidence
regarding Washington's prior felony acts of violence.
Agreeing that "there's no indication that  [the purported
1976 conviction order] has been entered by the Court," the trial
court sustained Washington's motion in limine.    Washington moved
for a mistrial, the Commonwealth did not object, and the trial
court granted the motion.    The trial court did not determine at
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which phase of a bifurcated proceeding prior convictions were to
be introduced into evidence.
In preparation for the second trial upon the same
indictments, Washington filed a written "Motion in Limine to
Prohibit Introduction of Defendant's Prior Conviction Record
Before Sentencing."    After a hearing on the motion, the trial
court found that "the Commonwealth has the burden of proving two
prior convictions of felonious acts of violence, as charged in
the indictment against Mr. Washington" and that such findings
must "be made by the fact finders in this case, that is the
jury, and it is to be made during the guilt or innocence phase
of the proceeding."
In its case in chief, the Commonwealth introduced the
sentencing and conviction orders for the two robberies.1    At the
conclusion of the evidence, the Commonwealth offered a jury
instruction on the indicted offense which stated that the jury
must find the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime of malicious wounding and "[t]hat the
defendant has been previously convicted of two violent
felonies."    Washington objected to the Commonwealth's
instruction arguing that "even though the Commonwealth is
1 The prior defect with regard to the  1976 robbery was cured
by a properly certified conviction order.    Washington did not
object to the certification but "preserve[d]  [his] exception  [to
the trial court's ruling on] the motion in limine."
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permitted to introduce  [Washington's prior convictions] before
sentencing  .  .  . it is not actually an element of the offense,
and, therefore, does not belong in the instruction."    Washington
offered another instruction which included only the elements of
malicious wounding as they appear in Code  §  18.2-51.2    The trial
court overruled Washington's objection and instructed the jury
using the language of the Commonwealth's proposed instruction.
After a two-day trial, a jury convicted Washington as
charged and fixed his sentence at life imprisonment.    The trial
court entered judgment affirming the verdict and imposing a
sentence consistent with the jury's determination.
The Court of Appeals granted Washington an appeal as to
whether the "trial court err[ed] in permitting the Commonwealth
to introduce evidence of two prior robbery convictions in its
case-in-chief."3    A majority of a three-judge panel of the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, finding that
nothing in Code  §  18.2-51 "provides that the occurrence of
2                                                                      §  18.2-51.
If any person maliciously shoot, stab, cut, or wound any
person or by any means cause him bodily injury, with the intent
to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill, he shall, except where it
is otherwise provided, be guilty of a Class  3 felony. If such
act be done unlawfully but not maliciously, with the intent
aforesaid, the offender shall be guilty of a Class  6 felony.
3 The Court of Appeals denied Washington's appeal as to
whether "the trial court erred in allowing the enhanced
sentencing option to be placed before the jury where the
elements of Code  §  19.2-297.1 had not been met," finding that
this argument was not preserved in the trial court.
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prior, separate acts of violence are elements of the offense of
malicious wounding."    Washington v. Commonwealth,  44 Va. App.
157,  161,  604 S.E.2d  92,  94  (2004).
Upon rehearing en banc, a majority of the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.    Washington v.
Commonwealth,  46 Va. App.  276,  285,  616 S.E.2d  774,  779  (2005).
Finding that Code  §  19.2-297.1 did not specifically state
whether a defendant's prior convictions should be introduced in
the guilt or punishment phase of a trial, the en banc majority
noted that neither Code  §  19.2-295.1, which allows for
bifurcated felony trials, nor Rule  3A:17.1(e)(1), allows "the
prosecution to present substantive evidence  [necessary to meet
its] burden of proof under Code  §  19.2-297.1(A)" during the
punishment phase.    Id. at  283,  616 S.E.2d at  778.    Thus, the
majority held "that the recidivism evidence necessary to
implicate the terms of Code  §  19.2-297.1 may be admitted during
the guilt phase of a bifurcated jury trial."    Id. at  285,  616
S.E.2d at  779.
The dissenting opinion rejected the majority's reading of
Code  §§  19.2-297.1 and  19.2-295.1.    The dissent concluded that
"[r]ead together, Code  §  19.2-297.1 and Code  §  19.2-295.1
manifest the conclusion that the legislature intended that prior
convictions be proved only during the punishment phase when the
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purpose is to establish a sentencing factor."    Id. at  297,  616
S.E.2d at  785.4
We awarded Washington an appeal on the following
assignments of error:  (1) Whether "the interaction between
§  19.2-297.1 and  §  19.2-295.1  .  .  . require[s] that the prior
convictions be admitted during the guilt phase of the trial;"
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing "to consider
the issue that the requirements of  §  19.2-297.1 were not met at
trial where the trial court ruled that the jury would have to
impose a mandatory life sentence;" and  (3) Whether the
"requirements of  §  19.2-297.1 were required to be proven in the
trial court with the exception of the introduction of prior
violent convictions where the Court of Appeals ruled that the
statute's requirements had to be proven during the guilt phase
of the trial."5
4 A concurring opinion noted that "according to earlier
judicial interpretations of similar recidivist statutes, proof
of a defendant's prior like convictions is admissible during the
guilt phase of the trial because it is both a required predicate
for enhanced punishment and an element of the offense charged."
Id. at  290,  616 S.E.2d at  781.    The concurrence also opined that
the requirements of Code  §  19.2-297.1 were " 'facts,' " for
purposes of the United States Supreme Court decision in Apprendi
v. New Jersey,  530 U.S.  466,  491  (2000), which if proven, "may
'increase[] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum.' "    Id. at  293,  616 S.E.2d at  783.
5 Washington also assigned error to the holding of the Court
of Appeals that "the common law  [applies] to the determination
of  §  19.2-297.1 of the Code of Virginia."    We agree with
Washington that introduction of prior convictions under Code
§  19.2-297.1 is controlled by statute in this case and not the
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II.    ANALYSIS
Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law
and is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court.
Ainslie v. Inman,  265 Va.  347,  352,  577 S.E.2d  246,  248  (2003).
Under basic principles of statutory construction, we must
determine the General Assembly's intent from the words contained
in a statute. Commonwealth v. Diaz,  266 Va.  260,  264-65,  585
S.E.2d  552,  554  (2003).    This general rule applies except when
the language of the statute is ambiguous or would lead to an
absurd result.    Tiller v. Commonwealth,  193 Va.  418,  420,  69
S.E.2d  441,  442  (1952); Cummings v. Fulghum,  261 Va.  73,  77,  540
S.E.2d  494,  496  (2001).
When a given controversy involves a number of related
statutes, our rules of statutory construction direct that those
statutes be read and construed together in order to give full
meaning, force, and effect to each. Ainslie,  265 Va. at  353,  577
S.E.2d at  249  (citation omitted).    Moreover, appellate courts
read related statutes in pari materia in order to give, when
possible, consistent meaning to the language used by the General
common law.    Because recidivist statutes were unknown at common
law, Code  §  19.2-297.1 cannot be said to codify common law
principles.    "Habitual criminal proceedings providing for
enhanced or additional punishment on proof of one or more prior
convictions are wholly statutory[,]  .  .  . in derogation of the
common law  .  .  .                                                       ."    State v. Boles,  157 S.E.2d  554,  558  (W. Va.
1967).
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Assembly. Industrial Dev. Auth. v. Board of Supervisors,  263 Va.
349,  353,  559 S.E.2d  621,  623  (2002).
With these basic principles in mind, we review Washington's
assignments of error.
A.    CODE  §  19.2-297.1 AND THE BIFURCATED TRIAL STATUTE
Washington asks us to determine, as a question of first
impression, the relationship between Code  §  19.2-297.1 and
§  19.2-295.1 in the context of when the evidence of prior
criminal convictions is to be introduced at trial.    These
statutes were contained in the same bill enacted during the  1994
session of the General Assembly.    See  1994 Acts ch.  828  (S.B.
115).
Code  §  19.2-297.1, commonly denominated as the Three
Strikes Law, reads in pertinent part as follows:
A. Any person convicted of two or more separate acts
of violence when such offenses were not part of a
common act, transaction or scheme, and who has been at
liberty as defined in  §  53.1-151 between each
conviction, shall, upon conviction of a third or
subsequent act of violence, be sentenced to life
imprisonment and shall not have all or any portion of
the sentence suspended, provided it is admitted, or
found by the jury or judge before whom he is tried,
that he has been previously convicted of two or more
such acts of violence. For the purposes of this
section, "act of violence" means  (i) any one of the
following violations of Chapter  4  (§  18.2-30 et seq.)
of Title  18.2:
d. Any malicious felonious assault or malicious
bodily wounding under Article  4  (§  18.2-51 et seq.);
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e. Robbery under  §  18.2-58 and carjacking under
§  18.2-58.1;
B.  .  .                                                              .  . The Commonwealth shall notify the defendant
in writing, at least thirty days prior to trial, of
its intention to seek punishment pursuant to this
section.
The relevant portions of Code  §  19.2-295.1, the Bifurcated Trial
Statute, read as follows:
In cases of trial by jury, upon a finding that the
defendant is guilty of a felony  .  .  . a separate
proceeding limited to the ascertainment of punishment
shall be held as soon as practicable before the same
jury. At such proceeding, the Commonwealth shall
present the defendant's prior criminal convictions by
certified, attested or exemplified copies of the
record of conviction, including adult convictions and
juvenile convictions and adjudications of
delinquency.  .  .                                                    . After the Commonwealth has
introduced such evidence of prior convictions, or if
no such evidence is introduced, the defendant may
introduce relevant, admissible evidence related to
punishment. Nothing in this section shall prevent the
Commonwealth or the defendant from introducing
relevant, admissible evidence in rebuttal.
At the outset, we note that Washington raises no
Constitutional issue in his appeal.    See Medici v. Commonwealth,
260 Va.  223,  229,  532 S.E.2d  28,  32  (2000)  (finding that the
introduction of a defendant's prior crimes during the guilt
phase did not violate his due process rights).    Instead,
Washington contends that reconciliation of the two statutes
yields a rule that a recidivist defendant's prior convictions
for acts of violence for purposes of the Three Strikes Law may
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be introduced only in the punishment phase of a bifurcated
proceeding.    Washington contends the Three Strikes Law and the
Bifurcated Trial Statute must be so construed when read together
because the plain language of the Three Strikes Law places it
within the bifurcated trial paradigm.    Upon de novo review of
both statutes, we find that the plain language of the statutes
refutes Washington's argument.    Our earlier decisions construing
similar statutes support this conclusion.
The Three Strikes Law clearly states that before a
defendant may face enhanced punishment as a recidivist, the fact
finder must determine the fact of prior applicable convictions,
that the defendant was "at liberty" between the prior
convictions, and that the acts upon which prior convictions were
based were not part of "a common act, transaction or scheme."
Code  §  19.2-297.1, however, does not specifically state whether
these substantive determinations must be made at the guilt or
punishment stage of a bifurcated trial.
Washington argues that the phrase "upon conviction" in Code
§  19.2-297.1 places the recidivist determination in the
punishment phase of the trial.    We disagree.    The phrase "upon
conviction" appears in at least five other recidivist statutes.
See Code  §§  18.2-67.5:1,  -67.5:2,  -67.5:3,  -248, and  -270.
Neither this Court, nor the Court of Appeals, has found that
phrase to direct that the predicate prior convictions should be
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introduced only in the punishment phase.    See Medici,  260 Va. at
229,  532 S.E.2d at  32  (admission into evidence of a defendant's
prior rape convictions during the guilt/innocence phase of his
trial under Code  §  18.2-67.5:3 did not violate the defendant's
due process rights); Calfee v. Commonwealth,  215 Va.  253,  254-
55,  208 S.E.2d  740,  741-42  (1974)  (trial court did not err in
admitting prior conviction in guilt phase under a predecessor of
Code  §  18.2-270); Berry v. Commonwealth,  22 Va. App.  209,  213,
468 S.E.2d  685,  687  (1996)  (prior convictions admissible during
the guilt phase under Code  §  18.2-248 because they are an
element of the charge set forth in the indictment).
Nothing in the plain language of either statute compels the
result argued by Washington.    To the contrary, the Bifurcated
Trial Statute clearly restricts the evidence which may be
introduced by the Commonwealth at the punishment phase to "the
defendant's prior criminal convictions."    There is no authority
in Code  §  19.2-295.1 for the Commonwealth to present any other
evidence unless and until "the defendant may introduce relevant,
admissible evidence related to punishment."    In Washington's
case, for example, the Commonwealth could not present any
additional evidence beyond the fact of the prior convictions in
the punishment phase, including the requirements under Code
§  19.2-297.1 that the defendant was "at liberty" and that the
prior convictions were not a part of "a common act, transaction
11




or scheme" unless Washington chose to offer "relevant,
admissible evidence related to punishment."    Code  §  19.2-295.1.
Under Washington's reading of the statutes, no enhanced
punishment under Code  §  19.2-297.1 could ever be adjudicated
unless the defendant chose to put on evidence under Code  §  19.2-
295.1.
In Sheikh v. Buckingham Correctional Ctr.,  264 Va.  558,  570
S.E.2d  785  (2002), we discussed the statutory limitation on the
character of evidence that may be introduced in the punishment
phase of a bifurcated trial under Code  §  19.2-295.1.    In Sheikh,
the appellant claimed his trial counsel was ineffective because
he "fail[ed] to introduce any evidence concerning  [the
appellant's] character or the mitigating circumstances of the
crime, or to provide any argument supporting a lesser sentence
by the jury."    Id. at  564,  570 S.E.2d at  788.    We rejected the
appellant's argument, holding that counsel's decision not to
introduce evidence at the punishment proceeding was strategic.
Id. at  566,  570 S.E.2d at  789.    "Under Code  §  19.2-295.1  [and
Rule  3A:17.1(e)], counsel's decision not to present evidence
during the sentencing phase precluded the prosecutor from
introducing any evidence other than a record of Sheikh's prior
offenses."    Id.  (emphasis added).    Thus, we implicitly rejected
the argument that the Bifurcated Trial Statute permitted the
12




introduction of any evidence by the Commonwealth, other than the
prior convictions themselves, except in rebuttal.
Washington's reading of Code  §  19.2-297.1 to restrict the
prior convictions evidence to the trial's punishment phase does
not comport with the plain language of Code  §  19.2-295.1.    Under
well-settled principles of statutory construction, we may not
adopt an interpretation of one statute that conflicts with the
plain language of another.    See Phipps v. Liddle,  267 Va.  344,
346-47,  593 S.E.2d  193,  195  (2004); Lake Monticello Owners'
Assoc. v. Lake,  250 Va.  565,  570,  463 S.E.2d  652,  655  (1995);
Albemarle County v. Marshall,  215 Va.  756,  761,  214 S.E.2d  146,
150  (1975).
Washington admits that in order to find that the
requirements of Code  §  19.2-297.1 may be introduced only during
the punishment proceeding, those requirements must be read into
Code  §  19.2-295.1.    This we cannot do.    Courts cannot "add
language to the statute the General Assembly has not seen fit to
include." Holsapple v. Commonwealth,  266 Va.  593,  599,  587
S.E.2d  561,  564-65  (2003). "[N]or are they permitted to
accomplish the same result by judicial interpretation." Burlile
v. Commonwealth,  261 Va.  501,  511,  544 S.E.2d  360,  365  (2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, this Court has repeatedly held that the prior
convictions of a criminal defendant facing trial as a recidivist
13




may be introduced and proved at the guilt phase of the trial on
the principal offense.    In Brown v. Commonwealth,  226 Va.  56,
58-59,  307 S.E.2d  239,  240  (1983), we determined that a trial
court did not violate a defendant's due process rights when it
admitted evidence of her prior offenses, noting that the statute
under which she was convicted "explicitly requires that  [prior
convictions be] either admitted or proved  .  .  . in order for the
enhanced punishment provisions to become applicable."    See also
Griswold v. Commonwealth,  252 Va.  113,  116 & n.2,  472 S.E.2d
789,  790 & n.2  (1996)  (stating that "the prior offense must be
charged and proven"  (quoting Calfee,  215 Va. at  255,  208 S.E.2d
at  741)), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Shelton,  535
U.S.  654  (2002); Commonwealth v. Ellett,  174 Va.  403,  413,
4 S.E.2d  762,  766  (1939).    Thus, according to our clear
precedent construing similar recidivist statutes, proof of a
defendant's prior predicate convictions is admissible during the
guilt phase of the trial.    This reading comports with the plain
language of Code  §  19.2-295.1 and gives full meaning, force and
effect to both statutes.
Washington advances two additional observations, neither of
which supports the conclusion for which he contends.    He notes
that  (1) the two statutes were passed by the same session of the
legislature; and  (2) three strikes recidivism is purely a
punishment issue as that statute is contained in Chapter  18 of
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Title  19.2, which deals only with matters related to punishment
and is titled "Sentence; Judgment; Execution of Sentence."
As for the first argument, while it is true that "two
statutes  [which] are passed by the same session of the
legislature  [presumably] were intended to stand together,"
Lillard v. Fairfax Airport Authority,  208 Va.  8,  13,  155 S.E.2d
338,  342  (1967), we have never held that the language of one
must be read into the other.    Rather, the statutes should be
read "in pari materia  [and] should be construed together,"
giving effect to both.    Id.    See also City of Richmond v. Board
of Supervisors,  199 Va.  679,  685-86,  101 S.E.2d  641,  646  (1958).
Further, the placement of the Three Strikes Law in Title
19.2 is not dispositive.    See Brown,  226 Va. at  59,  307 S.E.2d
at  240  (upholding a trial court's decision to allow introduction
of prior offenses at trial on the principal offense even though
the statute establishing the principal offense and outlining the
use of prior offenses was listed in Title  19.2, rather than
18.2).    See also HCA Health Servs. of Va., Inc. v. Levin,  260
Va.  215,  220-21,  530 S.E.2d  417,  420  (2000)  (finding the trial
court erred in considering a statute's placement in the Code
when the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous).
The General Assembly has promulgated the statutes at issue
in this case which require that the Commonwealth prove, and a
fact finder determine, certain substantive facts before a
15




recidivist defendant may receive an enhanced sentence.    See Code
§  19.2-297.1.    The legislature has also limited the evidence
that may be introduced in the punishment phase of a bifurcated
trial.    See Code  §  19.2-295.1.    Thus, we find that the General
Assembly has provided that evidence of the defendant's prior
applicable convictions, and the related requirements such as
being "at liberty" may be presented at the guilt phase of a
bifurcated trial.
Contrary to Washington's contentions, we do not find this
legislatively established procedure to be exceptionally
prejudicial to the defendant.    Prior to deliberations and
consistent with our case law, the jury was instructed that
"[e]vidence that  [Washington] was previously convicted of prior
offenses should be considered  .  .  . only for proof of the
element of a prior conviction and not as proof that he committed
the offense to which he is charged."    We have held such an
instruction sufficient to vitiate any prejudice created by
introducing prior convictions in the trial of a subsequent
offense.    See Calfee,  215 Va. at  255,  208 S.E.2d at  742.
B.    REMAINING ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Washington also assigns error to the trial court's failure
to consider whether all three substantive requirements of Code
§  19.2-297.1 for enhanced punishment were sufficiently proven
during the guilt phase of the trial.    This issue is raised for
16




the first time on appeal and thus, we cannot consider it.    Rule
5:25.    Washington objected to the Commonwealth's instruction
that the jury must find the Commonwealth proved his prior
convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and offered an instruction
that did not include proof of the prior convictions as a
requirement of the offense charged.    However, once the trial
court adopted the Commonwealth's language on the elements of
malicious wounding, Washington did not move to include in the
instruction the other substantive findings required under the
Three Strikes Law that he was "at liberty" and that the prior
convictions were not part of "a common act, transaction or
scheme."    Washington never argued to the trial court, or sought
to alert it in any other way, that the other requirements of
Code  §  19.2-297.1 were not addressed.    Because he did not object
to the instruction of the jury or make any other argument to the
trial court on the issue he now raises as to findings required
by Code  §  19.2-297.1, we cannot consider Washington's assignment
of error on this issue.    See City of Richmond v. Holt,  264 Va.
101,  108 n.*,  563 S.E.2d  690,  694 n.*  (2002).6
III. CONCLUSION
6 Washington raises no claim under Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S.  466  (2000), that the enhancement requirements of Code
§  19.2-297.1 were not proven according to the required standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.    Neither does he raise any
argument that proof at the guilt stage of a trial, instead of
17




For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment
of the Court of Appeals.
Affirmed.
the punishment phase, in any way implicates the Apprendi line of
cases.
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